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A TURNING POINT IN THE HISTORY OF OTTOMAN ARCHITECTURE: FOSSATI BROTHERS

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Abstract: *The Ottoman architectural change, which occurred between the Tulip Era and the Tanzimat period (1718–1839) and was shaped by both conventional and novel styles attempting to follow Western influence, reflects the country's shifting political and cultural landscape. The change in the Ottomans' perception of social and intellectual taste caused the architectural understanding to move away from the classical building styles. Although the Ottomans tried to train their own architects to implement the new building styles, attempts to meet the current need were made by foreign architects who received architectural education in Europe. The main figures of the new process, in which other foreign architects also took part, are the Fossati brothers. For the first time in the Ottoman Empire, after the Tanzimat, a team of foreign architects had the opportunity to undertake uninterrupted and successful works, leading to the subsequent employment of other foreign architects. This tradition, which started with the Fossati brothers in the Ottoman Empire, continued for about a century until the 1930s. In the study, an explanation of both the contributions of the Fossati brothers to the history of Ottoman architecture and the reason why they were the first representatives of a new era is proposed. In this regard, the history of the Ottoman architecture, deviating from the classical understanding and turning to a Western style, will be briefly mentioned. In addition, the buildings they constructed in Istanbul will be surveyed and their contribution to the architectural face of the city will be expressed.*

Keywords: *Ottoman Architecture, History of Science, Fossati brothers, Western style, Tanzimat Era.*

Rezumat: *Un punct de cotitură în istoria arhitecturii otomane: frații Fossati*

Transformarea arhitecturală, realizată în perioada dintre Epoca Lalelelor și perioada Tanzimatului (1718-1839), modelată atât de stilurile tradiționale cât și de noile stiluri apărute sub influența Occidentului, simbolizează o schimbare a peisajului politic și cultural al țării. Schimbarea percepției otomanilor asupra „gustului” social și intelectual a făcut ca arhitectura țării să se îndepărteze de stilurile arhitecturale clasice, consacrate. Deși a existat un efort de formare a propriilor arhitecți pentru implementarea noilor stiluri arhitecturale ale Imperiului Otoman, nevoile curente presante au făcut necesară aducerea de arhitecți străini, cu educație de specialitate obținută în Europa. Personajele principale ale noului proces, la care au participat și alți arhitecți străini, sunt frații Fossati. Pentru prima dată în Imperiul Otoman, după Tanzimat, o echipă de arhitecți străini a avut ocazia să întreprindă lucrări neîntrerupte și de succes, fapt ce a condus la angajarea ulterioară a altor arhitecți străini. Această tradiție, care a început cu frații Fossati, a continuat aproximativ un secol în Imperiul Otoman, până în anii '30 ai secolului trecut. Studiul evidențiază contribuțiile fraților Fossati la istoria arhitecturii otomane și rațiunea pentru care aceștia sunt considerați primii reprezentanți ai noii ere arhitecturale. Pentru o abordare cronologică a situației, va fi rezumată succint istoria aceluia capitol al arhitecturii otomane care, înaintea fraților Fossati, se abătuse deja de la canoanele sale clasice și se îndreptase către stilurile occidentale. În studiu vor fi incluse clădirile pe care frații Fossati le-au proiectat în Istanbul și, totodată, va fi cuantificată contribuția lor la creionarea siluetei arhitectonice a acestui oraș.

INTRODUCTION

From the Tulip Era to the Tanzimat period (1718–1839), the transformation in Ottoman architecture, created by traditional architecture, as well as new styles following Western influence, is a manifestation of the changing political and cultural life. With the proclamation of the Tanzimat, the perception of the West as a role model gained momentum. Although there was an effort to train local architects to implement the new building styles of the Ottoman Empire, attempts to meet the current need were made by foreign architects, who received architectural education in Europe. The main figures of this movement, in which other foreign architects also took part, are the Fossati brothers. For the first time in the Ottoman Empire, after the Tanzimat, a team of foreign architects had the opportunity to undertake uninterrupted and successful works, leading to the subsequent employment of other foreign architects. This tradition, which started with the Fossati brothers in the Ottoman Empire, continued for about a century until the 1930s. The Fossati brothers formed the first stage of an important period in the history of Ottoman architecture by virtue of the building techniques they used and the new functional structures they built in neo-classical and neo-

Ottoman styles. It is known that there were many foreign architects in the Ottoman Empire and these architects had taken part in projects individually before them. Moreover, neo-classical works had been built on these lands long before the Fossati brothers. In order to answer the question of what makes them different from other foreign architects, it is firstly necessary to approach the developments experienced in Ottoman architecture in the 18th and 19th centuries and the foreign architects who worked here.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF 19TH CENTURY TO OTTOMAN ARCHITECTURE

Until the first half of the 19th century, the institution responsible for the execution of all kinds of buildings, construction, and repair works within the borders of the Ottoman Empire was the Hassa Architects' Association. It is estimated that Hassa Architects' Association was established after the conquest of Istanbul. This organization, the long-time chief architect of which was Architect Sinan (1490–1588), was the official centre of the architectural activities of the Ottoman Empire. This situation is shown as the most important reason why architecture was far from an autonomous and civil structure in the Ottoman Empire.¹ In Hassa Architects' Association, where the Ottoman architectural tradition is passed down from generation to generation and applied training is given in a master-apprentice relationship, basic geometry and mechanics were taught in the training of architects. The best-known example in this regard is the geometry lessons that Sedefkar Mehmed Ağa (d. 1617) took from Architect Sinan in person.²

The fact that geometry is at the centre of the relationship between theoretical and applied knowledge in architecture gives the latter a scientifically valuable position. It is not a coincidence that, in the Ottoman Empire, mathematics, especially geometry, was encountered more in the education of architects, the secretaries involved in constructions activities, and occupational groups that needed knowledge of geometry in practice, such as the army's

¹ Göksun Akyürek, *Tanzimat Döneminde Mimarlığın Değişen Bilgisi: Fenn-i Mimari, Gazeteler ve Diğerleri* [Changing Knowledge of Architecture in the Tanzimat Era: Fenn-i Mimari, Newspapers and Others], in "Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi", Vol. 2009, No. 13, p. 97.

² Ali Naci Özyalvaç, *El-Kâşî'nin "Miftâh El-Hisâb" Adlı Eseri ve 16. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Yapılarında Kemer Biçimlenişleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme* ["A Study on El-Kâşî's "Miftâh El-Hisâb" and Arch Formation in 16th Century Ottoman Buildings, in *II. Türkiye Lisansüstü Çalışmaları Kongresi - Bildiriler Kitabı V*, 2013, p. 1223.

fortifications and sewers, rather than madrasas.³ Therefore, the history of architecture should not be ignored in Ottoman mathematics history research.

Moreover, Hassa Architects' Association is a large and official institution, at the head of which a chief architect executes his duty in a structure that is organized for him. As stated above, thanks to this organization, the construction activities that took place in all regions of the Ottoman Empire were carried out through a single centre. This practice was employed especially in the construction of public institutions, through the Academies, which were managed by the ruling class in the Renaissance and later in Europe, as well.⁴ Whoever was the chief architect of the Hassa Architects' Association in the formation of the Ottoman classical architectural understanding was the one to leave his mark on that period. Although the local features are felt from time to time in different regions of the state, the general practice was carried out in the form of imitation and reproduction of the works of the chief architect. While architects and masters in the Ottoman Empire probably did not even include their names in the works they made because of their humility, original architectural works in Europe were the way the architects made themselves visible. As it can be understood from the statements of foreigners who came to the Ottoman Empire, the role of Turkish architects in construction activities gradually decreased in the 18th century and more non-Muslims came to the fore. For example, the architect of Nuru Osmaniye Mosque was Master Simeon. Likewise, it is seen that Master Blind Yani worked in the construction of Fatih Mosque (1767–1771) and Master Kirkor worked in the construction of Nusretiye Mosque.⁵ However, the supervision and construction permit of the buildings belonged to Muslim architects with the title Hassa.

These years coincide with the period when military engineering offices were opened to train engineers who took part in providing the necessary mechanical knowledge in the military field. Engineering teachers were aware that the architectural knowledge used in the military field, which is one of the application areas of mathematics, changed in the 19th century. In order to close this gap for the students who would be the architects of the future, it was decided

³ Osman Nuri Ergin, *Türk Maarif Tarihi* [Turkish Education History], Vol. 1-2, İstanbul, Kültür Yayınları, 1977, p. 153.

⁴ Uğur Tuztaş, İlgi Yüce Aşkun, *Klasik Dönemden Batılılaşmaya Osmanlı Mimarlığında İdealleştirme Olgusu ve Batı Mimarlığıyla Olan Mukayesesi* [The Concept of Idealization in Ottoman Architecture from Classical Period to Westernization and Its Comparison with Western Architecture], in "Osmanlı Araştırmaları", Vol. 38, 2011, p. 216.

⁵ Cengiz Can, *İstanbul'da 19. Yüzyıl Batılı ve Levanten Mimarların Yapıları ve Koruma Sorunları* [Buildings and Conservation Problems of 19th Century Western and Levantine Architects in İstanbul], PhD Thesis, Yıldız Technical University, 1993, p. 52.

that the architects affiliated with this organization should take courses in Hendesehâne “theoretically” since 1801, although the Hassa Architects’ Association was not closed yet.⁶ This attempt ended in failure as the architects in question did not favour the theoretical courses. It is clear that Ottoman architects needed a new structuring and systematic education in this process, where it was understood that they did not have the knowledge of the age. In addition to the military and political fields, where the feeling of inadequacy began to dominate in the Ottoman Empire, the same understanding began to show its effect in architecture. It is natural that the West, which is in demand as a source of accurate and reliable information, should also be seen as a source of architectural knowledge. The transfer of knowledge from the West, which the Ottomans tried to implement in the field of science and technology, was carried out by bringing foreign experts to the Ottoman Empire to give lectures and sending students to Europe. In this process, the practical and theoretical knowledge of the past was neglected. Instead, it was tried to obtain information from textbooks written in a foreign language, but full adaptation could not be achieved by this method. Unfortunately, the transfer of knowledge and technology could not be achieved at the desired level in many areas. However, it can be said that partial success was achieved in the history of Ottoman architecture.

The social change experienced in the Ottoman Empire also led to differentiation in places. As mentioned above, the observations, criticisms, and suggestions of the ambassadors and state officials sent to Europe for the first time in the 18th century had an impact on Ottoman architecture in the later periods. These people, particularly bureaucrats working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed their opinions in the travelogue and embassy texts, as well as in the letters they wrote. The common opinion expressed by this aforementioned community is, astonishingly, their admiration for European cities, what they think is behind these cities, higher and transcendent knowledge. Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839), the traditional state model of the Ottoman Empire, which took its source from the Islamic culture, was abandoned and a new state organization was started. Among the changes made both in the army and in other fields, there was also the abolition of the Hassa Architects’ Association in 1831. With the closure of Hassa Architects’ Association, it can be said that the break with the classical Islamic architectural tradition became official. Ebniye-i Hassa Manager was established instead of the Hassa Architects’ Association and the last chief

⁶ Göksun Akyürek, *Tanzimat Döneminde Mimarlığın Değişen Bilgisi ...*, p. 100.

architect, Abdülhâlim Efendi, was appointed as the head of this new institution.⁷ An architect in the Ottoman Empire was responsible for many things, from the design to the building materials during the construction process. Not only the one who decided on the location of a building in the city but also the one who repaired the sidewalks was called an architect. The most notable distinction of the new period in terms of architectural history is the emergence of the idea that the class of architects and that of engineers should no longer be separated from each other. With the closure of the Hassa Architects' Association, it is seen that the centralist and statist structure of the Ottoman architectural system was abandoned, and a mixed system was formed, in which both the civil and the state existed together. This situation is the manifestation of the changes the 19th century, when specialization inevitably emerged because of the increasing knowledge in science and technology, brought about in the field of architecture in the Ottoman Empire.

The most influential factor in the formation of the Ottoman architectural understanding during the Tanzimat period is the thought of Ottomanism. The reforms effected by the Tanzimat especially concerned the acquisition of new legal rights by non-Muslim subjects. While Ottomanism had been the expression of the dominance of Muslims before the Tanzimat, it was then reinterpreted and turned into a new understanding based on the concept of international equality.⁸ Especially for Turkish Muslim citizens, activities that municipalities are currently responsible for, such as roads, water channels, and large structures providing common benefits, were carried out by foundations or individuals at the time. The 19th century is the century of a dualist form in which the old and the new sometimes come together in a reconciliatory approach. Alternatively, we can say that zoning activities were left to the individuals in the pre-Tanzimat period instead of being carried out by the state itself.⁹ Therefore, considering the increasing population of the cities, it could be understood that they had serious deficiencies in planning. It was obvious that zoning in the Ottoman Empire needed new regulations in terms of law and institutions like a municipal organization in terms of implementation. Among the first attempts to overcome these deficiencies were the planning and mapping studies of Helmuth Von Moltke (1800–1891) and Von Vincke, who were German-army officers assigned to the Ottoman Empire. The

⁷ Şerafeddin Turan, *Osmanlı Teşkilâtında Hassa Mimarları* [Hassa Architects in the Ottoman Organization], in "Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi", Vol. 1, 1963, No. 1, p. 178.

⁸ Cengiz Can, *İstanbul'da 19. Yüzyıl Batılı ve Levanten ...*, p. 52.

⁹ Osman Nuri Ergin, *Şehirciliğin Tarihi İnkişâfı* [Historical Development of Urbanism], İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi İktisat ve İçtimaiyat Enstitüsü Neşriyatı, 1936, p. 5-8.

plan prepared by Von Moltke in 1836 was designed to be implemented in Istanbul and formed the basis of the Tanzimat Edict dated 25 June 1839.¹⁰ With the proclamation of the Tanzimat Edict in 1839 and the Islahat Edict in 1856, the sociocultural framework of the concept of neighbourhood, which was the daily lifestyle of the Ottoman society, was destroyed. It is seen that the traditional elements of the neighbourhoods are replaced by a polycentric urban life.¹¹ In this period, when new building types emerged in Ottoman cultural life, architectural structures also changed as a reflection of thought and culture. By making a transition from wood to masonry in construction techniques, new styles were included in newly constructed buildings as the symbol of Tanzimat thought. The style applied in the Tanzimat period is the neo-classical style that had been used in the Ottoman Empire since 1740 and was also popular in Europe at the time.¹²

Non-Muslims, who mainly carried out commercial activities in the Ottoman Empire, became even richer with the commercial rights granted by the Islahat Edict, and a new bourgeois class emerged. The enrichment of this class, who resided especially in Beyoğlu and Galata districts, enabled the region to become a lively centre with new buildings, such as business centre, arcade, bank, hotel, theatre, and cabaret. Although the construction of mosques, inns, baths, and fountains, which feature in the classical architectural program of Istanbul, continues, the construction of buildings with new functions has come to the fore.

FOREIGN ARCHITECTS IN THE 19th CENTURY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

During the Tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire, it is seen that large-scale construction projects were given to the people who received a Western-style architectural education. While it was striking that the architects in question were foreigners or Levantines at first, it is understood that non-Muslim architects who were Ottoman subjects and received their architectural education in Europe, were

¹⁰ Koray Özcan, *Tanzimat'ın Reformları: Türk İmar Sisteminin Kuruluş Sürecinde Erken Planlama Deneyimleri (1839-1908)* [Reforms of the Tanzimat: Early Planning Experiences in the Establishment of the Turkish Zoning System (1839-1908)], in "Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları", Vol. 7, 2006, No. 2, p. 156-157.

¹¹ Kıymet Giray, *Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Döneminin Dinamikleri* [Dynamics of the Westernization Period in the Ottoman Empire], in *Arkeoloji ve Sanat Tarihi Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Döneminin Dinamikleri Tarihsel Çerçeve. Toplum ve Kültür*, Ankara, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2009, p. 1.

¹² Alidost Ertuğrul, *XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı'da Ortaya Çıkan Farklı Yapı Tipleri* [Different Building Types Emerging in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century], in "Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi", Vol. 7, 2009, No. 13, p. 297.

also included in this group in the following periods. In Istanbul, where embassies of many countries were opened in this period, it is seen that the Ottomans' cultural, artistic, and architectural contact with foreigners increased. Many architects, especially from countries such as France and Germany, were given the opportunity to work on the construction of new buildings and the restoration of old buildings by the state. Alternatively, there are Turkish students who were sent from the Ottoman Empire to countries such as France and Germany to receive architectural education. Our architects, such as Hayrettin, Vedat and Kemâleddin Bey, who grew up in this way, applied the new building styles in the Ottoman Empire as the architects who received Western education. It can be said that especially Hayrettin Bey applied the architectural style called neo-Ottoman through the public buildings he erected for Ottoman architecture.¹³

Mustafa Reşit Pasha (1800–1858), who served as the London ambassador, had a great impact on the history of Ottoman architecture in this period, when the buildings constructed by foreign architects who had grown up in Europe were visible. In the letter he wrote to Sultan Mahmut II in 1836, he mentions that masonry structures made of stone and brick in Europe took the place of the wooden structures in Istanbul, which suffered a lot due to the fires. He emphasized that, as a solution, new neighbourhoods to be established in Istanbul should be planned and built with masonry structures instead of wood. He also suggested the use of European architects and builders in the design and implementation of buildings to be erected with new construction materials.¹⁴ Again, in his letter of 1836, the German Marshal von Moltke, mentioned above, supported Reşit Pasha, and explained how the building materials and neighbourhood plans of the houses in Istanbul enabled the spread of fires.¹⁵ These developments herald the coming of a new era in Ottoman architecture in line with the Tanzimat thought through foreign architects. The decision to westernize the capital of the Ottoman Empire with the rescript of Hümâyûn of the Gülhane, which was announced in 1839, also paved the way for foreign architects officially. The Fossati brothers, who are also at the centre of our work, came to the Ottoman Empire in such an environment and started to carry out their architectural activities. After the brief overview of the developments in the Ottoman

¹³ John Freely, *A History of Ottoman Architecture*, Boston, Wit Press., 2011, p. 393.

¹⁴ Salih Salbacak, 19. Yüzyılda Pera Bölgesinin Mimari Gelişimi ve Alman Sarayı [Architectural Development of the Pera Region and the German Palace in the 19th Century], in "İJSHS", Vol. 1, 2017, No. 1, p. 114.

¹⁵ Helmuth von Moltke, *Moltke'nin Türk Mektupları* [Moltke's Turkish Letters], İstanbul, Yükselen Matbaası, 1969, p. 77-79.

architectural history in the 18th and 19th centuries, we can move on to Fossati brothers' life stories and contributions to the Ottoman architectural history to better understand their significant role in Ottoman architectural history.

THE FOSSATI BROTHERS' LIFE AND THE STORIES OF THEIR ARRIVAL TO ISTANBUL

Gaspare Trajano Fossati, Giuseppe Fossati, and their third sibling, engineer Virgilio Fossati, less involved than the other two, are the Architect brothers, members of the Fossati family, who carried out the most important construction activities of the 19th century in Istanbul and changed the face of the capital. The Fossatis belong to a family who has produced numerous painters and architects over the course of nearly five centuries. Their grandfather Carlo Giuseppe (1737–1805) and their uncle Pier Angelo Aloiso (1762–1827) are among these architects.¹⁶ It is seen that Gaspare Fossati took part in more than fifty major projects in the twenty-one years (1837–1858) he spent in Istanbul as the head of a team including his brother Giuseppe. The Fossati brothers caused a significant change in the general appearance of Istanbul by the works they created. For the first time in the Ottoman Empire, after the Tanzimat, a team of foreign architects had the opportunity to undertake such uninterrupted and successful works, leading to the subsequent employment of other foreign architects.¹⁷ The tradition of employing educated foreign architects, which started with the Fossati brothers in the Ottoman Empire, continued for about a century until the 1930s.

Gaspare Trajano Fossati was born on October 7, 1809, in Morcote, a town in Ticino, Switzerland. He left Morcote, a region heavily populated by Italians, in 1822 to study architecture at Milan's Brera Academy (Accademia di Belle Arti di Brera). During the years when Fossati was being educated, the influence of the neo-classical movement was dominant in the academy.¹⁸ After studying at the academy until 1827, he had the opportunity to examine historical buildings in Venice and Rome for 3 years. In 1830, he participated in the Capua and Pesto excavations with Bianchi. He also took part in the Ercolano and Pompeii excavations.¹⁹ The experience gained by Gaspare Fossati during these archaeological excavations enriched his future works.

¹⁶ Semavi Eyice, *Giuseppe Fossati*, in *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 2, No. 161, 1971, p. 5823.

¹⁷ Cengiz Can, *İstanbul'da 19. Yüzyıl Batılı ve Levanten ...*, p. 168.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

Afterwards, he went to Russia, where the neo-Renaissance style was famous, thinking that it would be a good opportunity to improve himself. His uncle, Giugliemo Fossati (1770–1843), who worked there, had a great influence on this decision. While he was teaching at the Academy of Fine Arts in St. Petersburg, he was also involved in the construction of palaces, churches, and houses, obtaining the title of palace architect.²⁰ During this period, Gaspare, who was understood to have a good reputation in Russia, was also experiencing good developments in his private life. In 1837, he married the granddaughter of another famous architect, Luigi Rusca, who worked in Russia. He applied the Russian Imperial style in the churches and residences he built in the four years he spent in Russia. The Russian experience, which was a successful period in Gaspare's life, ended with his acceptance of the Russian embassy building project to be constructed in Istanbul, which he presented to the Tsar.²¹ In line with this decision, Gaspare Fossati came to Istanbul on 20 May 1837 by way of Odessa and the Black Sea.²² Before the construction works of the embassy building was scheduled to start in the summer of 1838, Fossati delivered the church projects he prepared for his clients in Odessa, St. Petersburg, and Italy.

For the construction of the Russian embassy building, Gaspare Fossati asked for help from his brother Giuseppe, who was also an architect like himself. Born on July 5, 1822, in Morcote, Giuseppe was thirteen years younger than his brother. Before coming to Istanbul, Giuseppe studied architecture for two years in Milan, like his older brother.²³ Together with his older brother, Giuseppe, who came to Istanbul in 1839, had the opportunity to work in the construction of many important projects in Istanbul for about twenty years. He married Alessandrina Stiepevich in 1854 and two of his five children were born in Istanbul.²⁴ Giuseppe took part in various architectural projects in Istanbul, where he came to assist in the construction of the Russian embassy building. The most well-known among them are that he managed the construction of the Saint Esprit Church, took part in the repair of Hagia Sophia, and designed housing projects to be built in Beyoğlu and the Bosphorus 1848–59. In addition, he built the Spanish embassy building in 1854, a mansion for Samos Bey Vogorides in 1855 and Ömer Pasha in 1856.²⁵ It

²⁰ Semavi Eyice, *Gaspare Fossati Trajano*, in *İslam Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, Vol. 13, p. 170.

²¹ Cengiz Can, *İstanbul'da 19. Yüzyıl Batılı ve Levanten ...*, p. 99-101.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

²³ Nilay Özlü, *Fossati Biraderler* [Fossati Brothers], in *Türk Mimarisinde İz Bırakanlar*, Ankara, Afşar Matbaacılık, 2015, p. 62.

²⁴ Cengiz Can, *İstanbul'da 19. Yüzyıl Batılı ve Levanten ...*, p. 177.

²⁵ Semavi Eyice, *Giuseppe Fossati*, p. 5823.

can be said that Giuseppe remained in the shadow of his brother in the architectural profession and was not very successful because Gaspare Fossati took a much more active role in almost all the significant projects we have mentioned above.

The younger brother of the Fossatis, Virgilio, who was born in 1830, worked for a short time with his older brothers in Istanbul, and then took part in the construction of railways in his home country between 1861 and 1873.²⁶ Virgilio has contributed to a railway project planned to be built between Pangaltı and Büyükdere by the Fossatis for the Ottoman Empire in 1856.²⁷

The Gaspare and Giuseppe brothers undersigned major projects as licensed architects in Istanbul until the death of their benefactor, Reşit Pasha, in 1858. They also built a tomb for Reşit Pasha in Beyazıt.²⁸ After the death of Mustafa Reşit Pasha, who was their biggest supporter in the Ottoman court, the Fossati brothers returned to their country inasmuch as the great projects were not given to them. In 1862 Gaspare Fossati moved to Milan. After the seaside palace of Sultan Abdulaziz burned down in 1863, he was offered a new palace project, but he did not give a positive response. The Fossati brothers acquired Italian citizenship in 1869. Gaspare Fossati died at his home in Morcote in 1883.²⁹ Giuseppe, who attempted to prepare a book consisting of the pictures he had drawn about Istanbul, could not fulfil his wish. In 1890, Giuseppe succeeded in publishing a catalogue of the projects he and his older brother realized in Turin, entitled "Rilievi Storico-artistici sull' Architettura Bizantina, Milan 1890".³⁰ He died on March 1, 1891, shortly after this event.

GREAT PROJECTS CARRIED OUT BY FOSSATIS IN ISTANBUL

In this period, when new building types began to appear in the Ottoman cultural life, architectural structures changed as a reflection of thought and culture. Classical Ottoman structures such as mosques, fountains, and baths were influenced by the Western architectural understanding. In addition to this, new structures built in line with the needs of the period such as hotels, theatres,

²⁶ Cengiz Can, *İstanbul'da 19. Yüzyıl Batılı ve Levanten ...*, p. 180.

²⁷ Nurcan Yazıcı, *Osmanlılarda Mimarlık Kurumunun Evrimi ve Tanzimat Dönemi Mimarlık Ortamı* [The Evolution of the Architectural Institution in the Ottomans and the Architectural Environment of the Tanzimat Period], PhD Thesis, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, 2007, p. 216.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

²⁹ Semavi Eyice, *Gaspare Fossati Trajano*, p. 172.

³⁰ Nurcan Yazıcı, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

embassy buildings, post offices, and train stations emerged. Non-Muslims, who mainly carried out commercial activities in the Ottoman Empire, became even richer owing to the commercial rights granted by the Islahat Edict, and a new bourgeois class emerged. The enrichment of this class, especially residing in Beyoğlu and Galata districts, enabled the region to become a lively centre with new buildings such as business centre, arcade, bank, hotel, theatre, and cabaret. Although the construction of mosques, inns, baths, and fountains, which feature in the classical architectural program of Istanbul, continued, the construction of buildings with new functions began to be given more importance.

Six categories can be used to group together the enormous buildings constructed by the Fossati brothers, who are among the most significant architects in Istanbul's evolving architectural landscape.

1. Official state buildings. These are intended by the state for their existing institutions for the needs of reform or newly opened institutions.

2. Private residences. These are built in line with the luxury housing demands of the emerging elite.

3. Military structures and structures built for the benefit of the public. Military structures are planned in line with the needs of the army. Additionally, buildings meant for the benefit of the public comprise schools and hospitals.

4. Religious buildings and restorations of existing buildings. These are places of worship, including very old and large buildings such as Hagia Sophia Mosque.

5. Embassy Buildings: Russian Embassy Building (1838–1845), restoration of Palazzo Venezia (1853), Dutch Embassy Building (1854), Spanish Embassy Building (1854), Iranian Palace-Embassy Building (1856), Casa D'Italia, Project to expand Palazzo Venezia (1869).

6. Other Structures: Palace Theater (1846), Naum Theater (1846), Theater Project, Hunkar Assembly, Kasr-ı Humayun, Hunkar Entrance (1847–1849), Hagia Sophia Timetable (1847–1849), restoration of Aynalıkavak Pavilion, Sultan's Cascade Rococo Pavilion in Kagithane, Resit Pasha Tomb (1858), Sultan Ahmet arrangement-protection plan (1848), Caffè Oriente (1850), Bursa Public City Baths Project (1850), Maritime Agency (1855), Pera-Buyukdere Railway Project (1855), Tanzimat Monument, Sarayburnu monumental pier project, Drawing of archaeological artifacts excavated in Troy and Bursa.³¹

Through the medium of their buildings, the Fossaties ensured the spread of the neo-classical style in Ottoman architecture. Furthermore, according to the intended use of the building, they applied the native and Western forms sometimes

³¹ Cengiz Can, *İstanbul'da 19. Yüzyıl Batılı ve Levanten ...*, p. 112-114.

together and sometimes separately. They reflected Italian style in Naum and Palace theatres; Western style in foreign embassy buildings; traditional Ottoman style when they were trying domes in the construction of Seraskerlik Hospital, and they reflected the Byzantine architecture in the mahfili they added to the Byzantine Monument they restored. Some of the monuments mentioned above are:

5.1. Russian Embassy Building Project

Beyoğlu district, like other districts of Istanbul, has seen big fires with the disadvantage of wooden architecture. It is a large wooden structure rising in the area between the Russian embassy building, Galata Mevlevihanesi and the Swedish embassy next to it and Galata Palace in the early 19th century. The embassy building became unusable, possibly as a result of the fire that took place in Beyoğlu on 3 August 1831. The embassy building project, which was started in 1838, targeted the representation of the power and prestige of the Russians in Istanbul. The construction of the Russian embassy in a neo-Renaissance style, which lasted from 1838 to 1845, is such an ostentatious and magnificent building that it was seen as a part of the future plans of the Russian Tsardom concerning the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, among the foreigners residing in Beyoğlu, rumours even spread that it was built as a palace for the Russian Tsar to stay when he defeated the Ottomans and captured the shores of the Bosphorus.³²




Fig. No. 1 and 2, *Russian Embassy Building* ³³

One of the orders taken by the Fossati brothers in Istanbul during the construction of the Russian embassy building was the reconstruction of the San Pietro Church between 1841 and 1843. The admiration of the Russian embassy led the Fossati brothers to have their signatures in the construction of many buildings that would change the face of Istanbul.

³² Semavi Eyice, *Gaspore Fossati Trajano*, p. 171.

³³ Isabella Palumbo, 19. Yüzyıl Türkiye'sinden bir Kozmopolit Gaspore Fossati, *İki Dünya Arasında bir "Kılavuz" (1837-1858)* [Gaspore Fossati, a Cosmopolitan in 19th Century Turkey, A "Guideline" Between Two Worlds (1837-1858)], in "Harp ve Sulh Avrupa ve Osmanlılar" [War and Peace Europe and the Ottomans], <https://books.openedition.org/ifeagd/1658>, p. 337.

After the completion of the Russian embassy in 1845, Gaspare Fossati intended to return to his hometown. It is stated in the archive document dated January 6, 1846, that he had a desire to be awarded an order, showing that he was working for the Ottoman State before he left.³⁴ As the Russian ambassador Tellinof and Mustafa Reşid Pasha became intermediaries, Gaspare succeeded in getting an order from the Sultan. Then, the construction of the Darulfunun Building, which will be a monument in the sense of the change of civilian knowledge, apart from the transformation of military knowledge, in which the Tanzimat thought was made visible, was also given to the Fossati brothers.³⁵ This project, which Mustafa Reşit Pasha was the father of, started to be implemented in 1846, and the construction of the project continued until 1863.

5.2. Archive Building

In a will dated 8 November 1846, Gaspare Fossati was given the task of constructing an Archive building in the vicinity of Bâb-ı Âlî in order to preserve the official state archive. As stated in the archive document, the Ottoman Empire needed a large archive building for the preservation of important documents belonging to the state.³⁶ It was desired that the building, which was thought to be in the form of a regular library, be built in the new architectural style (*tarz-ı cedid*) from the newly invented brick (*nev-icâd*) by Architect Fossati (Gaspare), who was also the architect of the Darulfunun building. The Archive building, which was planned to be built of masonry, would thus be protected from the damp and it would be easier to search and find the desired documents. Gaspare Fossati, who had prepared an archive building project as his graduation thesis in 1827, was able to accomplish his project of the Archive Building, which became one of the important examples of the neo-Renaissance style in Istanbul.

5.3. Hagia Sophia Restoration

The Fossati brothers rose to a very prestigious position among Ottoman architects owing to the buildings they built in Istanbul. Thanks to such a reputation, they had the opportunity to renovate Hagia Sophia. Everyone knows how important Hagia Sophia is. While Hagia Sophia was the largest church of Byzantium, it became the Grand Mosque of the Ottoman Empire after the conquest of Istanbul. Many foreign travellers and ambassadors who visited Istanbul

³⁴ BOA. İ.HR. [Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi İrade Hariciyye / Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive Order Foreign Affairs], 33/1481

³⁵ BOA HR.TO. [Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Hariciye Nezareti / Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives Foreign Ministry Translation Chamber Documents], 407/9.

³⁶ BOA. İ.MSM. [Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi İrade Mesail-i Mühimme / Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive Important Order Documents], 25/658.

mentioned the architecturally magnificent Hagia Sophia in their memoirs with praise and admiration. One of them is the ambassador Busbecq, who came to Istanbul in 1554 to represent Hungary. Busbecq expresses his ideas about Hagia Sophia as follows: "Hagia Sophia is a fascinating building, which is worth seeing. The building, which has a high dome in the middle, receives light only from a gap at the top. Almost all Turkish mosques were built according to the model of Hagia Sophia. It is said that Hagia Sophia used to be larger, and the additional buildings were spread over a large area. But they no longer exist, only the central dome of the church is present."³⁷

Plan, mass, and plastic elements applied in Byzantine architectural structures have a standard style. Hagia Sophia, on the other hand, is a structure that is tried for the first time outside of the classical Byzantine architectural style.³⁸ It is the place where people came together and where the most important official and religious ceremonies of the state were held during the Byzantine period. It was in the centre of life; therefore, it received the most significant damage from riots, fires, and earthquakes. For this reason, it has only managed to survive by the repairs and reinforcements it has undergone over time. Hagia Sophia, the architectural structure of which was tried for the first time and the dome of which was the source of pride for the Byzantines, also had an impact on Ottoman architecture. Many additions were made by the Ottomans to the structure, which continued to be an important centre where feast prayers were held together with state officials and mass ceremonies were held in the Ottoman Empire. These include maintenance-repair and the construction of new additions by Mimar Sinan.

At that time, surpassing the size of Hagia Sophia turned into a race among Ottoman architects. The culmination of these efforts is represented by the Selimiye Mosque, erected by Mimar Sinan for Selim II (1566–74). With the completion of Selimiye in 1571, its rivalry with Hagia Sophia began. Mimar Sinan was also involved in the discussion, stating that the Selimiye Mosque in *Tezkiret'ül Bünyan* had a dome that exceeded that of Hagia Sophia.³⁹ The need for maintenance and repair of the Hagia Sophia Mosque, which was captured with the conquest of Istanbul, was meticulously fulfilled by the Ottoman Empire. Until the 19th century, Hagia Sophia underwent many repairs. By 1846, a problematic situation that required major repairs such as the cracks in the dome of Hagia

³⁷ Busbecq, *Türk Mektupları*, p.39.

³⁸ Selçuk Mülayim, *Sinan ve Çağı* [Sinan and His Age], İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1989, p. 71.

³⁹ Selen B. Morkoç, *A Study of Ottoman Narratives on Architecture: Text, Context and Hermeneutics*, Bethesda, Dublin and Palo Alto, Academia Press, 2010, p. 280.

Sophia and the bending of the columns emerged. Therefore, the renovation works of Hagia Sophia Mosque were started by the Sultan. In 1846, it was decided to repair and renovate Hagia Sophia. In April 1847, the scope of the project was expanded and, with the approval of Sultan Abdülmecid (1839–61), the project was given to the Fossati brothers. This is an indication that the Fossatis had gained the Sultan's trust. It is expected that such a project would be given to the Balyan family, who was the leader of the period and had its signature on many architectural projects in Istanbul.⁴⁰

It is obvious that the Fossati brothers attracted Abdülmecid's attention with the Russian embassy building and other works they had carried out. For the Fossati brothers, it was a great privilege to conduct the repair of a building of great historical and religious importance, such as Hagia Sophia.

Hagia Sophia, a very important building for the Ottoman Empire and the Christian world, had been repaired and renovated many times before the Fossati brothers. It is quite normal for such an old building to need constant maintenance and repair work. One of the most important repairs made on Hagia Sophia is the touch of Mimar Sinan, who made great contributions to the development of Ottoman architecture. During his appointment as chief architect, Sinan carried out structural strengthening works and repaired the outer buttresses so that Hagia Sophia could survive longer. On the grounds that it damaged the walls and vaults, he had a new minaret constructed farther from the wall and ordered the demolition of the Fatih Sultan Mehmet-built minaret on the weight tower at the southwest corner of the mosque.⁴¹

According to Sema Doğan, who is known for her writings on the history of architecture and Hagia Sophia, the Fossati brothers' renovation and repair works in Hagia Sophia can be summarized by eight items. The first of them is the static consolidation works, and the first thing that was done was to repair the 12 columns in the back of the structure. Later, hoops were used to repair the cracks in the dome and the lead roofs were renewed. The second is the renewal of the decorations, and the third is the repair of the exterior façades. While the exteriors were being renovated, they were painted in yellow and green stripes, respectively. In addition, in Istanbul, a city where fires were common, wooden buildings in the

⁴⁰ Semavi Eyice, *Ayasofya'da Abdülmecid'in Mozaik Tuğrası* [Abdülmecid's Mosaic Tugra in Hagia Sophia], in *Ayasofya Yıllığı* [Hagia Sophia Yearbook], 2014, p. 49.

⁴¹ Sema Doğan, *Sultan Abdülmecid Döneminde İstanbul-Ayasofya Camii'ndeki Onarımlar ve Çalışmaları Aktaran Belgeler* [Documents Describing the Repairs and Works in the Istanbul-Hagia Sophia Mosque during the Sultan Abdülmecid Era], in "Bilig", No. 49, 2009, p. 8.

immediate vicinity were demolished in order to protect the structure against fire. The fourth is to make architectural additions that did not exist before, and the fifth is to add new decorations. The sixth is the new equipment, the seventh is their work on mosaics, and the eighth is the arrangements around Hagia Sophia.

In this renovation work, in which approximately eight hundred workers took part, the walls of the hall were first renovated and then decorated with newly made paintings. For example, the walls of the hall, which is located between a large corridor from the entrance hall and the Sultan's mahfil, were decorated with Mecca and Medina drawings by the Italian artist Antonio Fonari. While the Fossati brothers were working in Hagia Sophia, they witnessed the emergence of different mosaics from the Byzantine period after the whitewashing of the arch and vault parts of the building. The mosaics of the building, which was built as a church by Byzantium, are extremely important in terms of Christianity and art history. It can be said that Sultan Abdülmecid was closely interested in these precious mosaics. When the Fossatis informed the Sultan about the emergence of the first mosaic, Abdülmecid, who personally followed the situation, demanded that all mosaics be revealed. Upon this, a great cleaning was carried out and all the mosaics were unearthed. Gaspare Fossati, who did not want to leave Abdülmecid's interest and tolerance unrequited, had a tughra made for Sultan Abdülmecid from mosaic pieces poured out. He had the tughra made by Italian artist N. Lanzoni, whom he had brought to Istanbul in those days to help him. This tughra is 57 cm in diameter and is the first sultan's tughra made of mosaic, which is a technique unique to Byzantium.⁴²



Fig. No. 3, Sultan Abdülmecid's Tughra⁴³

The artist embroidered Abdülmecid's monogram with colourful mosaics on a round floor paved with gold square mosaics. In addition, it is said that

⁴² Eyice, *Ayasofya'da Abdülmecid'in Mozaik Tuğrası*, p. 49-51.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

Abdülmecid did not volunteer to cover the mosaics. However, since this place was used for worship, he gave the order to cover them.

After the conquest of Istanbul, during the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, it was only covered with whitewash without damaging the mosaics inside. While the Fossati brothers were only responsible for the architectural repair of the Hagia Sophia Mosque, they realized that the mosaics that appeared after the spilled whitewash also needed maintenance, and they removed these plasters with the permission of Sultan Abdülmecid. After the depictions on the mosaics were repaired by the Fossati brothers, they were documented with pencil drawing and watercolour. The depictions of the mosaics unearthed were requested to be published by Gaspere Fossati. Fossati asked the Russian Tsar, with whom he was close, for 6000 rubles, in order to be able to publish a large and colourful album containing the depictions of the mosaics. Since the answer was only one ring instead of 6000 rubles, he gave up on this request.⁴⁴ Instead of mosaics, this time with the support of Sultan Abdülmecid, a book showing the interior and exterior of Hagia Sophia and its surroundings was published in London in 1852.




Fig. No. 4, Cover page of Gaspere Fossati's book published in London in 1852

W. Salzenberg, a Prussian architect, examined and drew the pictures of the mosaics unearthed by the Fossaties, in January-May 1848, while the restoration of the Hagia Sophia Mosque was underway. He published an album of mosaics of Hagia Sophia in 1854.⁴⁵ Gaspere Fossati, one of the Fossati brothers, whose architectural achievements were not ignored by Sultan Abdülmecid, and Nisân-ı Âlî and his brother Giuseppe Fossati were awarded the Mecidiye Order of the

⁴⁴ Edhem Eldem, *Ayasofya: Kilise, Cami, Abide, Müze, Simge* [Hagia Sophia: Church, Mosque, Monument, Museum, Icon], in "Toplumsal Tarih", No. 254, 2015, p. 80.

⁴⁵ Eyice, *Gaspere Fossati Trajano*, p. 172.

fourth degree.⁴⁶ We owe almost all the Hagia Sophia mosaics that have survived to the present day to the renovation and repair works of the Fossaties.

5.4. Darulfunun Building

In 1845, it was planned to make a series of reforms in the field of education with the initiatives of Mustafa Reşit Pasha. The third stage of these reforms was the opening of a higher education institution apart from the existing military schools and madrasahs.⁴⁷ Darulfunun, which is designed to teach courses in many fields together, is the first university of the Ottoman Empire in the modern sense. The construction of the Darulfunun building was given to the Fossati brothers. The Darulfunun building, which is the most important building that the Fossaties built in the neo-classical style in Istanbul, is located between Hagia Sophia and the Blue Mosque.

The fact that the construction of the building took many years (1846–1863), and therefore the cost was much higher than expected, led to criticism of the Fossaties. Although physics lessons were given for the first time for two years by Derviş Emin Pasha in 1863, courses could not start completely. In 1864, it was first used by the Ministry of Finance, then the Courthouse and Evkaf Ministries. In 1876, it started to be used as a parliament.⁴⁸ The building, which was badly damaged because of a fire in 1933, unfortunately could not reach the present day.

CONCLUSIONS

From the beginning of the 18th century, Ottoman intellectuals believed there was no lack of theoretical knowledge about sciences in the Ottoman Empire, which was a continuation of Islamic civilization. Alternatively, deficiencies in practical knowledge began to be recognized. Even though the reforms and the contacts made attempted to overcome this shortcoming, it is obvious that much success was not achieved. We can say that over a century, from the Tulip Era to 1837, the date when the Fossati brothers came to the Ottoman Empire, the tradition of architecture had been abandoned in the Ottoman Empire, and a change and transformation had taken place in the Western sense. Architecture, which was one of the areas where modernization efforts were made most visible in the Ottoman Empire with the Tanzimat, was somehow the flesh and bone of the changing minds.

⁴⁶ BOA İ.HR. [Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Tercüme Odası Evrakı / Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive Order Foreign Affairs], 188/10475.

⁴⁷ Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Bilim Mirası*, Vol.1, İstanbul, YKY, 2017, p. 144.

⁴⁸ Cengiz Can, *İstanbul'da 19. Yüzyıl Batılı ve Levanten ...*, p. 146.

There are three main reasons why the Ottomans gave many important projects to two Swiss brothers instead of local architects in the 19th century. The first is the presence of bureaucrats, such as Mustafa Reşit Pasha, who approached the subject with admiration for the West and who were in the decision-making mechanism with the understanding that the source of correct information and the best of everything would be done by the Westerners. The second is the abandonment of the old understanding in architectural education with the closure of Hassa Architects' Association and the lack of domestic architects with adequate education and equipment in the current system implemented. Undoubtedly, another factor that should not be disregarded is the fact that the Fossati brothers were able to complete many projects in the Ottoman Empire due to their expertise and knowledge in a wide range of fields, including furniture, decorations, architectural construction methods, and material knowledge. The Fossati brothers spent more than twenty years in the Ottoman Empire, where they had been invited to work on the Russian embassy building. By their religious, official, and private housing projects, they contributed significantly to the understanding of neo-classical architecture in the Ottoman Empire. The Fossati brothers, especially Gaspare, contributed greatly to the change of the city's appearance thanks to the large projects they took in Istanbul. Among the more than fifty projects mentioned above, the most significant application of the neo-classical style is the Darulfunun building, which unfortunately burned down in 1933 and could not reach the present day.

The Fossati brothers came to the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period, when a great intellectual and mental change was experienced, and they also met almost everything expected from them in a very self-sacrificing way during this period, when Ottoman architecture was experiencing problems. Through their close relations with Reşit Pasha, the influential bureaucrat of the period, the Fossatis brought other artists and architects from Italy for the big projects they received from the palace and provided employment to many foreign artists and craftsmen. As a result, it can be said that the most important point that distinguishes the Fossati brothers from other foreign architects who participated in construction works in the Ottoman Empire is that they were the first foreign architects with their own trained teams to carry out the big projects of the Ottoman Empire.

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SOME REFLECTIONS ON SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE MANIFESTED THROUGH TOTALITARIAN LANGUAGE IN NAZI GERMANY

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Abstract: *Symbolic violence was used during the Third Reich to instil the new political religion and intellectually strengthen the National Community (Volksgemeinschaft), as well as to purify and alter the German character from a national-socialist perspective. States that are authoritarian or totalitarian prevent the usual emergence of political language or mass media, changing communication – which requires dialogue – into a monologue-type approach (one person speaks and the others must listen). Political language takes on a discursive-aesthetic shape; it ceases to reveal meanings for society and instead obscures and conceals them, serving only as a tool for deceit, coercion, terror, and propaganda. Language exhibits the following key characteristics when used in authoritarian discourse: oratorical and declamatory style, campaigning tone, triumphalism, ideologization and assigning symbolic meanings to political concepts, creation of ideologemes – the significance of which is different from the usual meaning of the words –, scientism and exaggerated abstraction to the detriment of logic, uplifted criticism and, often false, fervour, heavy use of slogans or mantras, and the claim of absolute truth are all examples of these tactics.*

Keywords: *symbolic violence, coercion, totalitarianism, political language, Nazi, Germany, political religion, propaganda, terror.*

Rezumat: *Câteva reflecții asupra violenței simbolice manifestate prin limbajul totalitar în Germania nazistă. Violența simbolică a fost folosită în timpul celui de-al Treilea Reich pentru a insufla noua religie politică și pentru a întări în plan intelectual Comunitatea Națională (Volksgemeinschaft), precum și pentru a purifica și modifica caracterul german*

dintr-o perspectivă național-socialistă. Statele care sunt autoritare sau totalitare împiedică apariția limbajului politic normal sau a mass-media, schimbând comunicarea – care prin definiție necesită dialog – într-o abordare de tip monolog (unul vorbește, iar ceilalți trebuie să asculte). Limbajul politic capătă o formă discursiv-estetică; încetează să dezvăluie semnificații pentru societate și, în schimb, le ascunde servind doar ca un instrument pentru înșelăciune, constrângere, teroare și propagandă. Limbajul prezintă următoarele caracteristici cheie atunci când este folosit în discursul autoritar: stilul oratoric și declamator, tonul de campanie, triumfalismul, ideologizarea și atribuirea de semnificații simbolice conceptelor politice, crearea de ideologeme – diferite ca semnificație, în comparație cu sensul obișnuit al cuvintelor, scientismul și abstractizarea exagerată, în detrimentul logicii, critica înălțată și fervoarea, adesea falsă, folosirea intensă a lozincilor sau a mantrelor, și pretenția adevărului absolut sunt toate exemple ale acestor tactici.

INTRODUCTION

Violence is a core component of totalitarian regimes. This can take many subtle forms, ranging from symbolic violence¹ to radical violence² or genocide.³ During the Third Reich, the realization of a utopian vision of the world necessitated the creation of a specific language, which Viktor Klemperer, a German philologist of Jewish ancestry, named the *Lingua Tertii Imperii*. We believe that, along with ideology, propaganda, and terror, the totalitarian language of Nazi Germany served as one of the means to the transmission of the national-socialist political religion's belief system. Hitler's dictatorship grew elitist after the conclusion of the revolutionary phase⁴ (1934–1935), therefore it was necessary that every stratum of society, as well as public and private life, should be under the control of the government. Nazism manifested itself as a 'form of a secret society that acted in plain sight', therefore the modification of the social, political, and economic language had to be produced by obscuring, perverting the meanings, ideologizing, etc.

¹ See Rebecca Knuth, *Burning Books, and Levelling Libraries. Extremist Violence and Cultural Destruction*, Westport – London, Praeger Publishing House, 2006.

² Enzo Traverso, *The Origins of Nazi Violence*, New York, New Press, 2003.

³ Armin Nolzen, *The Nazi Party and its Violence Against the Jews, 1933-1939: Violence as a Historiographical Concept*, "Yad Vashem Studies", Vol. XXXI, 2003, pp. 235-285.

⁴ See Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde*, London – New York, Verso, 1995, pp. 160-163; Antoniu Alexandru Flandorfer, *Critica fundamentelor etico-filosofice ale național-socialismului* [Critique of the Ethical-Philosophical Basis of National Socialism], Bucharest, Eikon Publishing House, 2016.

The national-socialist ideological lexicon, as highlighted by Klemperer, is examined, with its connotations, euphemisms, phrases 'in the spirit of the times', scholarly terminology, institutional jargon, and neologisms. Furthermore, the rhetorical aspects of this propaganda language are described from the standpoints of linguistic pragmatics and argumentation theory. Klemperer appears in his *Journal* as a person who is sensitive to the power of words in ordinary language and who 'acts in resistance' by demonstrating the uniformity of the *LTI*, a 'linguistic jail' that locks up both 'victors and victims'. Victor Klemperer's study of the language in use identified a populist background in German Romanticism and culture. This was later expanded upon by Dolf Sternberger, Gerhard Storz, and Wilhelm Emanuel Süskind, leading to the 1957 *Wörterbuch des Unmenschen* (*Dictionary of Inhumanity*). The Third Reich's language was a propaganda tool, characterized by neologisms, hyperbole, euphemism, religious rhetoric, and semantic displacement. It was adopted by a small group led by Hitler and Joseph Goebbels, as well as the government and general society, and excluded victims and oppressed individuals. The Nazi totalitarian language is typically seen as propaganda⁵ in historiography, with little emphasis placed on how it contributed to the development of either symbolic or actual violence. Of course, this subject has been covered in key works of philology, semiotics, and semantics during the past three decades, as well as in fundamental synthesis works on the history of the Third Reich⁶ or Adolf Hitler.⁷

In our opinion, such a topic can only be studied in an interdisciplinary manner, utilizing a diverse range of sciences such as history, cultural anthropology, and philological sciences from the linguistic area (psycholinguistics,

⁵ About Nazi propaganda, see David Welch (Ed.), *Nazi Propaganda. The Power and the Limitations*, London and New York, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 1983; David Welch, *The Third Reich. Politics and Propaganda*, 2nd edition, London – New York, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2002; Jeffrey Herf, *The Jewish enemy. Nazi propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust*, Cambridge – London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.

⁶ Richard J. Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich. A History*, New York, Penguin Books, 2004; Idem, *The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939*, New York, Penguin Press, 2005; Idem, *The Third Reich at War. How the Nazis Led Germany from Conquest to Disaster*, New York, Penguin Books Limited, 2012.

⁷ Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, 1889-1936. Hubris*, London-New York, Penguin Books, 1999; Idem, *Hitler, 1936-1945. Nemesis*, New York-London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2000; Idem, *Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution*, New Haven-Jerusalem, Yale University Press – International Institute for Holocaust Research, Yad Vashem, 2008.

sociolinguistics, anthropological linguistics, stylistics, grammar, phonetics), cultural studies, political philosophy, geopolitics, and so on. In our research, we have employed a variety of methodologies, including analysis, synthesis, comparison, and comparative translation, to attempt to understand the various linkages between symbolic violence and language violence, both of which served as implements of the Third Reich's political religion. In our study, we try to show the importance of the viral-metamorphic factor of the quasi-total ideologization of language, impregnated with symbolic violence, in the modification of German society, in the sense of 'monolithization' and the creation of a new type of 'Nazified national community' (*Volksgemeinschaft*). The *LTI* played a significant part in the institutionalization and bureaucratization of crime both before and during WWII, and the obscuration of language permitted the concealing of the Holocaust's unprecedented level of horrors.⁸

THE ORGANIC CONNECTION BETWEEN SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE AND *LINGUA TERTII IMPERII*

When used in authoritarian discourse, language exhibits the following key characteristics: oratorical and declamatory style, campaigning tone, triumphalism, ideologization and assigning symbolic meanings to political concepts, creation of ideologemes – the significance of which is different from the usual meaning of the words –, scientism and exaggerated abstraction to the detriment of logic, uplifted criticism and, often false, fervour, heavy use of slogans or mantras, and the claim of absolute truth are all examples of these tactics. In his work, *Lingua Tertii Imperii*, Victor Klemperer reveals that the Nazi language is addressed directly to some feelings such as hatred and love, as well as mechanical forms of thought. The speakers gradually adjust to the transformations, Nazism insinuates itself into the flesh and blood of a large number of people through single idioms, turns of phrase, and syntactic structures that imposed themselves on millions of copies and were accepted automatically and unconsciously. According

⁸ Karin Doerr, *Nazi-Deutsch: An Ideological Language of Exclusion, Domination, and Annihilation*, in Robert Michael, Karin Doerr (Eds.), *Nazi-Deutsch/Nazi German. An English Lexicon of the Language of the Third Reich*, Westport – London, 2002; Thomas Pegelow Kaplan, *The Language of the Nazi Genocide. Linguistic Violence and the Struggle of German of Jewish Ancestry*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009; Andreas Mussolff, *Language under totalitarian regimes: the example of political discourse in Nazi Germany*, in Ruth Wodak, Bernhard Forchtner (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Politics*, New York, Routledge, 2018, pp. 660-672.

to Klemperer in *LTI*, Words can be like tiny doses of arsenic: you take them without realizing, they seem to have no impact, and then eventually the toxic consequence kicks in. The philologist stresses the new language's indigence: it distinguishes itself not by inventing words, but by recycling and bludgeoning those that already exist. The Nazi administration was able to legitimize the debasement of specific terminology and the enhancement of lexical fields, particularly that of war, by repeating the warped meaning of a word. Thus, *Aktion* refers to 'massacre operations' during the Third Reich; *Sturm*, 'storm,' is identical to 'assault'; and *Figuren* ('the puppets') refers to the corpses exhumed to disguise the extermination for the Nazis.⁹

The songs, the words, and the lack of measures are all intended to 'anesthetize' the intellect's faculties. Totalitarian discourses are built on slogans, fanaticism, and blind obedience. The idea's universality is reduced to an empirical figure ('Arian humanity' of Europe, Germany, equality in a classless society, unlimited domination, etc.). Totalitarian discourse favours the following forms: saving the community, eliminating enemies, overcoming negativism, or adopting it. Manichaeism eliminates the concept of difference or otherness, allowing the other to always be a suspect, an enemy, or a scapegoat. Authoritarian/totalitarian regimes' rhetoric is consistently superior on topics such as proletarian heroism, the eternity of the new society, mass enthusiasm, and so on. It calls for the transfiguration of existence, rejecting relativism and hermeneutics in favour of a new soteriology, a phantasmagorical image of the social unit, and, finally, the spectre of extermination and death. Totalitarian speech imitates democratic speech by replacing reality with a meta-reality that embodies the abolition of the separation between power and society.

The declared intention was the announcement of Austria's annexation to the Third Reich. The unspoken intention – the obligation to abandon the old Austrian national identity in favour of the new German and Nazi identities. We notice the meticulous staging, but also his speech's accessibility and simplicity. The oratory is located on a balcony above the audience, with these elements contributing to the semiotics of totalitarian discourse orientation (from above to down). Hitler began his speech by addressing the mostly Austrian audience with the phrase 'Germans!', implying that Austria had lost its independence as a state and had been absorbed into the great German nation. The obligation to change one's identity

⁹ Virginie Bloch-Lainé, *Enquête. Victor Klemperer, décrypteur de la langue totalitaire* in https://www.liberation.fr/chroniques/2019/10/08/victor-klemperer-decrypteur-de-la-langue-totalitaire_1756289/ (Accessed on 15.03.23).

became more than clear. Then, triumphantly, the Führer of the Third Reich announced the demise of the old Austrian state model – predominantly Catholic, class-structured, created and consolidated by Austrian chancellors Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg – and its replacement with the Nazi model. Hitler continued his speech with abstract, generalizing formulas, addressing the public with the formula Men and women! to shift attention from the individual to the masses. The combination of NSDAP ideology, The Nazi Weltanschauung, superimposed on the Hitler-type authoritarian/totalitarian personality, has determined the metamorphosis of political language in the so-called *Lingua Tertii Imperii* / *LTI* (the viral-metamorphic theory). The German philologist Victor Klemperer (1881–1961) developed this theory to describe a particular type of nazi political language that was characterized by the dissipation of meaning in words and the crushing of personality in the nazi utopian project.¹⁰

In his Vienna speech, Hitler shifted from a generalizing model to a concrete/historical one, employing phrases like ‘the unity of the German people’ (*Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft*). Austria’s new mission as a member of the Third Reich, in his opinion, was to protect the German nation from ‘storms from the East.’ Austria was relegated to a medieval identity in the Nazi leader’s mindset, becoming an east mark of the Reich (*Oste mark*) or a *Gaue* (territory, province). Hitler ended his speech on a personal note, expressing his delight at Austria’s ‘return’ to the German world.

Nazi Germany used language as a tool of coercion and brainwashing. Towards specific racial and territorial objectives. Even when these aims were intended to be hidden, the Third Reich language exposes them to us. Ironically, following World War I, the right-wing National Socialist German Workers Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*) began its ascension under Hitler in democratic Weimar Germany. From the moment he took power in 1933, the regime started an intricate campaign to bring all levels of government, institutions, and companies in line with Nazi philosophy. For this purpose, they adopted an electrotechnology term: *Gleichschaltung* (coordination). Denying personal freedom of choice, everyone was forced to conform to the state’s political framework. To promote their views and gain public support for their long-term ambitions, the Nazi leadership used effective propaganda techniques on radio, in the press, and at official occasions. What was heard, read, and eventually used in

¹⁰ Hitler’s speech – Heroes Square in Vienna, March 15, 1938. Cf. Max Domarus, *The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary*, Wauconda, Illinois (USA), Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2007, p. 1056-1057.

all aspects of German life was a language shaped by and saturated with Nazi *Weltanschauung*. It has come to be known as *Nazi-Deutsch* (Nazi German), and it is a true reflection of its time, revealing all the nuances of German National Socialist ideology and behaviour, as well as the impact on all levels of speech. This comprised dictionaries, grammar books, and popular literature.¹¹

The roots of the Nazi language go far back in history, long before the birth of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, the NSDAP. And even well before the first political steps of former first-class Adolf Hitler and his little clique. It is rooted in a very broad movement to which we gave the untranslatable name of *völkisch*, a mixture of ethnic nationalism, return to the land, esotericism, anti-Semitism, paganism, and a few other ingredients. The indigestible literature of this shapeless movement sowed a few seeds that germinated through continuation: a certain taste for emphasis, patriotic vibration, the apology of violence, and the obscurity of language. All these elements were subsequently taken up by the authors of the 'conservative revolution.' Ernst Niekisch, Hans Freyer, Oswald Spengler, or Arthur Moeller van den Bruck made abundant use of it, as did a certain Ernst Jünger, who gives, for example, in a bloated text from 1930, the full measure of its anti-Semitism. Throughout the history of Nazism, we will find this singular mixture of esoteric vagueness, pagan delusions, brutal reasoning, not to say brutalists, carried by an exalted tone and martial impulses. This is expressed, well heard most clearly in *Mein Kampf*, a work that Hitler wrote in the mid-1920s in the Landsberg fortress, where an attempted putsch, in 1923, gave him a (fairly brief and very comfortable) stay. Hitler's language is like the movement of a swastika: it hypnotizes and crushes. It hypnotizes because its circular functioning somehow drowns the brain, making it wrap around itself like the 'thought' that he has in front of him until it reminds him to deliver the final ideological blow in two or three short, punchy sentences. *Mein Kampf* respects the codes of the *völkisch* style, obscure and bombastic, and puts them in the service of demonstrations as soporific as they are effective.

Aware of the abominable and unprecedented nature of the genocide that they were committing, the National Socialists have from the start multiplied the measures of precaution to conceal first their intentions, then their actions. Terms intended to hide the reality of the massacre were numerous and were rehearsed from the beginning of the regime, for which the eviction, at the very least, of the Jews from Germany, was from the outset a goal and an obsession. But we search in vain in the official texts or propaganda of words like 'deportation' or

¹¹ Karin Doerr, *Nazi-Deutsch...* p. 27–28.

'extermination'. The euphemism 'Final Solution' (*Endlösung*) used after the Wannsee conference was one of the last links in a long chain of linguistic dissimulations that played on the ambivalence of vocabulary. *Vernichtung* was used alternatively to designate the economic 'annihilation' of Germany (notably in *Mein Kampf*), the 'destruction' of enemy troops, then 'extermination.' *Entfernen* ('to move away,' as one moves an object away on a table), *ausräumen* ('evacuate') and *Lager* ('camp') were all terms intended to mask the reality of the genocide and deportations under voluntary ambiguity.

However, confusion and opacity are neither the only features nor the important qualities of the Nazi language. It became accustomed to the four main roles it had to play: seduction, terrorization, reality modification, and reality concealment. However, linguistic manipulation did not simply have hideous characteristics. The basic ideas of Nazism spread like oil on absorbent paper. *Volk*, which in German means both 'people' in the social sense and 'ethnicity' in the racial sense, was therefore used in all sauces: *Volkgemeinschaft* ('community of the people'), *Volksgenosse* ('comrade of the people'). However, if these terms were intended to create an exclusive community that did not include members of 'inferior races' or people who did not share Nazism's love, others were present to ground this community in the daily life and spirit of the Germans: the *Volkswagen* was thus the 'people's car' and the *Volksempfänger* the 'people's radio receiver.' Victor Klemperer created a precise inventory of this linguistic contamination in *LTI*, some of the pathogens of which are once again rampant throughout Europe today. But this operation of seduction and language impregnation was not the only one: Nazism intended to frighten its opponents from the start. The classic moment from *The Great Dictator* in which Chaplin is actually blown away by Hitler's comments, shouted out in the street through a megaphone, is well known. This comedy was not on Chaplin's part, who undoubtedly put out the finest investigations on the profound nature of Nazism at the time. Along with seduction and contamination, the other side of the Nazi language was the utilization of the terrible dimension that we may give to the German language. All you have to do is be tough, pounding, and nasty. It is, or nearly was, what the Nazi 'movement' strove toward from its inception. The *Sturmabteilung*, the 'SA,' which meant 'assault section,' but could also be read 'storm section' and cracked like a whip anyway, like the *Schutzstaffel*, the SS ('protection squadron'), whose ranks were a grotesque festival of hissing and alliterations as high-sounding as they are untranslatable (*SS-Obersturmbannführer*, 'senior assault section leader,' *SS-Rottenführer*, literally leader of a hoard). All the movement's propaganda statements contained this almost *beautiful violence*, to use the phrase loosely. Both scaring the rival or enemy

and assembling its own 'fanatics' around a ruthless, destructive energy were primary goals. Recognizing the heinous and unparalleled nature of the genocide they were committing, the National Socialists multiplied precautionary actions from the start in order to conceal first their objectives, then their actions. The terms used to conceal the truth of the murder were various and were practiced from the commencement of the government, for which the deportation, at the very least, of Jews from Germany was a goal and obsession from the start. But we look in vain for words like 'deportation' or 'extermination' in official writings or propaganda. The euphemism 'Final Solution' (*Endlösung*) used after the Wannsee conference was one of the final links in a long chain of linguistic deceptions that exploited word ambiguity. *Vernichtung* was employed to denote the economic 'annihilation' of Germany (particularly in *Mein Kampf*), the 'destruction' of enemy forces, and finally 'extermination.' *Entfernen* ('to move away,' as though moving an article on a table), *ausräumen* ('evacuate'), transport, and *Lager* ('camp') were all phrases used to conceal the truth of the Holocaust and deportations.¹²

Euphemisms, neologisms, names, codes, and Third Reich jargon in general provide the door to a world of ideas, complex organizations, and distinctive positions inside German military and civilian life. Their titles and roles serve as a reminder of the state's influence on the learning, employment, and leisure pursuits of German children and adults. There was the Hitler Youth (*Hitlerjugend* or *HJ*), which had a system of youth leaders (*Jugendführer*), youth camps (*Jugendlager*), and planned events like club night (*Heimabend*), which featured required Wednesday night classes for both boys and girls. The titles of these organizations highlight how the regime affected German women's lives by upholding traditional gender roles. In the name of the state and its citizens (*Volksganze*), mother schooling (*Müterschulung*), an ideological and practical education, prepared them for marriage and motherhood. The influential *Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft* was entirely in charge of assigning official responsibilities and programs that involved all German women beginning in

¹² See: Kate Burridge, *Euphemism with Attitude: Politically Charged Language Change*, in Monika S. Schmid, Jennifer R. Austin, Dieter Stein (Eds.), *Historical linguistics 1997*, Amsterdam – Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 1998, pp. 57–76; Dirk Deissler, "The Nazis may almost be said to have 'invented' a new German language". *Der anglo-amerikanische Diskurs über nationalsozialistischen Sprachgebrauch im Zweiten Weltkrieg und in der Besatzungszeit*, in "Germanistische Linguistik", Vol. 169-170, 2003, pp. 319-337; Olivier Mannoni, *Les pièges du langage totalitaire : traduire le nazisme. Petit manuel de survie*, in "Traduire. Revue française de la traduction", 2019, No. 240. <https://doi.org/10.4000/traduire.1614> (Accessed on 14.03.23).

1936, though not without the cooperation of some women. The association for young girls (*Jungmädelsbund*) was where it all began. The women of the League of German Girls (*Bund Deutscher Mädchen*) were required to provide *Kriegshilfsdienst* (state duty) throughout the war. The family had lost its basic meaning and had changed to an ideological interpretation of the blood relationships that the Germans had established using the medieval name *Sippe* (clan). As Germans were compelled to present the *Ariernachweis* (evidence of Aryan heritage), which was necessary after the racist 1935 Nuremberg Laws were implemented, the state even decided whom they could marry. The SS elite required an ancestral pass (*Ahnenpaß*) and government clearance before getting married.¹³ In one way or another, almost every German was required to swear allegiance to Hitler. This was expressed in the many loyalty oaths (*Treueide*), which were taken by everyone from the youngest members of the Hitler Youth to the highest SS ranks. Personal ties were based on the idea of a shared destiny, much like the SS motto, "My honour is loyalty" (*Meine Ehre heißt Treue*).¹⁴ Slogans like "Wake up, Germany!" and "You, Führer, command, and we will follow and obey!" were directed at the German people in an effort to create an obedient national collective. The Third Reich rhetoric was permeated with an ancient Germanic mythology that was brought back to life and promoted heroism (*Heldentum*), self-sacrifice (*Opferwilligkeit*), and the sacrifice of the person (*Opfertod*). The expression of such ideas was meant to arouse feelings of mystical blood links and emotions to convince Germans of the transcendental nature of the German nation (*Volk*). A stronger sense of belonging by virtue of birth to this privileged group highlighted the exclusion of others from this racially defined community (*Volksgemeinschaft*). These few language examples of life in Nazi Germany also speak to the tight grip the state had over every facet of an individual's existence, as well as the link and ongoing interaction between the leader, the party, and society.¹⁵ The National Socialists hoped to influence collective thought with their magnificent Aryan oratory in public. *Volk*, *Blut*, and *Rasse*, the fundamental nationalistic principles, outlined a system intended to exclude anything non-German as foreign (*artfremd*), as a 'counter race' (*Gegenrasse*), and as harmful (*Volksschädlinge*) to the entire German people. The belief in the superiority of the German race was part of the ideological discourse, which was based on Social Darwinist theory (*Herrenrasse*).

¹³ Karin Doerr, *op. cit.*, p. 28-29.

¹⁴ See Adrian Gilbert, *Waffen SS: Hitler's Army War*, New York, Da Capo Press, 2019.

¹⁵ Karin Doerr, *op. cit.*, p. 29-30.

THE SYMBOLIC LANGUAGE VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST THE JEWS

This racial nationalism was combined with a particularly vicious antisemitism, which seeped into both public and private discourse. The Nazis promoted anti-Jewish ideas that were already present in the cultures and languages of European Christendom in addition to their pro-German agenda. Many Christians had been adverse towards Jews for a long time due to hostile stories and strong negative images about them, which frequently lead to alienation, exclusion, and death. The Nazis linked these historical threads of religious antisemitism (*Judenhaß*) with new, racial forms of antisemitism as a result of this stereotyping and prejudice that rejected the humanitarianism that emerged from the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution. They also perpetuated the concept of a Jewish world conspiracy (*Weltjudentum*), which was at the heart of the nineteenth-century fabrication Protocols of the Elders of Zion. There seemed to be no trouble characterizing Jews as both Judeo-Bolsheviks (Communists) and global capitalists.¹⁶ Therefore, in addition to Darwinian phraseology, the Nazi language also contained an amalgam of medical and religious terminology. The Jews were viewed as a plague (*Seuche*) or bacteria (*Volksbazillen*) that needed to be removed from the body of the German nation (*Volkskörper*) based on pseudo-medical science. The broad German population was helped in their acceptance of the need for a strong and pure German race, *judenrein* (literally, 'clean' or 'cleansed' of Jews), and ultimately a new supplantation by these useful parallels. The *Rassenhygiene* (race hygiene) program, a general term that emphasized the preservation and purification (*Säuberung*) of German society and blood, served as the government's means of achieving this goal. When Nazi doctors began killing thousands of German patients in institutions as part of the euthanasia program, code-named 'T-4,' in the later 1930s, ideas of purification had already taken concrete form. By referring to the lives of the terminally ill as 'life unworthy of life' (*lebensunwertes Leben*), they justified murder. The ensuing stage of preparing for the murder of the Jews was expressed using already-used phrases whose meanings were altered or that received new metaphorical and confusing connotations. The phrase *Endziel* (ultimate objective), which served as a prelude to the infamous euphemism *Endlösung* (final solution) der *Judenfrage*

¹⁶ See Berel Lang, *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*, Chicago – London, University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 81-102; Cornelia Schmitz-Berning, *Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus*, Berlin–New York, De Gruyter, 1998.

(Jewish trouble), is one painful example. This Jewish 'world parasite' (*Weltparasit*) had to be eliminated or exterminated (*Ausrottung or Ausmerze*) as the answer.¹⁷

The term *parasite* has multiple connotations: it can be literal, biological, or metaphorical, and it can also be used as a figure of speech. When this concept was applied to humans, a new 'entity' was created: *homo parasitus*, which was inferior to man and hence had fewer rights and freedoms. The word 'parasite' in relation to Jews was used to 'justify' the Final Solution. For example, according to a Wehrmacht document from 1944, "the Jews want to turn the Germans into slaves in order to insert themselves more easily among them, to suck their blood, i. e. their vitality, and parasitize them." Because Jews cannot be rehabilitated, there is only one 'choice' in the Nazi vision: either be devoured by the parasite or be exterminated. Thus, the eradication of the Jew is viewed as a duty necessary to create a healthy existence and maintain life, rather than a crime against life. The origins of the German collective mind's warped image of the Jew can be traced back to his demonization in the Middle Ages. German Romantic nationalism took on an organic character in the nineteenth century, combining aspects of Darwinism, biological racism, and political racism. In the second and third decades of the twentieth century, nationalists, conservatives, and especially the Nazis saw the German nation as a racial body (*Volkskörper*), with proper biological meaning. The Jew was associated with the insulting and degrading appellation of the parasite in this context. Johann Gottfried Herder compared Jews to parasitic weeds in 1784. Through the assistance of strong National Socialist propaganda, the image of the parasitic Jew, as less human than the German, began to permeate extensively. It was merely a few steps from here to the genocide (Holocaust). Considered and catalogued as a leech sucking the blood of Christians in the Middle Ages, the Jew was then associated in the modern era with other distorted features – the quality of foreigner, scapegoat, racial inferiority, or lack of productivity or loyalty to the host nation (in our case, against the German national community).¹⁸

¹⁷ Wolfgang Mieder, *Language and Folklore of the Holocaust*, in David Scrase, Wolfgang Mieder (Eds.), *The Holocaust. Introductory Essays*, Burlington, Vermont, The Center for Holocaust Studies at the University of Vermont, 1996, pp. 235-252; Saul Friedländer, *Extermination of European Jews in Historiography: Fifty Years Later*, in Omer Bartov (Ed.), *The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath*, London – New York, Routledge, 2000; Cristopher M. Hutton, *Linguistics and the Third Reich. Mother-Tongue Fascism, Race and the Science of Language*, London-New York, Routledge, 1999, pp. 154-158.

¹⁸ Anders M. Gullestad, *Parasite*, in "Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon", 2012, No. 1, in <http://www.politicalconcepts.org/anders-m-gullestad-parasite/> (Accessed on

There had been authors before the Nazis who were concerned with the problem of parasitism and degeneration. One of them was Max Simon Nordau, a major Zionist Movement leader who released a treatise on the deterioration of man in modern civilization in 1892. The way the Nazis eliminated degenerate parasites is a significant distinction between Nordau's conception and the Nazis' ludicrous and destructive view of degenerate parasites. Nordau longed for the recovery of individuals 'infected' by the age's degraded spirit. Those who are unable to heal should not be eliminated since nature will take care of them. According to him, what distinguishes phylogeny (the development of new species) from degenerate morbid variation is that the latter will die out on its own in a few generations due to becoming sterile.¹⁹

The chance of treating or improving *homo parasitus* (the degenerate parasite) was null in the national-socialist ideal. The Nazis considered it their job to remove these degenerates, first by symbolic violence, then through institutional and administrative violence, physical violence, and last through industrialized crime (genocide, Holocaust). The image of the Jew also influenced the tactics of annihilation used. If Jews were slaughtered in the Middle Ages because they were frequently considered hypostases of the Antichrist and Satan, they were killed in lodging rooms during the Third Reich as a result of their identification with the concept of the parasite.²⁰

Thus, in order to safeguard the purity of the National Community or the Aryan 'racial body,' the Nazis mixed various forms of violence (from symbolic to murder and extermination) with propaganda, exclusion, and generalized theory. They attempted to impose the antinomy between Superman (*Übermensch*) and *Homo parasitus* (*Untermensch*) on an ideational level, but also on the individual psyche or the collective consciousness. In this sense, the image of the Jew played a vital role in Hitler's skewed mental universe. Since his boyhood in Vienna, his mind had become obsessed with Jews. He believed that they were the source of all ills, tragedies, and disasters, as well as the Germans' tough economic circumstances following World War I. The perplexity of war and starvation, financial and economic crises, unexpected death, failures, and sinfulness could all

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¹⁹ Max Nordau, *Degeneration*, Translated from the second edition of the German work, Introduction by George L. Mosse, Lincoln – London, University of Nebraska Press, 1993, p. 550-551.

²⁰ See Alex Bein, *The Jewish Parasite. Notes on the Semantics of the Jewish Problem with Special Reference to Germany*, in "The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook", Vol. 9, 1964, pp. 3-40.

be explained by the presence of a single component in the cosmos, that horror that disrupts humanity's march toward well-being, abundance, success, and victory. A hero who dared to kill the hideous beast was required. In Hitler's preoccupied mind, as in the delusory fantasies of ancient millenarians, the Jews were demonic hordes delivered to him as a holy mission.²¹ *Mein Kampf* depicted the fight between Aryans and Jews as apocalyptic. This fight was a dualistic interpretation of the eternal conflict between good and evil, God and Satan, and Christ and Antichrist. Hitler declared in front of intimate associates such as Rauchnig that the Germans were the people of God, and the Jews were the people of Satan (we can see the viral-metamorphic perversion of the biblical concept of the chosen people). As a result, the Jewish race became an anti-race, serving as the primary impediment to Hitler's and Nazi ideologues like Alfred Rosenberg's millenarian and racist ideal of Aryan dominance.²² Thus, the Jew was viewed as the ultimate evil in a variety of guises: outsider, other, a man outside society, parasite, carrier, and emblem of bodily and moral sorrow. The harmfulness of the Jew, according to Hitler's distorted perspective, consists of components such as the race's blood and physical, intellectual, and cultural conformation. "The portrayal of Jews as filth and disease carriers, and thus of death and destruction, dates back to the history of anti-Semitism in the Middle Ages, when Jews were accused of spreading the plague and poisoning wells. A plague pandemic in Vienna was explained as early as the 17th century: «It is known that such plague epidemics are caused by evil spirits, Jews, gravediggers, and witches». Hitler accused Jews in particular of sexual immorality and blamed them for the postwar survival of syphilis. He also did not ignore the issue of cultural pollution: «Is there any dirt and degradation, especially in cultural life, that does not involve at least one Jew? The poison of the press, controlled by the faces of Jews, was able to infiltrate our people's bloodstream»".²³ It was only a short step from the image of the Jew as a parasite, vampire, leech, and contaminator of the Aryan race to the accreditation of the image of the Jew sucking the blood of the German economy and finance. The latter stems from the left-wing anti-Semitic caricature of the second part of the nineteenth century.²⁴

²¹ Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *Războiul împotriva evreilor (1933-1945)* [The War Against the Jews (1933-1945)], Translation by Carmen Pațac, Bucharest, Hasefer Publishing House, 1999, p. 45.

²² See Alfred Rosenberg, *Le Mythe du XXe siècle. Bilan des combats culturels et spirituels de notre temps*, translation from German to French by Adler von Scholle, Paris, Avalon Publishing House, 1986.

²³ Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

One of the most common clichés associated with Nazi Germany's anti-Semitic imagology is the Jew as a *racial alien*. The exclusion policy was most brutally and extensively applied against Jews, that is, to all persons defined as 'Jews' by German authorities. This policy touched all Jews, regardless of age or gender, in every part of their lives, with various measures aimed at social segregation and discrimination, economic isolation, expropriation, and imprisonment. These tactics were increasingly becoming part of what proved to be the goal of Nazi racial policy in the pre-war years: the expulsion of all Jews from Germany. However, this policy did not take a straight course. It evolved in numerous ways, driven by the dynamics of activity at the central and local levels, bureaucratic measures, and outright terror. These dynamics caused various shifts and twists in conditions in the years leading up to the war. Following the draconian measures of exclusion and isolation imposed in the spring of 1933, there were two further stages in the Nazis' war against German Jews. The first of these occurred in the spring and summer of 1935, culminating in the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws, which classified Jews as second-class citizens and served as the basis for their racial classification.²⁵ This second stage began with waves of attacks focused on Jewish stores and Jewish-Aryan interactions, led by local Nazi activists. These attacks, in part, served as an outlet for the resentment of *disgruntled Nazis*. However, these individuals acted in accordance with Hitler's anti-Semitic worldview, and they were not alone. For example, the Nazi party press, as well as some judges and the central government, pushed for the prohibition of marriages and sexual connections between Jews and non-Jews. The Nuremberg Laws, enacted in September 1935 as a result of a combination of local fear and central planning, outlawed future marriages and extramarital encounters between Jews and non-Jews: men found guilty of 'defilement of the race' were to be imprisoned. Women were not penalized under the law, but they could be punished in other ways by the courts or the police. German judges quickly extended this statute to the point that even kissing between Jews and non-Jews was punishable. However, sending Jews to prisons or camps was a very uncommon action at the time: only a few hundred Jewish men were convicted of 'defilement of the race' each year. The anti-Jewish program did not include camps or prisons in the early phase.

²⁵ Nikolaus Waschmann, *Politica excluderii: represiunea în statul nazist, 1933-1939* [The Politics of Exclusion: Repression in the Nazi State, 1933–1939], in Jane Caplan (Coord.), *Istoria Germaniei Naziste* [History of Nazi Germany]. Translation by Liviu Mateescu, Bucharest, Orizonturi Publishing House, 2020, p. 194.

In comparison to the anti-Semitic rise of 1935, most of the early Nazi period may appear quiet. In fact, life was far from peaceful for German Jews. There were so many activities at so many different levels that the cumulative impact was enormous. The Jews were gradually forced into poverty and seclusion. Economic discrimination advanced in multiple directions at the same time. More and more Jews were fired, special levies were imposed, and discrimination in commercial and civil courts increased, affecting everything from service conflicts to tenancy cases. On a local level, Jews started to experience constant discrimination. Municipal officials denied them access to parks, swimming pools, and other public areas, and this was a major factor in the mid-1930s abandonment of any contact between Jews and Aryans, of which there was still a relatively small number. This was in addition to ongoing anti-Semitic propaganda.²⁶

After 1933, the NSDAP's anti-Jewish violence took four forms or categories of action: direct physical assault of Jews and non-Aryans; damage to Jewish property; boycott of Jewish enterprises; and takeover of Jewish wealth and assets. The four forms of anti-Jewish violence served four purposes: 1) Jews and non-Aryans had to be physically hurt (intentional injury); by this deliberate use of violence, Jews and non-Aryans had to be segregated and expelled from German society while seeking to ruin these people's personalities. 2) Propaganda attempted to incite public rage against Jews. The symbolic brutality of propaganda was used to gain the agreement of the German people. Initially, the Nazi regime's calls for violence were either ignored or dismissed. 3) The NSDAP and so-called *popular anger's pressure* on the ministerial bureaucracy and state administration. 4) The transformation of Nazi party members into a 'community of jurors' (the practice of collective violence by inactive or indifferent party members, via the state apparatus's so-called *coordination/synchronization* (*Gleichschaltung*)).²⁷

"Perhaps more than any other idea in the history of human culture, race is imbued with a great deal of responsibility. It is not just another abstract concept with little social and political impact outside academia or the university. During the time of its ascendancy as an organizational principle of society, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the idea of race has fundamentally changed the history of many countries, individuals, and communities across the world. It was a source of both national self-esteem and a national disgrace, particularly during the Second World War. Many people have been oppressed, marginalized,

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 196.

²⁷ Armin Nolzen, *The Nazi Party and its Violence Against the Jews, 1933-1939: Violence as a Historiographical Concept*, "Yad Vashem Studies", Vol. XXXI, 2003, pp. 235-285.

and killed for not belonging to the 'right' race. Notwithstanding this painful history, racial stereotypes continue to exist in contemporary society and various representations of race still inhabit and invade our lives in disturbing ways. It is as if race, though now viewed as an obsolete and anachronistic concept, has become ossified in the very foundation of our culture and public consciousness, serving as a permanent source of indurated ideas, influencing thought and behaviour, both personal and public".²⁸

The language was not apathetic to barbarism; rather, it actively joined in the war against individual liberties. It configured the 'enemy,' giving him a body and a form in order to better dispose of him. It was necessary to make language a collaborator of barbarism within its own trenches, just as it was necessary to abolish the names of camp prisoners and substitute numbers for them, to annul every vestige of human dignity in the victims destined for gas and cremation. For Nazi ideology, it was important to eliminate any indication of individuality in experience as well as language; it was also important to reduce the individual to a simple component of an organism that does not think but instead effectively performs its function. That is the core of totalitarian systems: reducing people to components of a massive machine, in the case that concerns us, designed to eliminate numerous 'races' off the map of Europe, 'inferiors' that hindered and jeopardized the Aryan race's advancement. The standardization of language and, consequently, its weakening and impoverishment, have not been achieved independently: they have always been accompanied by the standardization of experience and a loss of the sense of individuality. So, if it remains true that language is found everywhere and that it crosses all modalities of our experience, it would be necessary to say that language and the experience of Nazism have always been intimately linked: always alongside one another and accompanying each other in a mutual negation of personal brands. The word 'Jew' is more essential than the word 'fanatic' in Hitler's propaganda. This is not by chance, because the majority of his ethnic cleansing campaign is aimed at him. Thus, the adjective 'Jew' appears to emerge more frequently than the noun, because it is primarily the adjective that allows all foes to be united under the picture of a single enemy whose goal is the destruction of Germany. As a result, much of the fight against the 'enemy' is combined into the adjective Jewish, and the opponent is asphyxiated by the Nazi word. The Third Reich had to impoverish and standardize language to a degree that would allow it to transform men into mechanical figures

²⁸ Marius Turda, Maria Sophia Quine, *Historicizing Race*, London – Oxford – New York – New Delhi – Sidney, Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, p. 1-2.

responding simply to the stimuli of the system, of the Führer, the SS, or anyone capable of imposing this impoverished, but deadly rigid, language.²⁹

CONCLUSIONS

Totalitarian discourse is described as euphemistic, manipulative, or othering its victims, but these are understatement because they gloss over the qualitative difference to the biased and polemical nature of all political language use. Polemical debates in open societies that allow for public debate without imposing violent consequences can be antagonizing, divisive, and manipulative, but they are nonetheless predicated on the premise that counter-discourses are theoretically viable. The deceptive language of a totalitarian dictatorship, in contrast, occurs against a backdrop of covert state terrorism, which includes the threat and implementation of denunciation and harsh punishment of any oppositional discourse. The traditional meanings of words or statements are unaffected by this unique communicative context, but it distorts their socio-pragmatic value and significance by treating them as matters of life and death. Nazi Germany used language as a tool of coercion and brainwashing. Even when these aims were intended to be hidden, the Third Reich language exposes them to us. Ironically, following World War I, the right-wing National Socialist German Workers' Party began its ascension under Hitler in democratic Weimar Germany. For this purpose, they adopted an electrotechnology term: *Gleichschaltung*. To promote their views and gain public support for their long-term ambitions, the Nazi leadership used effective propaganda techniques on the radio, in the press, and on official occasions. What was heard, read, and eventually used in all aspects of German life was a language shaped by and saturated with Nazi *Weltanschauung*. This comprised dictionaries, grammar books, and popular literature.

The roots of the Nazi language go far back in history, long before the birth of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, the NSDAP. And even well before the first political steps of former first-class Adolf Hitler and his little clique. It is rooted in a very broad movement to which we gave the untranslatable name of *völkisch*, a mixture of ethnic nationalism, return to the land, esotericism, anti-Semitism, paganism, and a few other ingredients. The indigestible literature of this shapeless movement sowed a few seeds that germinated through continuation: a certain taste for emphasis, for patriotic vibration, the apology of violence, and obscurity

²⁹ Ester Cohen, *Les narrateurs d'Auschwitz*, Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2010, pp. 103-107.

of language. Throughout the history of Nazism, we will find this singular mixture of esoteric vagueness, pagan delusions, brutal reasoning, not to say brutalists, carried by an exalted tone and martial impulses. This is expressed, well heard most clearly in *Mein Kampf*, a work that Hitler wrote in the mid-1920s in the Landsberg fortress, where an attempted putsch, in 1923, gave him a stay.

Aware of the abominable and unprecedented nature of the genocide that they were committing, the National Socialists have from the start multiplied the measures of precaution to conceal first their intentions, then their actions. Terms intended to hide the reality of the massacre were numerous and were rehearsed from the beginning of the regime, for which the eviction, at the very least, of the Jews from Germany, was from the outset a goal and an obsession. We search in vain in the official texts or propaganda of words like 'Deportation' or 'Extermination.' The euphemism 'Final Solution' used after the Wannsee conference was one of the last links in a long chain of linguistic dissimulations that played on the ambivalence of vocabulary. *Vernichtung* was used alternatively to designate the economic 'Annihilation' of Germany, the 'Destruction' of enemy troops, then 'Extermination.' *Entfernen*, *ausräumen*, and *Lager* were all terms intended to mask the reality of the genocide and deportations under voluntary ambiguity.

Confusion and opacity are neither the only features nor the important qualities of the Nazi language. Linguistic manipulation did not simply have hideous characteristics. The basic ideas of Nazism spread like oil on absorbent paper. *Volk*, which in German means both 'People' in the social sense and 'Ethnicity' in the racial sense, was therefore used in all sauces: *Volksgemeinschaft*, *Volksgenosse*. If these terms were intended to create an exclusive community that did not include members of 'inferior races' or people who did not share Nazism's love, others were present to ground this community in the daily life and spirit of the Germans: the *Volkswagen* was thus the 'People's car' and the *Volksempfänger*, the 'People's radio receiver.' Victor Klemperer created a precise inventory of this linguistic contamination in *LTI*, some of the pathogens of which are once again rampant throughout Europe today. This operation of seduction and language impregnation was not the only one: Nazism intended to frighten its opponents from the start. Along with seduction and contamination, the other side of the Nazi language was the utilization of the terrible dimension that we may give to the German language.

Euphemisms, neologisms, names, codes, and Third Reich jargon in general provide the door to a world of ideas, complex organizations, and distinctive positions inside German military and civilian life. The titles of these organizations

highlight how the regime affected German women's lives by upholding traditional gender roles. The influential *Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft* was entirely in charge of assigning official responsibilities and programs that involved all German women beginning in 1936, though not without the cooperation of some women. The women of the League of German Girls were required to provide *Kriegshilfsdienst* throughout the war. The family had lost its basic meaning and had changed to an ideological interpretation of the blood relationships that the Germans had established using the medieval name *Sippe*. In one way or another, almost every German was required to swear allegiance to Hitler. The expression of such ideas was meant to arouse feelings of mystical blood links and emotions to convince Germans of the transcendental nature of the German nation.

Volk, *Blut*, and *Rasse*, the fundamental nationalistic principles, outlined a system intended to exclude anything non-German as foreign, as a 'Counter race,' and as harmful to the entire German people. The belief in the superiority of the German race was part of the ideological discourse, which was based on Social Darwinist theory. In addition to Darwinian phraseology, the Nazi language also contained an amalgam of medical and religious terminology. The Jews were viewed as a plague or bacteria that needed to be removed from the body of the German nation based on pseudo-medical science. The broad German population were helped in their acceptance of the need for a strong and pure German race, *judenrein*, and ultimately a new supnation by these useful parallels. The *Rassenhygiene* program, a general term that emphasized the preservation and purification of German society and blood, served as the government's means of achieving this goal. When Nazi doctors began killing thousands of German patients in institutions as part of the euthanasia program, code-named 'T-4,' in the later 1930s, ideas of purification had already taken concrete form.

Language was not apathetic to barbarism; rather, it actively joined in the war against individual liberties. It was necessary to make language a collaborator of barbarism within its own trenches, just as it was necessary to abolish the names of camp prisoners and substitute numbers for them, to annul every vestige of human dignity in the victims destined for gas and cremation. For Nazi ideology, it was important to eliminate any indication of individuality in experience as well as language; it was also important to reduce the individual to a simple component of an organism that does not think but instead effectively performs its function. The standardization of language and its weakening and impoverishment have not been achieved independently: they have always been accompanied by the standardization of experience and a loss of the sense of individuality. If it remains true that language is found everywhere and that it crosses all modalities of our

experience, it would be necessary to say that language and the experience of Nazism have always been intimately linked: always alongside one another and accompanying each other in a mutual negation of personal brands. The word 'Jew' is more essential than the word 'Fanatic' in Hitler's propaganda.

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BOLSHEVISM, FROM CLASS IDEOLOGY TO IMPERIALIST IDEOLOGY. THE UKRAINIAN CASE

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Abstract: *The article examines how Bolshevism transitioned from a class ideology to an imperialist ideology with particular emphasis on the Ukrainian context. The authors analysed the essence of the Russian autocratic state as a despotic empire. Since one of Russian imperialism's primary objectives was to maintain control over Ukraine, the Bolshevik regime maintained its neo-imperial expansionist policies. Particular attention was paid to the formation of the Ukrainian national-political identity in the context of Russian (Soviet) imperialism. In terms of totalitarianism, the Bolshevik regime far exceeded the imperial autocratic regime and strove to obliterate as much of Ukrainian national identity as possible.*

Keywords: *Bolshevism, class ideology, imperialist ideology, Ukraine, expansionism, Bolshevik regime, national identity, despotism, neo-imperialism.*

Rezumat: *Transformarea bolșevismului dintr-o ideologie de clasă într-o ideologie imperialistă. Cazul ucrainean. Articolul examinează procesul de transformare a bolșevismului dintr-o ideologie de clasă într-o ideologie imperialistă, în cazul special al Ucrainei. Autorii analizează esența statului autocratic rus, considerând că aceasta a fost imperială, despotică. O atenție deosebită este acordată formării identității național-politice ucrainene sub imperialismul rus (sovietic). Regimul bolșevic a depășit regimul autocratic imperial în materie de totalitarism. În același timp, bolșevicii au căutat să distrugă pe cât a fost cu putință identitatea națională a ucrainenilor.*

INTRODUCTION

The shift of Bolshevism from a class ideology to an imperialist ideology marked a significant turning point in the history of the 20th century. This was particularly relevant for Ukraine. Since the end of the 19th century, Russia has witnessed the rise of Bolshevism as an opposition party to the Russian autocracy. Furthermore, after 1917, Bolshevism gradually acquired signs of continuity concerning the Russian monarchist despotism. Russian Bolshevism absorbed the worst totalitarian traits of autocratic despotism and gradually transformed into an extreme, misanthropic type of totalitarianism. Ideology, propaganda, and many myths played a decisive role. The latter was closely linked to communist ideology. Bolshevism restored the autocratic policy of despotism, great-power chauvinism, Russification, and several other instruments for denationalizing national minorities as part of its authoritarian strategy. The Bolsheviks could take advantage of the country's military-political, socio-economic, and spiritual crises. At the same time, they increasingly expanded their sphere of influence on the population of the former Russian Empire, which was especially evident in ideological and agitation propaganda.

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY

The construction of various ideologemes and ideological systems is often based on subjective or non-essential reasons. At the same time, various kinds of myths are constantly employed, which significantly harms the historical process. A more equitable attitude would be for ideology to be grounded on constructive socio-political and socio-cultural systems, principles, and ideas. Exploring the formation of totalitarian ideologies, Hannah Arendt characterizes them as the result of the mythologization of mass consciousness. At the same time, totalitarian movements rely on broad appeal, and countries with a large population are most suited to them.¹ Notably, Russia, a large country with ancient despotic traditions, has evolved into such a totalitarian regime. Then it spread to the neighbouring countries that were previously under the influence of the Russian Empire. The defining factor of the totalitarian regime was the communist ideology. Nikolai Berdyaev noted that Russian communism is challenging to understand because of

¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins Of Totalitarianism*, New York, Harvest Book, 1973, p. 357.

its dual nature. After all, it is both a Russian and national phenomenon and, simultaneously, a global one. At the same time, knowledge of Marxism cannot help in understanding the national foundations of Russian communism and its determinism in Russian history.² Firstly, it was the Russian people's lengthy stay in serfdom, as well as other factors, most notably the influence of Asian despotism, that shaped the Russian mentality. They provided a solid foundation for the rise of Bolshevism.

Michel Heller's perspective on the political concept of Moscow autocracy arising in Orthodox monasteries in the context of conflict with the despotic Asian 'yoke' is relevant to highlight at this point. Nevertheless, it was from this Asian Horde tradition that the Muscovite state borrowed many features. This is particularly accurate when considering the autocratic style of administration and the policy of expansion, which began with the concept of 'Moscow – the Third Rome'.³

As Oleh Bagan noted, Joseph Stalin, the Bolshevik leader, perfectly translated Peter I's vision into the reality of the 20th century replacing the traditions of patriarchal Russia with active cooperation with the West. Adopting the technological merits of the West, the Bolsheviks sought to westernize the Russian state consciousness. However, they continued to stand by communism's utopian and fundamentally pro-Russian imperial ideals⁴, which created a unique symbiosis between Russia's patriarchal traditions and its imperial drive.

Robert Service described the origin of communist doctrine in Europe and Russia before 1917. The communists claimed that only they had the doctrinal and practical potential to change society radically.⁵ At the same time, the Bolshevik revolution, and the formation of the communist system in the territory of the former Russian Empire, signalled the birth of a totalitarian regime.

Totalitarianism, as opposed to democracy, is a multifaceted phenomenon, according to Vlad Gafița. At the same time, certain types of totalitarianism (left and right) show signs of mutating democracy.⁶ There has been a recurrent trend of

² Nikolai Berdyaev, *Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma* [Origins and meaning of Russian communism], Moskva, Nauka, 1990, p. 94.

³ Michel Heller, *Histoire de la Russie et de son empire*, Perrin, Collection Tempus, 2015, p. 244-248.

⁴ Oleh Bagan, *Istorijsos'ki ese* [Historiosophical Essays], Ternopil', Vydavnytstvo "Kryla", 2021, p. 181.

⁵ Robert Service, *Comrades! History of World Communism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 20-69.

⁶ Vlad Gafița, *Landmarks of the Viral-Metamorphic Theory. A New Interpretation of Right-Wing Totalitarianism* (I), in "Codrul Cosminului", Vol. 26, no. 2, 2020, p. 303-330.

democracy devolving into an authoritarian (despotic) regime since ancient Greece. Moreover, the reason for this transformation was usually the weakness of democracy. However, this was typical of much later states, including the Russian Empire, where the despotic nature was primarily exhibited via the oppression of national minorities. In particular, this took place in the manifestations of Chauvinism. Thus, the national question was one of the most sensitive and pressing issues in Russian society. This was particularly noticeable on the outskirts of the Empire.

According to Craig Calhoun, the idea of a nation is usually associated with the assertion that a certain ethnic identity must be 'superior' to all other forms of identity, including communal, family, class, and political. Nevertheless, this does not mean that nationalism diminishes the importance of all other identities. Such statements are made not only by nationalists and by other ethnopolitical players but also by the whole spectrum of Western historical and sociological studies.⁷ As a result, nationalist ideology, and the process of creation of a nation impacted the Ukrainian intellectual legacy to a certain extent.

The nation concept functioned as a type of state religion, acting as a 'cement' that tied citizens to the state and allowed it to directly address them on issues about religion, nationalism, and above all – class. Because they were unrelated to the state and defended entirely different interests, the more the population of constitutional states was drawn into the political struggle over elections, the more such appeals were addressed to them from all sides. Even isolated unconstitutional states understood that it was politically constructive to address citizens in accordance with a national idea, such as democracy. However, at the same time, it avoided the risks that democracy entails.

Along with this, there were calls for citizens to obey the authorities following the will of God. Thus, in the 1880s, the Russian Emperor Alexander III, faced with revolutionary agitation, turned to the policy that Nicholas I unsuccessfully tried to pursue in the 1830s. That is, Alexander III began to rely in his reign not only on the principles of autocracy and orthodoxy but also on the national idea, which mobilized the national feelings of the Russian people.⁸ At the same time, in the second half of the 19th century, science became another pillar of the ideology of progress while religion has become more and more a worldview stamp. The general loss of faith in God in the middle of the 19th century was perceived quite calmly in the Western world. The intellectual atheism of a significant part of the population gradually acquired the features of militant atheism. A new

⁷ Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 36.

⁸ Erik Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875–1914*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1987, p. 149.

revolutionary ideology based on materialistic philosophy was increasingly conquering the world. At the same time, the old ideology of national liberation fell noticeably into decline. The ideology, which in the Middle Ages was predominantly religious, gradually acquired a secular character.

The intense attack against religion in Western Europe has been generally paired with anti-clericalism. This trend covered all the intellectual currents of society, from moderate liberals to Marxists and anarchists. In Ukraine and on the territory of the Russian Empire as a whole, the situation was not so critical. However, the so-called 'progressive' forces (materialists, socialists, Marxists) were atheists who saw evil in religion and the church. Such an ideological confrontation between 'progressive' and conservative forces was not clearly expressed until 1917. However, it has subsequently evolved into an open uncompromising struggle. Among its significant consequences was the emergence of that inhumane system, which, with the help of populism, demagoguery, and terror, could temporarily take over a vast living space. However, like everything false and hypocritical, it turned out to be unviable. Therefore, the decline of the Soviet system marked the collapse of the communist ideology.

One of the first who tried to create the concept of neo-Marxist ideology was Karl Mannheim. He recognized that human ideas are shaped according to social circumstances, but he also sought to deprive ideology of negative connotations, primarily due to totalitarian dictatorships. The leading role belonged to political ideologies that restrained criticism of these regimes and advocated brutal regimented subjugation. Therefore, ideologies unify and serve as an instrument of social control, ensuring approval and submission.⁹

According to Mannheim, ideologies appear and become dominant when a particular political system begins to free itself from the direct power of inherited traditions and the direct dictate of religious and philosophical canons.¹⁰ Karl Mannheim sought to trace the dynamics of ideological content across history. He, in particular, concluded that reality distortion occurs throughout all stages of ideology formation and functioning. Accordingly, none of the social groups has objective truth, and ideology does not contain such truth. Because the ideological process does not result in the purification of human knowledge from error, the criteria of truth and untruths do not apply to it. According to the scientist, truth is

⁹ Fedir Kyryliuk, *Filosofiya politychnoyi ideolohiyi* [Philosophy of Political Ideology], Kyiv, Tsentr uchbovoyi literatury, 2009, p. 15.

¹⁰ Karl Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 94-98.

an attribute of an object that does not depend on the forms of involvement of this object in cognitive procedures: truth is represented by a fundamental process of knowledge. Therefore, Yaroslav Dashkevych believes that Karl Mannheim rejected Marx's identification of ideology with false consciousness and emphasized the functions of ideology and its efforts to protect the existing system.¹¹

According to Olga Zazdravna, the appeal to the phenomenon of ideology in our time requires a revision of the deep foundations of human social existence. In particular, a conceptual revision of the fundamental paradigms of all social life and, above all, the paradigms of ideological knowledge is inevitable. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to solve the following problems. First, the difficulties in identifying socio-cultural origins prompted the formation and development of ideology. They later began to determine changes in its role and functions in society. In this case, it is natural to turn to ideological archetypes. Second, the issues related to the causes and consequences of revising ideological variables. Exploring the intricacies of how mass consciousness functions helps to understand this challenge.

Furthermore, thirdly, the issues of life's fulfilment – a historical substrate, rather than theoretical constructions – constitute the leitmotif of all of Mannheim's research.¹² Karl Mannheim singled out two critical aspects of the concept of 'ideology': particular and total. Particular ideology expresses the ideas and perceptions of the individual regarding his position in society. Total ideology is the ideology of an epoch or a class, the study of which is the sociology of modern society's directions and concepts in the context of the formation of the individual's spiritual world.¹³ Mannheim disregarded a key issue in developing his social theory in the spirit of liberalism: the effect of national spiritual factors on the formation of a national (state) ideology. The position of Karl Mannheim in this context was rather one-sided. In addition, as an example of more thorough thinking, one should cite the opinion of the Ukrainian scientist Yuriy Rymarenko that the 'national spirit' is the leading and sometimes the sole indicator of a nation. Therefore, one should proceed from the fact that one of the most effective forms

¹¹ Yaroslav Dashkevych, *Ukrayina u vohni ideolohiy* [Ukraine in the Fire of Ideologies], in Kis' Roman, *Final Tret'oho Rymu (Rosiys'ka ideya na zlami tysyacholit')* [The Final of the Third Rome (Russian idea at the turn of the millennium)], Lviv, Publishing House of the Basilian Fathers "Missionary", 1998, p. XI.

¹² Olga Zazdravna, *Ideologiya v evolyutsionuyuchomu sotsiumi* [Ideology in an evolving society], dissertatsiya na soiskaniye uchenoy stepeni doktora filosofskikh nauk, spetsial'nost': 09.00.03 [Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, specialty: 09.00.03], Kharkiv, 2002, p. 51-52.

¹³ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 49.

of expressing the 'national spirit' is through national ideology.¹⁴

The transformation of Russian imperial tradition into Bolshevism ideology had a profound negative context for Ukraine. An essential methodological point should be made here because the search-cognitive paradigm of this study first provides a dialectical approach to the analysis of ideological processes. The most visible manifestation of ideology is dogma, which results from the absolutization of ideological schemes and their transformation into values themselves, including all other social values. This specificity of ideology makes other alternatives impossible and suppresses personal self-awareness. The main direction of the Russian imperial tradition was manifested in expansion against Ukraine. At the same time, state ideology played a significant role. In particular, this was most noticeable during Bolshevism's suppression of the Ukrainian national ideology.

In general, studying the transformation of Bolshevism from a class ideology to an imperialist ideology is a timely topic, especially given the threat posed by modern Russian neo-imperialism to Europe. Due to the versatility of the topic, this research does not engage in providing exhaustive information.

THE ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL TRADITION. THE CONCEPT OF 'MOSCOW – THE THIRD ROME'

After the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans and the fall of Constantinople in the second half of the 15th century, Moscow Rus remained the last independent country in the Orthodox world, which gave rise to the idea of Moscow's spiritual dominance.¹⁵ Therefore, the ideological project 'Moscow – the Third Rome' emerged, rooted in the imperial tradition.

According to Anthony Smith, the Moscow state was a spiritual reduction of Byzantium and the Kyiv state. The conquest of Byzantium by the Turks allowed them to secure its reputation as the 'last bastion of true faith'. Consequently, the Moscow rulers deliberately adopted Byzantine court ceremonies and symbols.

¹⁴ Yuriy Rymarenko, *Natsional'na samosvidomist': vykhid u praktyku Etnonatsional'nyy rozvytok Ukrainy: terminy, vyznachennya, personaliyi* [National self-consciousness: putting into practice Ethnonational development of Ukraine: terms, definitions, personalities], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 1993, p. 73-80.

¹⁵ Oleksander Sytnyk, *Protystoyannya ukrayins'koyi ta moskovs'koyi seredn'ovichnykh ideolohichnykh tradytsiy* [Confrontation of Ukrainian and Moscow medieval ideological traditions], in *Istorychna pam'yat': naukovyy zbirnyk* [Historical memory, a scientific collection], Vol. 37, Poltava, 2017, p. 44-45.

Furthermore, the idea of Orthodox Moscow as a unique 'third Rome'¹⁶ evolved gradually. The concept of the 'Roman kingdom' advanced by Philotheus of Pskov (Rus. *Filofei*), the Moscow Orthodox ideologist, was used to substantiate that. He argued that after the decline of Ancient Rome and Byzantium, the bearers of the ideal kingdom concept, the image of the 'Roman kingdom' should have passed on to the Moscow kingdom. At the same time, the 'Roman Kingdom' was viewed as an ideal kingdom in terms of integrating Christian religion with state power.¹⁷ Michel Heller's observation that the political concept of the Moscow autocracy and – 'Moscow – the Third Rome' originated in monasteries should be taken into account. They were the only source of information and the centre of political and spiritual life during the Tatar "yoke."¹⁸ However, in the process of confrontation with the despotic 'yoke', these centres gradually became not only and not so much spreaders of Christianity but genuine foundations of monarchical despotism.

From the moment that Moscow became a state, active work began to shape society's perception of the new power. The tendency to depict authority as 'sacred' was especially essential in this process. Thus, the 'Moscow – the Third Rome' concept emerged. Later it became the ideological weapon of Russian imperialism.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich sought to accomplish the goal of creating a unified Orthodox empire with the support of church reform. At the same time, the Moscow state needed to legitimize its power. This was an attempt to refer to the legacy of Genghis Khan, which was the reason for the first conquests. However, later the Orthodox Church took over this role. Her religious exaltation and xenophobia soon transformed into megalomania, according to Alain Besançon, after the small and insignificant Moscow principality proclaimed itself the 'Third Rome'. Along with the cult of the true God, the church's identification with the state saw the rise of idolatrous self-admiration and the religion of Russianness. What used to be defined as religion became an element of the state. As a result, the state gradually fused into religion.¹⁹ As Michel Heller rightly noted, the Church

¹⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant, and Republic*, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008, p. 88-90.

¹⁷ Oleksander Sytnyk, *Formuvannya ta evolyutsiya ideolohichnykh kontseptsiy natsional'no-derzhavnyts'koho spryamuvannya v Ukraini (vid pochatku XIX st. – do 1939 r.)* [Formation and Evolution of Ideological Concepts of Nation-State Orientation in Ukraine (from the beginning of the 19th Century to 1939)], Donetsk, Nuolidzh, 2009, p. 117-118.

¹⁸ Michel Heller, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

¹⁹ Alain Besançon, *Les frontières de l'Europe*, in Chantal Delsol, Jean-François Mattéi (Eds.), *L'identité de l'Europe*, Presses Universitaires de France, 2010, p. 78-79.

needed Moscow as a stronghold of Orthodoxy. Therefore, the Church supported the policy of the Moscow princes in every possible way. In turn, the Moscow rulers needed a church to legitimize their power.²⁰ In the formation of the Muscovite state, the idea of the 'third Rome', taken from the heritage of Byzantium, began to be identified with state omnipotence. At the same time, Moscow placed itself above Constantinople.

According to Jardar Østbø, the myth of Moscow as the Third Rome is considered a rather striking example of the desire for ideologically motivated expansion. Ideologically, this was inherent not only in Russia but also in the Soviet Union.²¹ This tendency manifested first in Bolshevism and later into neo-imperialism. Its essence lay in the despotic oppression of its own people and external expansion.

Modern Russian scholars tend to associate the ideology of 'Moscow is the Third Rome' with the idea of a messianic pan-Orthodoxy and derive this ideological and political doctrine from the history of the Orthodox Church. Moscow as the Third Rome became the prevailing ideology of Muscovite Russia.²² However, according to Roman Kis, the doctrine of 'Moscow – the Third Rome' essentially contradicted even the principles of the Russian messianism promoted by it because these principles only formally featured signs of universality. In practice, the monk Philotheus of Pskov's concept of 'Moscow – the Third Rome', aimed to dissociate from the world in self-sufficiency, rather than take part in it. Thus, Moscow placed itself above Constantinople and even broke with it.²³ While Muscovites adopted the notion of a 'third Rome', that is, state omnipotence, from Byzantium during the formation of the Muscovite state, Ukraine-Rus' promoted the ideology of the 'Second Jerusalem', the holy land.

On the other hand, 'Holy Russia' has turned into a primary concern in Ukraine. This ideology subsequently led to the spiritual mind issue in Ukrainian literature. It was not about the intellect but about the rational soul, feeding on the 'inner word' of the heart (Theodosius Pechersky), 'intellectual love' (Grigory Konissky), or the wisdom of the 'inner man' (Grigory Skovoroda). As a result of such an understanding, there was no sharp gap in the Ukrainian mentality

²⁰ Michel Heller, op. cit., p. 248.

²¹ Jardar Østbø, *The New Third Rome: Readings of a Russian Nationalist Myth*, Stuttgart, "Ibidem" Publishing House, 2016, p. 54-55.

²² Sergey Levitskiy, *Ocherki po istorii russkoy filosofii* [Essays on the history of Russian philosophy], Vol. 1, Moskva, Kanon, 1996, p. 20.

²³ Roman Kis', *Final Tret'oho Rymu (Rosiys'ka ideya na zlami tysyacholit')* [The Final of the Third Rome (Russian idea at the turn of the millennium)], L'viv, Vydavnytstvo ottsiv Vasyliyan "Misioner", 1998, p. 185-186.

between intellect and feeling, between spirit and body, faith, and the rational sphere, which caused the tragic duality of man in Western European spirituality. Moreover, the 17th-century Metropolitan of Kyiv, Isaiah Kopinsky, even stated "The mind is higher than faith because it leads to faith".²⁴

Calling itself Russia or Great Russia, Muscovy thereby sought to establish itself as the heir and successor of Kievan Rus'. With this, the Kremlin authorities tried to prove their right to 'gather Rus' lands'. As a result, the formation of the Moscow state began, and later the Russian Empire.

IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN UKRAINE DURING THE MAJOR LIBERAL REFORMS OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH – EARLY 20TH CENTURY

The issue of urgent reform of the entire state's legal system arose in 1855, with the accession of Alexander II, a liberally inclined ruler, to the Russian throne. After all, this was required by the need to catch up with the more developed West, especially in political and legal terms.

At this time, the territory of Ukraine was divided between the Russian and Austrian empires. Thanks to Western influences, Ukraine was better positioned to implement liberal reforms. Even the part of Ukraine that belonged to the Russian state had significantly developed relations in most aspects of socio-political and economic life. Since the end of the 18th century, the process of national revival has contributed to the formation of an identity and the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation. This process acquired the features of a national liberation movement by the middle of the 19th century.

Moreover, the national aspirations of the Ukrainians combined with similar beliefs of the Poles during opposition to Russian imperialism and nationalism, which was especially noticeable in the Right-bank part of Ukraine. After all, it was there that the Poles were a significant national minority. The stay of Ukrainians and the Poles in the Russian state provided the best opportunities for the development of the Ukrainian national revival. Thus, several scientists and public and political figures of Polish origin (V. Antonovich, V. Lypynsky, and others) not only defended the rights and interests of Ukrainians but also contributed to developing their national consciousness and identity. In turn, the Russian intellectual elite (including liberals) placed imperial interests above everything else.

²⁴ Serhiy Kryms'kyy, *Pid syhnaturouy Sofiyi* [Under the Signature of Sofia], Kyiv, Vyd. dim "Kyievo-Mohylyans'ka akademiya", 2008, p. 293.

Petr Valuev, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian state at the beginning of liberal reforms, was such an example. He was seen as a moderate reformer – a liberal, in the administration. Despite this, the activities of Petr Valuev were aimed at destroying Ukrainian national identity, beginning with the preparation of the so-called Valuev circular of 1863, which significantly limited the use of the Ukrainian language. Moreover, Valuev received support from representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, who were concerned about the start of the Polish uprising in 1863. Even more negative consequences had the adoption in 1876 of the Ems Decree. Its author was the Russian Emperor Alexander II, who initiated liberal reforms. The purpose of the decree was to remove the Ukrainian language from the public and the cultural sphere. Consequently, Russian imperialism's approach has been defined by its determination to destroy Ukrainian national identity.

One of the serious problems of that time in the Russian state was political radicalism. It became a significant factor in slowing down the process of further reform in the countryside and caused a political reaction in the 1880s – 1890s. The rapid intensification of revolutionary terrorist activity was observed precisely after the liberal reforms of the 1860s. The evolutionary reform of the existing feudal system was not part of the plans of the radical Narodniks and other political movements because their goal was a revolutionary change. Furthermore, the inconsistency of the liberal reformism of the 1860s and 1870s contributed to the expansion of the social base of the opposition forces. After the suppression of the revolutionary and terrorist actions of the populists, the government of Alexander III launched a direct response. Moreover, many counter-reforms were carried out in the 1880s – 1890s, which to a certain extent, overturned the liberal reforms and restored some pre-reform orders, which proved an essential condition for subsequent revolutionary events at the beginning of the 20th century.

All attempts to counteract the spread and activation of revolutionary parties and movements were either ineffective or incomplete. Also unsuccessful were their attempts to reform tsarism to prevent revolutionary shifts. Moreover, the assassination of Petr Stolypin in 1911 opened the way for Bolshevism to seize power. Stolypin was considered one of the most progressive state and political figures in Russia; at the same time, he was a Russian nationalist. Ukrainians, Jews, and other empire national minorities were foreign to him. Nevertheless, the main problem of Stolypin, as well as of all power in the Russian state, was that they were caught between two more radical political forces: the chauvinists and the socialists, and this, according to Sergey Bulgakov, was the result of the lack of a

full-fledged national identity²⁵.

On the eve of and during the First World War, corruption and embezzlement, as well as the merger of bourgeois businesses with the state machinery deformed the Russian military-political system. The royal family only tried to hide or downplay these manifestations in every possible way. For many Russian patriotic nobles, this situation was unbearable. As a result, the most active supporters of radical change among the military nobility decided to join the Bolsheviks. They saw in the revolutionary government a new imperial force capable of creating a more efficient centralized state-legal system and forming a new ideology to replace the outdated 'Orthodoxy – autocracy – nationality'. Many talented and determined generals and officers consciously joined the Red Army, where they began to occupy the highest command posts, which, in turn, allowed the Bolsheviks to suppress both external and internal opponents. Moreover, later, the same fate awaited the noble officers, who could not understand in time the insidious and self-devouring essence of Bolshevism. At the same time, Bolshevism obtained a solid foundation and support for its shift from a class ideology to an imperialist ideology.

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL AND POLITICAL IDENTITY UNDER THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE BOLSHEVIK IDEOLOGY

The influence of the Bolshevik ideology on the Ukrainian identity within the Soviet Union is quite widely represented in historiography. Summarizing its main aspects, it is essential to note the works that reveal the origins and preconditions of Soviet totalitarianism.

Pavlo Shtepa cited some testimonies from foreign authors about the imperial nature of the power of the Kremlin regime. He, in particular, changed the name 'monarchism' to 'Bolshevism'. However, at the same time, he did not change his primary goal – to impose his ideas about the social and political structure of the whole world.²⁶ According to Pavlo Shtepa, Marxism was based not only on materialism. Thanks to Marxism, Moscow's tsarism was transformed into Bolshevism. Furthermore, the myth of the Moscow rulers about the 'Third Rome'

²⁵ Sergey Bulgakov, *Geroizm i podvizhnichestvo (Iz razmyshleniy o religioznoy prirode russkoy intelligentsii)* [Heroism and asceticism (From reflections on the religious nature of the Russian intelligentsia)], in *Vekhi – Iz glubiny* [Milestones – From the depths], Moscow, Pravda, 1991, p. 65.

²⁶ Pavlo Shtepa, *Moskovstvo* [Muscovite], Drohobych, Vidrodzhennya, 2000, p. 272-273.

turned into the myth about the 'Third International'. Instead of the Third Rome, the Bolsheviks created the Third International, which absorbed many aspects of the Moscow Third Rome. It became a manifestation of the old Moscow messianism, not an international but a native Moscow ideology.²⁷

According to Roman Brzeski, the Bolshevik government tried in a certain way to restore some of the attributes of the Russian Empire. The Bolsheviks sought to replace Orthodoxy with their quasi-religion, communism. On this basis, they built a new imperial ideology. One of its fundamental principles was that 'workers of all countries unite'. It was in it that the main goal of Bolshevism was expressed: the creation of a world empire of 'proletarians' with a centre in Moscow.²⁸ The idea of a world revolution has become one of the most pressing topics among Bolshevik ideologists. At the same time, they were ready to sacrifice national traditions and interests.

As stated by Nikolai Berdyaev, Bolshevism was the third emergence of Russian great power and imperialism (after the Muscovite kingdom and the Petrine empire). He advocated a strong and centralized state. And in the very essence of Bolshevism, there was a combination of the will to social truth with the will to state power. The latter turned out to be stronger, which made Bolshevism a powerful militarized force.²⁹

Stepan Lenkavsky noted that traditional Russian despotism was preserved in the form developed by Lenin, the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship. Tsarist state centralism transformed into the Russian interpretation of Stalin's USSR federation, which was infused with party Bolshevik ideology. At the same time, Soviet pledges to "protect the world proletariat" reflected Russian messianism. Russian imperialism continued in the Soviet imperialist plans for a world proletarian revolution and a world communist state. Furthermore, Great Russian patriotism was replaced by 'Soviet patriotism'.³⁰ Gradually, the separation of Bolshevism from the theory of Marxism increased. The Bolsheviks' declaration of the "right of nations to self-determination" had been, in reality, replaced with a

²⁷ Idem, *Ukrayinets' i moskvyn: dvi protylezhnosti* [Ukraine and Muscovite: two opposites], Drohobych, Vidrodzhennya, 2008, s. 203.

²⁸ Roman Brzeski, *'Bila knyha'. Natsional'na i sotsial'na polityka sovyetiv na sluzhbi moskovs'koho imperializmu* ['White Paper'. National and social policy of the Soviets in the service of Moscow imperialism], Kyiv, Ukrayins'ka vydavnycha spilka, 2008, s. 34-36.

²⁹ Nikolai Berdyaev, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

³⁰ Stepan Lenkavsky, *Natsional'na polityka bol'shevykiv v Ukrayini* [National Policy of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine], in Stepan Lenkavsky, *Ukrayins'kyi natsionalizm. Tvory v 2-kh tt.* [Ukrainian Nationalism. Works in 2 vol.], Vol. 2, Ivano-Frankiv'sk, Lileya-NV, 2003, p. 41.

commitment to form a 'united Soviet people'.

According to Jörg Baberowski, from the very beginning, the Bolshevik experiment was based on ideological promises.³¹ Moreover, according to the eyewitness of those events, Vsevolod Volin, the Bolsheviks were not even going to fulfil them. Moreover, the mass of the population that brought them to power was rapidly subdued by their ruthless rule.³² Having seized power, the Bolsheviks made terror and violence official state policy. Instead of a despotic autocracy, their leader, Lenin, attempted to establish a Soviet authoritarian system in the former Russian Empire.

Vladimir Lenin outlined the Bolsheviks' ideological program in his "April Theses." It called for the establishment of a 'commune state', the nationalization of land, and the creation of Soviet farms. Lenin interpreted the course of history in his works rather primitively and schematically: the bourgeois revolution is the first stage of the revolution, followed by the dictatorship of the proletariat, which, in turn, will initiate the creation of a classless society.³³ Thus, throughout history, the schematic approach set the purpose and meaning of social development. Even Lenin's opponents began to think in terms of the bourgeois and proletarian revolution. Significant masses of the population became dependent on the primitive populism of Lenin.³⁴ As a result, the Bolshevik populism in the form of massive propaganda and agitation claimed the status of trans ideology, with the further aim of preparing for the world revolution. In this context, Ukraine has long been viewed as a resource and human base for effectively achieving these goals.

Separately, the situation of the Ukrainian national-political identity in the context of the rise of Bolshevism should not be overlooked. Serhii Plokhyy investigated Ukraine's Bolshevik hybrid national policy. This, in his opinion, presented itself as national communism. Ukrainian national communists became one of the Bolsheviks' instruments in the power struggle.³⁵ At the same time, the Bolsheviks used the policy of indigenization to strengthen their power

³¹ Jörg Baberowski, *Der rote Terror: Die Geschichte des Stalinismus*, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 2007, p. 99-103.

³² Vsevolod Volin, *Neizvestnaya revolyutsiya* [Unknown revolution. 1917 – 1921], Moskva, NPTS "Praksis", 2005, p. 137-138.

³³ Vladimir Lenin, *Izbrannyye sochineniya* [Selected works], Vol. 7, Moskva, Politizdat, 1985, p. 258.

³⁴ Christoph Lindenberg, *Die Technik des Bösen: Zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus*, Stuttgart, Verlag Freies Geistesleben, 1979, p. 39-40.

³⁵ Serhii Plokhyy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, New York, Basic Books, 2015, p. 231.

in the USSR. The leaders of the Bolshevik Party viewed nationalism as a natural stage in the development of human society. Therefore, they were convinced that the people of the USSR should be allowed to pass through this stage as quickly as possible.³⁶

In general, the national question was one of the most controversial issues in Bolshevik ideology. The process of indigenization was merely one component of a larger scheme to construct an imaginary communist society. Furthermore, the political view of national communism, in our opinion, has become an integral part of Bolshevism's populist trans-ideology.

The strategy of indigenization fuelled the 'Ukrainization' process in the 1920s. Zynoviy Antonyuk points out that at that time, representatives of the national communist elite requested that the concept of 'Ukrainization' should be replaced with the term 'de-Russification', because, in the opinion of those who carried out the 'Ukrainization', the issue was not merely replacing Russian with Ukrainian but removing Russian imperial strata from Ukrainian identity.³⁷ However, Bolshevik leaders miscalculated this. Indeed, in many national outskirts of the former Russian Empire, manifestations of the opposition have already acquired the traits of a national liberation movement. First, this took place in Ukraine. However, during the 1920s, these anti-communist movements were brutally suppressed. Consequently, national communism remained one of Bolshevism's major challenges.³⁸

National communism in Ukraine could not create a separate ideological trend or a specific political force. The National Communists, unlike the Bolsheviks, could not achieve significant ideological influence on the masses and enlist their support. At the time, the Ukrainian nation mainly consisted of peasants. As Stanislav Kulchitsky rightly notes, land ownership was the main interest of Ukrainian peasants.³⁹ Thus, social ideas and economic factors were more attractive to the Ukrainian peasantry than the prospect of creating a national identity, which is precisely what the Bolsheviks were able to exploit. At first, they

³⁶ Idem, *Lost Kingdom. A History of Russian Nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin*, New York, Basic Books, 2017, p. 234-238.

³⁷ Zynoviy Antonyuk, *Konspekt samousvidomlennya* [Synopsis of self-awareness], Part 2, Kharkiv-Kyiv, Dukh i litera, 2007, p. 60.

³⁸ Andreas Kappeler, *Nerivni braty. Ukrayintsi ta rosiyany vid seredn'ovichchya do suchasnosti* [Unequal brothers. Ukrainians and Russians from the Middle Ages to the present], Chernivtsi, Knyhy – XXI, 2018, p. 196.

³⁹ Stanislav Kulchytsky, *Rosiy's'ka revolyutsiya 1917 roku: novyy pohlyad* [The Russian Revolution of 1917: A New Look], Kyiv, Nash Chas, 2008, p. 60-61.

seized the initiative to influence the peasantry in the Ukrainian Social Revolutionary Party. Later, the Bolsheviks managed to neutralize the National Communists as well.

The so-called 'Ukrainization' was formal. The Bolsheviks used it primarily to distract nationally conscious Ukrainians from the struggle for their own state. Consequently, 'Ukrainization' actually turned out to be a cover for the anti-Ukrainian policy of the Bolsheviks. Since the late 1920s, the Bolshevik regime has intensified its fight against 'local nationalism', which destroyed modest manifestations of Ukrainian national identity that had emerged during this time. As a result, conditions were created for the further development of the 'Russian World' in Ukraine, as well as the deformation of Ukrainians' cultural and national identity, perpetuating the policy of cultural discrimination against Ukrainians that once took place in the Russian Empire. However, the Bolsheviks exerted far more oppressive pressure on the Ukrainian nation during the 1920s and early 1930s. In this regard, the Bolshevik totalitarian regime surpassed the imperial autocratic regime. At the same time, the Bolsheviks sought to crush the national identity of Ukrainians. Thus, the Bolsheviks employed communist ideology primarily as a cover for their imperial aspirations. Ukrainians and other peoples of the former Russian Empire were recipients of this policy.

The particular danger of Bolshevism was that it became the ideology of the geopolitical dimension. It was an experiment with humankind never witnessed before in history, aimed at destroying spiritual and national shrines. More specifically, a mechanism was launched to create a macro-model of economic, financial, and political separation from the geopolitical game of the Russian state. Furthermore, this was accomplished through the revolutionary seizure of political power. In this set of events, the national-political identity of Ukrainians was also destroyed.

CONCLUSIONS

The ideological foundation of the imperial tradition began to evolve in the Muscovite state in the 15th century. Built at the cost of neighbouring territories, the emergence of the Russian Empire itself originated around the end of the 17th century. One of the most critical components of this empire was Ukraine. Many Ukrainians, such as spiritual leaders, scientists, and military men became essential supporters of the imperial state's defence. At the same time, the native language of Ukrainians was one of the primary means of preserving their own identity; Ukrainians have always defended their right to their language. Ukrainians were

subjected to systemic Russification in the Russian Empire beginning in the second half of the 18th century, with the most intense Russification occurring in the 19th century in Ukrainian regions that were part of the Russian Empire, whose policy in the second half of the 19th century was to erase Ukrainian national identity.

During the 19th – early 20th centuries, the Russian state established itself as a despotic empire, with the primary goal of oppressing surrounding peoples. Distinguished by its determination to achieve its imperial objectives in nearly any corner of Europe and Asia, it did not achieve noticeable success because of issues such as the feudal serf system, the autocratic-despotic nature of power, and the bureaucratic corruption apparatus. The backwardness and corruption of the autocratic monarchy became most visible during the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. After the February Revolution and the Bolshevik putsch, the Russian Empire began to fall apart.

Nevertheless, the Bolshevik regime that replaced it only continued the policy of neo-imperial expansionism. The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia was a natural result of the moral and spiritual degradation of the royal elite, led by Emperor Nicholas II. During the civil war unleashed by the Bolsheviks, the process of creating states on the territory of the former Russian Empire began. The expanses of the empire, freed from the tsarist autocracy, were filled with new state formations, founded by various national and semi-national (for example, Cossack) movements. During this time, the Ukrainian People's Republic emerged as an alternative to Russia's imperial legacy and Bolshevism's ideology. However, the lack of a unified constructive and integrating ideological concept aimed at protecting national interests among patriotic Ukrainians led to the defeat of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The transformation of Bolshevism from a class ideology into an imperialist ideology naturally led to the strengthening of the aggressive policies of this regime. At the same time, Russian expansionism was clearly directed against Ukraine, although, for the sake of objectivity, it should be said that many other peoples and nations suffered from Russian imperialism and its Soviet incarnation. Russian imperialism sought the destruction of Ukrainian national identity. The Bolshevik regime acted more insidiously. Having achieved complete control over the nation, the Bolsheviks enforced absolute terror and genocide against minorities despite their original claims of national equality and progress. This practice occurs even in our time on the part of Russian neo-imperialism, making it one of the most serious threats to the democratic, civilized world.

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PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE POWER IN A MIXED REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT. THEORY AND UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE

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Abstract: *The question of the relationship between the head of state and the executive branch is of fundamental importance in governance. In a presidential republic, the president is functionally and structurally integrated into the executive branch and heads the system of relevant bodies. In a parliamentary republic, the president is distant from the executive branch. In a mixed republican form of government, the president is not a structural component of the executive branch but is substantially integrated with it by functional duties. The level of this combination is significant and causes a dualism of executive power. The presence of the two leading executive bodies prevents abuse of executive power. This issue is becoming extremely important for many post-Soviet republics.*

Keywords: *mixed form, republican form, government, head of state, president, executive power, dualism of executive power, division of competence.*

Rezumat: *Președintele și puterea executivă într-o formă republicană mixtă de guvernământ: teorie și experiență ucraineană. Problema relației dintre șeful statului și puterea executivă este de o importanță fundamentală în guvernare. Într-o republică prezidențială, instituția prezidențială este integrată funcțional și structural în cadrul puterii executive, conducând sistemul organelor relevante. Într-o republică parlamentară, președintele este îndepărtat practice de puterea executivă. Într-o formă de guvernământ*

republicană mixtă, instituția prezidențială nu este o componentă structurală a puterii executive, ci este integrată substanțial cu aceasta, prin atribuțiile funcționale. În acest fel, se provoacă un dualism al puterii executive. Prezența celor două organe executive de conducere împiedică, cel puțin în principiu, abuzul de puterea executivă. Această problemă este extrem de importantă pentru multe republici post-sovietice.

INTRODUCTION

The peculiarities of the President's rapport with the executive power mostly reflect the essence of the accepted form of government. Each type of republic presupposes its own, unique way of relating the president and the executive. In modern republics, significant differences are found both in the way the president is combined with the executive branch and in the degree to which this combination is affected. While in a presidential republic the president is united with the executive branch structurally and heads the system of its bodies, the president in a parliamentary republic is as distant from the executive branch as possible. In a mixed republican form of government, the president is removed from the executive branch structurally, but is significantly integrated into it functionally. Different ways of relating the president to the executive are based on dissimilar doctrinal approaches to understanding the functional nature of the president and his role in the state mechanism. The whole history of the development of the republican form of government is marked by the search for the optimal structural and functional relationship between the president and the executive branch. The diversity of modern republics reflects the results of that search. At the same time, the variability of the republican form of government shows that the search for the optimal model of the president's relationship with the executive branch is not complete.

Naturally, the question of the president's relationship with the executive remains relevant for many countries with underdeveloped civil society and insufficient influence exerted by political parties on the state mechanism. In these conditions, the need to ensure government stability makes it inevitable to strengthen the constitutional means of influencing the executive branch by the president. For countries with weak democratic political institutions, the dilemma of the need to introduce strong presidential power while limiting the risk it poses is particularly clear¹. The theoretical preconditions for resolving this dilemma are

¹ A. Arutiunyan, *Institut prezidenta Respubliki Armeniya. Sravnitelno-pravovoj analiz* [Institution of the President of the Republic of Armenia. Comparative legal analysis],

directly related to establishing the functional nature of the president and his optimal relationship with the executive branch.

The analysis of the models underlying the relationship between the president and the executive branch is inseparable from the issue of the form of government, so it is an adjacent subject of research in many scientific papers on this issue. In such a broad context, the study of the ways in which the president relates to the executive branch, their advantages and disadvantages, inevitably becomes generalized. At the same time, in their research, several scholars directly address the issue of competencies between the president and the system of executive bodies. In particular, the American scholars Matthew Shugart and John Carey extensively analyse the shortcomings of the “rigid” separation of powers in the presidential form of government and its acceptable model for the relationship between the president and the executive². Giovanni Sartori, an Italian and American researcher, was one of the first in Western political science to analyse the model of competencies between the president and the government in a mixed republican form of government and he revealed the essence of the hallmark of this form of government – the dualism of executive power³. The phenomenon of dualism of executive power in a mixed republican form of government is also studied by Irish scholars Robert Elgie and Iain McMenamin⁴. Competent relations between the President and the Government in the Fifth French Republic as the first “full-fledged” mixed republican form of government in modern history are studied by the French scientist Philippe Ardant⁵. The methods of the relationship between the president and the executive branch in modern republican forms of government are studied by Russian scientist Oleg Zaznaev⁶. The issue of competencies between the president and the government in a mixed republican form of government, the President of Ukraine,

Yerevan, Mkhitar Gosh, 1996, p. 65.

² M. Shugart, J. Carey, *Prezidentskie sistemy* [Presidential systems], in <https://info.wikireading.ru/241644>.

³ J. Sartori, *Porivnialna konstytutsiina inzheneriia: Doslidzhennia struktur, motyviv i rezultativ* [Comparative Constitutional Engineering: A Study of Structures, Motives, and Outcomes], Kyiv, ArtEk, 2001, 224 p.

⁴ R. Elgie, I. McMenamin, *Razdelennaya ispolnitelnaya vlast i demokratizaciya v poluprezidentskih sistemah* [Divided executive power and democratization in semi-presidential systems], in “Political Science”, 2014, No. 3, pp. 40-59.

⁵ Ph. Ardant, *Franciya: gosudarstvennaya sistema* [France: The State System], Moskva, Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1994, 175 p.

⁶ O. Zaznaev, *Poluprezidentskaya sistema: teoreticheskie i prikladnye aspekty* [Semi-Presidential System: Theoretical and Applied Aspects], Kazan, Kazan State University named after Ulyanov-Lenin, 2006, 374 p.

and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in particular, is most thoroughly revealed in the works of such Ukrainian scholars as Vadym Averyanov⁷, Volodymyr Shapoval⁸, Yurii Barabash⁹, Anastasia Repetska and Vira Burdyak¹⁰. These Ukrainian scholars studied, in particular, the peculiarities and shortcomings of the dualism of executive power, enshrined in the original and current versions of the Constitution of Ukraine.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE HEAD OF STATE AND EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE PRACTICE OF MODERN REPUBLIC: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DOCTRINAL APPROACHES

Different approaches to determining the constitutional and legal status of the president caused significant variability in the modern republican form of government. In essence, each type of republic reflects a certain, uniquely peculiar way of relating the president to the executive power. In particular, among the political scientists of the United States of America, doctrinal ideas prevail, according to which the functions of the head of state and the head of executive power should be combined in the status of the president. According to this approach, the role of the president in the state mechanism is associated with the exercise of executive power. In the presidential form of government, the integration of the head of state into the executive power is justified by the idea of a "strict" separation of powers, which requires a structural combination of all state authorities with one of the three "separated powers". Under the conditions of "rigid" separation of powers, the government as an independent higher collegial body of executive power does not exist, just as the position of prime minister does not exist, and all the traditional powers of the government are covered by the

⁷ V. Averyanov, *Dualizm vykonavchoi vlady u svitli konstytutsiinoho vdoskonalennia formy derzhavnoho pravlinnia v Ukraini* [Dualism of executive power in the light of constitutional improvement of the form of government in Ukraine], in "Visnyk Konstytutsiynoho Sudu Ukrainy", 2010, No. 3, pp. 106-115.

⁸ V. Shapoval, *Vykonavcha vlada v Ukraini u konteksti formy derzhavnoho pravlinnia (dosvid pislia pryiniattia Konstytutsii Ukrainy 1996 roku)* [Executive power in Ukraine in the context of the form of government (experience after the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996)], in "Pravo Ukrainy", 2016, No. 4, pp. 72-88.

⁹ Yu. Barabash, *Prezydentska vlada u zmishanykh respublikakh: okremi pytannia teorii ta praktyky* [Presidential power in mixed republics: some issues of theory and practice], in "Pravo Ukrainy", 2014, No. 8, pp. 67-76.

¹⁰ A. Repetska, V. Burdyak, *The Constitutional Basis for the Separation of Powers in Ukraine*, in "Codrul Cosminului", XXVI, 2020, No. 1, pp. 143-168.

competence of the president. Therefore, in a presidential republic the executive power is personified by the head of state and given to him in personal form. This explains why the presidential republic does not know the dualism of executive power¹¹ – a distinctive feature of a mixed republican form of government, in which the president and the prime minister often compete with each other for the dominant influence on government activities.

In a presidential republic, the concentration of executive powers in the hands of the president creates a serious risk not only of abuse of executive power and permanent conflicts between the legislative and executive authorities¹², but also of the decline of democratic political institutions in general, and only a developed civil society can prevent this.

The parliamentary republic, the prototype of which was the British parliamentary monarchy (and its theoretical basis is the English concept of the supremacy of the parliament), was introduced in several leading Western European countries in the post-war period. The establishment of parliamentary republics on the European continent was facilitated, in particular, by the fact that having just finished with fascism, which was associated with such “leaders” as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, the societies of the respective countries showed fear of the strong power of the president, legitimized by direct elections.

A parliamentary republic is characterized by maximum weakening of the functional relationships between the president and the executive power. Here, the role of the president in the state mechanism is limited to the exercise of powers related mainly to the foreign policy representation of the state and the leadership of the country’s armed forces. In general, under the conditions of a parliamentary republic, any powers of the head of state must be evaluated in the context of the use of the institution of countersignature, which significantly determines and limits the value of the formal and legal means of the president’s influence on the executive power. The institution of countersignature determines the “connection” of the president’s actions with the political will of the prime minister. Since the president of the parliamentary republic exercises his constitutional competence at the initiative of the government or with its sanction, the competence of the president turns into the sphere of government activity. The government controls practically all the activities of the president: the act of the head of state becomes effective as a result of its binding by the prime minister, if it is a document of

¹¹ R. Elgie, I. McMenemy, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹² Juan J. Linz, *Opasnosti prezidentstva* [The Perils of Presidentialism], in *Politologiya: Hrestomatiya* [Political Science: Reader]. Sankt-Peterburg, Piter, 2006, p. 50.

general political content, and (or) by the corresponding minister, if it is a document in a certain field of administration.

Implementation of the idea of distancing the president from the executive power in a parliamentary republic is difficult to consider successful. Limiting the influence of the president on the executive power inevitably leads to a corresponding expansion of the competence of the prime minister. The concentration of executive power in the hands of the prime minister in a parliamentary republic replaces the danger of a one-person presidential dictatorship with the danger of a narrowly collegial dictatorship¹³. The threat of this dictatorship is determined precisely by the absence of a “strong”, independent, and opposite parliament in the sense of the party affiliation of the president. In the parliamentary form of government, the potential subject of this dictatorship is the prime minister as the leader of the parliamentary majority and the government headed by him. Only the diversity of the party system and the government instability it generates neutralize the potential authoritarian tendencies of classical parliamentarism.

The concept of a mixed republican form of government, first implemented in 1958 in the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, describes the president as a functionally “neutral” element of the state mechanism. The functionally “neutral” nature of the president cannot be rigidly tied to any of the “separated powers”. In a mixed republican form of government, the president is structurally removed from the executive power, and, at the same time, he does not form a separate branch of power. He plays the role of a coordinator-arbiter, who ensures the coordinated interaction of the highest state bodies, hence the effectiveness of the state mechanism. The doctrinal approach, which defines the president as the guarantor of the unity of state power and coordinator-arbiter, makes it impossible for him to be structurally or even functionally integrated into any branch of government, which could lead to his dominant role in the relevant field. The status of a coordinator-arbiter, in particular, makes it inadmissible to identify the president with the executive power. This would contradict his mediating role in conflicts between the highest bodies of the state and would prevent the implementation of the principle of separation of powers. The president can head the executive branch or be an arbiter in the system based on the separation of powers but cannot combine both roles. In a mixed republican form of government, the president has substantial executive powers, but he is not a structural element

¹³ D. Gorovic, *Razlichiya demokratij* [Differences among democracies], in <http://old.russ.ru>.

of the executive power.

It is obvious that in terms of the organization of executive power, a mixed republican form of government has a fundamental advantage over classical republics. In a mixed republican form of government, there are two leading centres of executive power – the president and the government. This important circumstance makes it impossible to concentrate executive power in the hands of the president or the prime minister. Therefore, in a mixed republican form of government, the possibility of abuse of executive power by either the president (a flaw of a presidential republic) or the prime minister (a flaw of a parliamentary republic) is significantly limited.

DUALISTIC ORGANIZATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER AS THE MODEL OF COMPETENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT IN A MIXED REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT

In a mixed republican form of government, the level of functional combination of the president with the executive power causes its dualism. This feature of the organization of the executive branch is of fundamental importance for the classification of the form of government as a mixed republican form of government. The very concept of “dualism of the executive branch” reflects a significant functional combination of the president with the executive branch and the constitutionally determined division between the two entities of the head of state and the government. The variability of balance of power between the president and the government is inherent to mixed republican forms of government, but it is important that the form of government remains a mixed republican form of government as long as it preserves the dualism of executive power.

The constitutions of countries with a mixed republican form of government seldom contain provisions that directly indicate the joint exercise of executive power by the president and the government (Part 2 of Article 10 of the Constitution of Poland of 1997¹⁴, Clause 3 of the Basic Law of Finland of 1999)¹⁵, but always establish its dualism by means of distributing relevant competencies. Since the dualistic organization of the executive power potentially complicates the pro-

¹⁴ *Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997*, in <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>.

¹⁵ *Constitution of Finland of June 11, 1999*, in https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland_2011

cess of joint decision-making by the president and the government (prime minister) in conditions of party opposition between these subjects, the constitutions of states with a mixed republican form of government sometimes require the president to interact with the government or members of the government in certain areas of authority activities. For example, Part 3 of Article 133 of the Constitution of Poland of 1997 stipulates: "The President of the Republic in the field of foreign policy interacts with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the competent minister"¹⁶. Article 99 of the Croatian Constitution of 1990 establishes that "the President of the Republic and the Government of the Republic of Croatia cooperate in the formation and implementation of foreign policy"¹⁷.

The dualistic organization of the executive branch presupposes the existence of its two leading centres – the government and the president, which are connected not structurally but functionally. The relationship of these entities with the executive is not the same: despite the fact that the government is the highest governing body, the president is united with the executive by means of his executive powers¹⁸. Such powers, although vested in the president, are executive in their legal nature¹⁹.

Thus, the dualistic organization of the executive branch presupposes not a structural but a functional cooperation of the president with it. The common approach for the mixed republican forms of government to the division of powers between the president and the prime minister in the executive branch is that although the respective powers of these entities are "intertwined", the powers of the president are crucial. As a head of state, the president is primarily responsible for resolving strategic issues, overseeing areas of government such as foreign policy and defence, and the prime minister is responsible for tactical tasks and operational, day-to-day management.

Having, in a number of cases, the right to terminate the powers of the

¹⁶ *Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997*, in <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>

¹⁷ *Constitution of the Republic of Croatia of December 22, 1990*, in <https://www.sabor.hr/en/constitution-republic-croatia-consolidated-text>.

¹⁸ V. Averyanov, *Vikonavcha vlada v Ukrayini: organizaciya ta rozvitok institutiv* [Executive power in Ukraine: organization and development of institutions], in *Derzhavotvorennia i pravotvorennia v Ukraini: dosvid, problemy, perspektyvy* [State-Building and Law-making in Ukraine: Experience, Problems, Prospects], Kyiv, Instytut derzhavy i prava im. V. M. Koretskoho, 2001, p. 139.

¹⁹ O. Petryshyn, *Forma derzhavnoho pravlinnia v Ukraini: do poshuku konstytutsiinoi modeli* [The form of government in Ukraine: to find a constitutional model], in "Pravo Ukrainy", 2014, No. 8, p. 109.

government, the right to chair its meetings and play, in fact, in accordance with the content of his constitutional powers, a leading role in areas of joint competence with the government, the president has significant influence in a mixed republican form of government. At the same time, despite its real and direct functional combination with the executive branch, the parliamentary responsibility of the government here does not lead to the early termination of the president's powers. This shows that in a mixed republican form of government, the president does not head the executive branch²⁰. The dualism of the executive does not mean that its various segments are subordinate to different centres – the president or the government – and the constitutionally determined supreme body of executive power is the government. In a mixed republican form of government, the president, given the nature of his competence, cannot be associated with any branch of government, including the executive.

The first precedent of the classical dualism of executive power was set in the Fifth French Republic. According to the 1958 Constitution of France, the President “presides over the Council of Ministers” (Article 9), and the Prime Minister “directs the activities of the Government” (Article 21)²¹. These constitutional provisions reflect the dualistic organization of the French Government, which may take the form of a Council of Ministers (a meeting of the Government chaired by the President) or a Cabinet of Ministers (a meeting of the Government chaired by the Prime Minister). In essence, the Council of Ministers is an institutionalized form of cooperation between the President and the Government, designed to ensure the unity of public policy in areas of their joint competence. Acts adopted by the Council of Ministers need to be signed by the President, the Prime Minister, and the relevant Minister. They do not come into force at the will of the President or the Government alone. As a result, the President and the Prime Minister seem to balance their prerogatives and they need to reconcile their positions each time in order to make a government decision at a meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Constitution specifies relatively clearly which issues need to be considered by the Council of Ministers. However, the issue of the division of powers between the President and the Government in the areas of their joint competence is not directly reflected in the 1958 French Constitution.

In the process of implementing the relevant constitutional provisions in the

²⁰ Ph. Ardant, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

²¹ *Constitution of the French Republic of October 4, 1958*, in <https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/constitution-of-4-october-1958>.

Fifth Republic, a mechanism for the division of executive powers of the President and the Government was developed. The practice of allocating these powers in the Fifth Republic has undergone some development. During the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, there was a kind of vertical demarcation of the joint competence of the President and the Government. The president mainly directed France's foreign and military policy. In the post-Gaullist period, a kind of horizontal division of powers was established, in which the decisions of the most general political nature are made by the President and all current management of the country is carried out by the Government. However, neither model of separation of powers is available when the President and the Prime Minister represent opposing political forces and the parliamentary majority with the Government are in opposition to the President. Under such conditions, the President is forced to seek a compromise with the Government, as, however, the same task must be solved by the Government. During "coexistence", the current public administration is concentrated mainly in the hands of the Government. At the same time, the President's sole authority, not mediated by the Prime Minister's countersignature, remains intact.

The joint competence of the president and the government reflects the desire both to combine the best features of the presidential and parliamentary forms of government in the organization of the executive branch and to avoid their shortcomings. The positive features of the dualistic organization of the executive branch are the high functional efficiency of the government, which is largely a consequence of the president's influence on its organization and activities, and the presence of a prime minister who is sufficiently independent in his decisions and actions. The consequence of the dualistic organization of the executive branch is a significant functional dependence of the president on the prime minister (government). For example, according to the French Constitution of 1958, the President cannot exercise a number of his powers without an official proposal from the Government or prior consultation with the Prime Minister (Articles 11, 12)²². In Portugal, in cases provided for by the Constitution, the President exercises his powers after hearing the opinion of the Government (paragraph f of Article 137)²³. Thus, the dualism of the executive ensures the unity of state policy pursued by two independent entities – the president and the government.

The dualistic organization of the executive branch is based on the

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of April 2, 1976*, in https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005.

realization of the common flaw of presidential and parliamentary forms of government, i. e., the concentration of executive power in the hands of the sole entity – the president or, vice versa, the prime minister. In a mixed republican form of government, this defect of the classical republics is eliminated by the dualism of executive power. The existence of two leading executive bodies, the president and the prime minister, neither of which is competent to dominate²⁴, makes it impossible for any party affiliation to concentrate executive power in the hands of one of them, thus abusing the executive branch.

Although the dualistic organization of the executive branch presupposes the leading role of the president in certain areas of government activity, it requires balancing the influence of these entities on decisions concerning their joint competence. These decisions are the result of a compromise between the president and the government. The latter is provided by the constitutional requirement to sign the acts of the President concerning the competence of the government with the signatures of the Prime Minister and (or) the responsible Minister. At the same time, in the Fifth French Republic, the mechanism of interaction between the President and the Government is more complex. Here, the President has the right to chair sessions of the Government, which consider issues related to their joint competence, and to sign the relevant acts. “The President of the Republic chairs the Council of Ministers”, “The President of the Republic signs ordinances and decrees adopted by the Council of Ministers” – such legal provisions were enshrined in the French Constitution of 1958 (Article 9; paragraph 1 of Article 13)²⁵. The practice of signing acts of the government by the president is reflected in the Constitution of Portugal of 1976 (paragraph b of Article 137)²⁶.

If the means of influencing the president and parliament on the organization and activities of the government are normatively balanced, the dualism of the executive takes on different meanings given the party “colour” of the president, and the prime minister as a protégé of the parliamentary majority. This leads to a changing functional attraction of the mixed republican form of government to the parliamentary or presidential form of government.

Although, in the period of ‘coexistence’, the dualism of the executive branch poses a threat of confrontation between the president and the prime minister²⁷, it

²⁴ M. Shugart, J. Carey, *op. cit.*

²⁵ *Constitution of the French Republic of October 4, 1958*, in <https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/constitution-of-4-october-1958>.

²⁶ *Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of April 2, 1976*.

²⁷ Arturo Valenzuela, *Latin American presidencies interrupted*, in “Journal of democracy”,

promotes the tradition of their interaction and prevents the concentration of the executive branch in a sole entity. Forming a complex mechanism of mutual control between the president and the prime minister, it ultimately serves to control the power of society. The dualistic organization of the executive mitigates the failure of the president's political course. In a presidential republic, the problem of the apparent failure of the political course of the head of state can be solved only by the results of his next election. Here, the president heads the executive branch, so the consequences of the failure of his political course are the most disastrous. However, in a mixed republican form of government, the outsider president does not pose as many problems as in the presidential form of government²⁸.

The mixed republican form of government is characterized by the key role of the prime minister in the state mechanism, which is clearly seen in the situation of "coexistence". In this form of government, the constitutional status of the government guarantees its role as the governing body of the executive. "Under this form of government", says Ukrainian constitutionalist Volodymyr Shapoval, "the government headed by its head is a kind of centre of gravity in the executive branch"²⁹. However, the importance of the prime minister as head of government does not eliminate the dualism of the executive branch. For example, in the Fifth French Republic, the Prime Minister's right to countersign relevant acts of the President, the need for the Prime Minister's consent to the resignation of the Government and the President's lack of right to repeal governmental acts guarantee the Prime Minister the status of an equal subject with the President. At the same time, even under conditions of "coexistence", it is incorrect to speak of the Prime Minister's dominance over the President, as government acts passed by the Council of Ministers chaired by the President, except for extraordinary cases, cannot come into force without his signature. In a mixed republican form of government, the growing political weight of the prime minister does not limit the president's leadership role in certain areas of government, as such a role is constitutionally defined. After all, in this form of government, the president can dissolve parliament at any time, hoping to end opposition to the parliamentary-government bloc. The latter also takes into account this possibility, which strengthens the role of the president in the state mechanism.

The constitutions of the mixed republican forms of government, while preserving the fundamental features of the dualistic organization of the executive

Baltimore, MD, 2004, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 5-19.

²⁸ M. Shugart, J. Carey, *op. cit.*

²⁹ V. Shapoval, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-88.

branch, enshrine it in certain variations. However, these variations always embody the idea of constitutionally limiting the president's influence over the executive branch. In France, for example, the President can terminate the powers of the Prime Minister only with his consent, as evidenced by the Prime Minister's resignation. The President does not have the right to repeal acts of the Government here, either. According to the 1976 Constitution of Portugal, the right of the President to terminate the powers of the Government as a whole or of its individual members is significantly limited. The President may terminate the powers of the Government only when "it is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of democratic institutions" (Part 2 of Article 198)³⁰, after hearing the opinion of a special advisory body – the State Council. Although the position of the State Council is not imperative for the President, it complicates the termination of the Government's powers. The President of Portugal has been deprived of the right to repeal government acts.

The real dualism of the executive branch, at the same time, is an elusive phenomenon. Only the optimal limitation of the president's means of influencing the government and, as a result, the equal influence of these entities on the executive branch guarantee its dualism. The equal influence of the president and the government on the executive branch is possible under several fundamental conditions: the presence of a parliamentary investiture of the government, the president's lack of discretion to terminate the government (prime minister and members of the government) and the right to repeal the Prime Minister of discretion to sign the acts of the head of state. Significant strengthening of the president's means of influencing the executive branch, as well as their significant weakening, erodes the dualism of the executive branch. The dualism of the executive branch, which has been overcome in favour of the president, no longer allows us to define it as a mixed republican form of government form of government. Given the prime minister's administrative dependence on the president, the dualism of the executive branch has become, in particular, impossible for many post-Soviet republics, whose form of government mimics a mixed republican form of government. In these republics, lack of a full-fledged civil society and, as a result, prerequisites for the formation of a government on a parliamentary basis has transformed the president into the factual head of the executive³¹. It has nullified any dualism and caused the emergence of a hybrid

³⁰ *Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of April 2, 1976*, in https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005.

³¹ Stephen Holmes, *Postkommunisticheskiy institut prezidenta* [The Post-communist

form of government that can be identified with a mixed republican form of government in a number of respects but corresponds to a presidential republic in a number of other respects.

The organization of state power inherent in post-Soviet presidential republics reflects the abandonment of some of the most important institutions of a mixed republican form of government. The content of the constitutions of these republics shows, in particular, the desire to avoid the dualism of the executive branch. The dualism of the executive branch is eliminated primarily by the relevant constituent and personnel powers of the president in relation to the government. Presidents of Azerbaijan (paragraph 5 of Article 109 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan of 1995)³², Belarus (paragraph 7 of Article 84, Article 106 of the Constitution of Belarus of 1994)³³, Kazakhstan (paragraph 3 of Article 44 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan of 1995)³⁴, Kyrgyzstan (paragraph 4 of Part 1 of Article 70; Part 1 of Article 92 of the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan of 2021)³⁵, the Russian Federation (Article 83; Part 2 of Article 117 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993)³⁶, Uzbekistan (paragraphs 10, 11 of Article 93 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan in 1992)³⁷ have the unconditional right to terminate the powers of the government as a whole or its individual members. The president's unrestricted discretion to terminate the powers of members of the government (the government as a whole) results in their administrative subordination to the head of state.

The president's right to repeal government acts also helps to destroy the dualism of the executive branch. This right is established by paragraph 8 of

Presidency], in "Konstitucionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropejskoe obozrenie" [Constitutional Law: Eastern European Review], 1994, No. 4-5, p. 54.

³² *Konstituciya Azerbajdzhanskoj Respubliki ot 12 noyabrya 1995 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan of November 12, 1995], in <https://mincom.gov.az/ru/view/pages/13/>.

³³ *Konstituciya Respubliki Belarus ot 15 marta 1994 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Belarus of March 15, 1994], in <https://president.gov.by/ru/gosudarstvo/constitution>.

³⁴ *onstituciya Respubliki Kazahstan ot 30 avgusta 1995 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of August 30, 1995], in https://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitution.

³⁵ *Konstituciya Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki ot 11 aprelya 2021 g.* [Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of April 11, 2021], in <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/112213?cl=ru-ru>.

³⁶ *Konstituciya Rossijskoj Federacii ot 12 dekabrya 1993 g.* [Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993], in <http://duma.gov.ru/news/48953/>.

³⁷ *Konstituciya Respubliki Uzbekistan ot 8 dekabrya 1992 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan of December 8, 1992], in <https://www.lex.uz/acts/35869>.

Article 109 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan of 1995³⁸, paragraph 25 of Article 84 of the Constitution of Belarus of 1994³⁹, paragraph 3 of Article 44 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan in 1995⁴⁰, Part 3 of Article 89 of the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan of 2021⁴¹, Part 3 of Article 115 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993⁴², Part 6 of Article 69 of the Constitution of Tajikistan⁴³, paragraph 16 of Article 93 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan of 1992⁴⁴.

The right to terminate the powers of the government (the prime minister and other members of the government) and the right to repeal government acts correspond to the status of the head of the executive branch and demonstrate a real role in the state mechanism of presidents of post-Soviet presidential republics. Analysing, in particular, the competencies of the President and the Prime Minister in the Russian Federation, Russian researchers Aleksandr Kozyrin and Yelena Glushko note: "Although Russian law does not say that the president heads the executive branch, but in fact its prerogatives in this area are the most important. Under such a construction, the powers of the head of government inevitably become administrative in nature"⁴⁵.

The abolition of the dualism of executive power also turns into nothing such a fundamental deterrence for a mixed republican form of government as the countersignature of the president's acts by the prime minister and (or) the relevant minister. It is noteworthy, however, that of all the current constitutions of the post-Soviet presidential republics, the institution of countersignature is

³⁸ *Konstituciya Azerbajdzhanskoj Respubliki ot 12 noyabrya 1995 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan of November 12, 1995], in <https://mincom.gov.az/ru/view/pages/13/>

³⁹ *Konstituciya Respubliki Belarus ot 15 marta 1994 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Belarus of March 15, 1994], in <https://president.gov.by/ru/gosudarstvo/constitution>.

⁴⁰ *Konstituciya Respubliki Kazahstan ot 30 avgusta 1995 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of August 30, 1995], in https://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitution.

⁴¹ *Konstituciya Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki ot 11 aprelya 2021 g.* [Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of April 11, 2021], in <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/112213?cl=ru-ru>.

⁴² *Konstituciya Rossijskoj Federacii ot 12 dekabrya 1993 g.* [Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993], in <http://duma.gov.ru/news/48953/>.

⁴³ *Konstituciya Respubliki Tadjikistan ot 6 noyabrya 1994 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan of November 6, 1994], in <http://legalns.com/download/books/cons/tajikistan.pdf>

⁴⁴ *Konstituciya Respubliki Uzbekistan ot 8 dekabrya 1992 g.* [Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan of December 8, 1992], in <https://www.lex.uz/acts/35869>.

⁴⁵ A. Kozyrin, E. Glushko, *Pravitelstvo v zarubezhnyh stranah* [Government in Foreign Countries], Moskva, Os-89, 2007, p. 12.

enshrined, albeit in an atypical form, only in the Constitution of Kazakhstan in 1992 (Part 3 of Article 45)⁴⁶.

Thus, in the post-Soviet presidential republics, the president's relationship with the executive nullifies its dualism. Here, the government is an instrument for implementing the president's policy.

The Constitution of Ukraine institutionalizes the dualism of executive power in a number of provisions of Chapters 5 and 6, which enshrine the executive powers of the Head of State and the Government. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, "the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is the highest body in the system of executive bodies" (Article 113), which "directs and coordinates the work of ministries and other executive bodies" (paragraph 9 of Article 116)⁴⁷. However, the Government is not authorized to pursue public policy exhaustively⁴⁸. The Constitution of Ukraine establishes the relevant power of the President of Ukraine in relation to the executive branch – the Head of State directs government activities in such areas as guaranteeing state sovereignty, human and citizen rights, constitutional legitimacy, ensuring Ukraine's national security and defense capability, implementing foreign policy, foreign policy, guaranteeing state sovereignty, ensuring national security and defence of Ukraine.

According to Article 102 of the Constitution of Ukraine, "The President of Ukraine is the guarantor of state sovereignty", and in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 of Part I of Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the President "ensures state independence, national security and succession of the state", "represents the state in international relations, manages the foreign policy of the state, negotiates and concludes international treaties of Ukraine"⁴⁹. These constitutional provisions indicate that in such areas as guaranteeing state sovereignty, human and citizen rights, constitutional legitimacy, ensuring Ukraine's national security and defence capability, implementing foreign policy, the President of Ukraine has not only a key and leading role. In these spheres of state power, he is a real subject of executive power, authorized to make important decisions⁵⁰. Conversely, paragraphs 1 and 7 of Article 116 of the Constitution of Ukraine stipulate that "the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ensures state sovereignty and economic independence of Ukraine, implementation of domestic

⁴⁶ *Konstituciya Respubliki Kazahstan ot 30 avgusta 1995 g.*

⁴⁷ *Konstytutsiia Ukrainy vid 28 chervnia 1996 r.* [Constitution of Ukraine of June 28, 1996], in https://kodeksy.com.ua/konstitutsiya_ukraini.htm.

⁴⁸ V. Averyanov, *Dualizm vykonavchoi vlady...*, p. 110.

⁴⁹ *Konstytutsiia Ukrainy vid 28 chervnia 1996 r.*

⁵⁰ V. Shapoval, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

and foreign policy, implementation of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine”, “takes measures to ensure defence and national security of Ukraine”⁵¹.

According to Article 102 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine is the guarantor of “observance of the Constitution of Ukraine, human and civil rights and freedoms”, “implementation of the strategic course of the state to gain full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”⁵². At the same time, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 1-1 and 2 of Article 116 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ensures the implementation of the Constitution of Ukraine, “implementation of the strategic course of the state to gain full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, “takes measures to ensure human and civil rights and freedoms”⁵³.

These powers of the Head of State and the Government outline the areas of their joint competence. In these areas, they must coordinate their positions and cooperate in order to implement a unified and systematic public policy.

Elements of dualism of executive power can also be traced in the constitutional and legal status of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, headed by the President of Ukraine, more precisely, in the functions of the Council on executive bodies, in particular the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in the field of national security and defence. The existence of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and the leadership of the President of Ukraine in this body play a significant role in combining the functions of the Head of State with the executive branch.

Thus, the areas in which the President of Ukraine manages the activities of relevant executive bodies, direct executive and administrative activities (in particular, directs the work of heads of central executive bodies), are those defined in Part 2 of Article 102 of the Constitution of Ukraine. At the same time, in accordance with the Basic Law, the President of Ukraine does not coordinate the activities of executive authorities outside the spheres of guaranteeing state sovereignty, human and citizen rights, constitutional legitimacy, ensuring Ukraine’s national security and defence capability, the sphere of the state’s foreign policy activity. The President of Ukraine should not interfere in the activities of executive bodies concerning other issues not covered by his constitutional

⁵¹ *Konstytutsiia Ukrainy vid 28 chervnia 1996 r.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

competence using administrative acts.

The dualism of executive power is also reflected in the wording of Article 113 and Article 116 of the Constitution of Ukraine. According to Part 3 of Article 113 of the Constitution of Ukraine, "The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in its activities is guided ... by the decrees of the President of Ukraine", and in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 116 of the Constitution, the Government "ensures ... the implementation ... of acts of the President of Ukraine". These constitutional provisions directly indicate the supremacy of normative decisions of the President of Ukraine in the system of bylaws⁵⁴. Therefore, by means of his respective decrees, the Head of State directs the activities of the Government.

CONCLUSIONS

Each country, which constitutionally enshrines the chosen form of government, is faced with the question of how to relate the institutions of the head of state and the executive branch. The effectiveness of the form of government depends on the successful resolution of this issue. In particular, in each type of republican form of government the organization of state power reflects its own, unique logic of competent relations between the president and the government.

In modern republics, significant differences are found both in the way the president is combined with the executive branch and in the degree of such combination. In the presidential form of government, the head of state is also the head of the executive branch and therefore united with it both functionally and structurally. In a parliamentary republic, the president is functionally and structurally distanced from the executive branch. The relationship between the president and the executive branch in a mixed republican form of government is special. Here, the status of the president as an impartial coordinator and arbiter in the relations of the highest bodies of the state makes it impossible for him/her to integrate structurally into any branch of government. At the same time, this status requires the president to be given significant powers as the instruments to influence all branches of government. The purpose of these powers is to ensure the integrity of the state mechanism, the coordinated functioning of all its structural elements. The instruments of the president's influence on the executive branch, which are characteristic of a mixed republican form of government, are so

⁵⁴ L. Gorbunova, *Princip zakonnosti u normotvorchij diyalnosti organiv vikonavchoyi vladi* [The Principle of Legality in the Rule-Making Activities of Executive Bodies], Kyiv, Yurinkom Inter, 2008, p. 71.

significant that they lead to its dualism – the constitutionally established division of the joint competence of the president and the government.

The question of the president's relationship with the executive branch is of particular importance for countries with underdeveloped civil societies and insufficient influence of political parties on the state mechanism. For these countries, the need to ensure governmental stability inevitably increases the president's influence over the executive branch. At the same time, the strengthening of the constitutional status of the president against the background of the weakness of the parliament always threatens the authoritarianization of the power of the head of state.

In the original version of the Constitution of Ukraine, the method of correlation between the President of Ukraine and the executive branch inconsistently combined the features of presidential and mixed republican forms of government. In fact, the prevalence of elements of presidentialism in the form of government led to overcoming the dualism of executive power in favour of the President of Ukraine. The current version of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees a real dualism of executive power, but the constitutionally established model of competencies between the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine deprives the President of Ukraine of sufficient constitutional means to influence the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. As a result, given the different party affiliations of the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, the implementation of the guarantor functions by the President of Ukraine is significantly complicated. There is an obvious need to review the constitutionally established procedure for forming the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, to consolidate the natural form of countersignature of acts of the President of Ukraine by members of the Government, which is proper to the mixed republican form of government, to establish a mechanism of responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to the President of Ukraine. We are convinced that the constitutional requirement to adopt acts ensuring the exercise of the powers of the President of Ukraine provided for in paragraphs 1, 3, and 17 of Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine at sittings of the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by the President of Ukraine can be a constructive means of ensuring equal influence of the President and the Prime Minister of Ukraine on the decisions of the Government on issues of joint competence of the Head of State and the Government. The President of Ukraine should be given the exclusive right to convene and determine the agenda of such sessions of the Government.

In general, the constitutional means of influencing the executive power by the President of Ukraine should guarantee its stability and effectiveness, serving

the purpose of developing and implementing a single political course carried out by the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. At the same time, the constitutional means of the influence of the President of Ukraine on the executive branch should not functionally and motivationally orient him/her to fulfil the role of the head of the executive branch. Such an orientation of the President of Ukraine would make it impossible to realize his status as a guarantor of constitutional values, coordinator of the mechanism of interaction between branches of government and a mediator in state and legal conflicts.

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CIVILIAN VESSEL PASSAGE IN THE TURKISH STRAITS: THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION (1994)

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Abstract: *The desire to control the passage regime of the Turkish Straits caused several wars throughout history. For 86 years, beginning with the 20th century, the Montreux Convention (1936) has regulated the long-term transit regime of the Straits. After the Montreux Convention, vessel-building technology progressed at such a rate that several provisions were created to adapt to the newly established Cold War (CW) conditions. Nevertheless, almost all those arrangements were aimed at regulating the passage of naval vessels, and no comprehensive regulation addressing civilian vessels was made until the 1990s. A comprehensive regulation was prepared and issued at the beginning of January 1994 to fill that gap, in compliance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982. The new Regulation imposed several new rules and brought restrictions contrary to the freedom of passage guaranteed by international conventions and even by the Montreux Convention. The Russian Federation (RF), as a littoral country, was the first to express strong opposition to the new Regulation, and other countries soon followed. Despite criticism and reasonable concerns, the Regulation came into force six months after its publication, at the beginning of July 1994. However, persistent complaints forced Turkey and the RF to reach an agreement, and four years later, the first Regulation on the Turkish Straits was replaced by a new one. This study examines the rules implemented by the first comprehensive regulation of the Straits in 1994, the protests, objections, and amendments consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS.*

Keywords: *Turkish Straits, Freedom of Passage, Regulation, Montreux, Contrariety*

Rezumat: Dispoziții normative privitoare la trecerea vaselor civile prin strâm-torile turcești: primul regulament complet dat în folosință în 1994. Dorința de control a regimului de trecere prin strâm-torile turcești a provocat, de-a lungul istoriei, mai multe războaie. Începând cu secolul XX, regimul de trecere de lungă durată a strâm-torilor a fost reglementat de Convenția de la Montreux din 1936, timp de 86 de ani. După Montreux, tehnologia construcțiilor navale s-a dezvoltat atât de repede, încât au fost făcute mai multe aranjamente pentru a se adapta la condițiile nou apărute în vremea Războiului Rece. Cu toate acestea, aproape toate aranjamentele aveau ca scop reglementarea trecerii navelor de război. Până în anii '90 nu s-au făcut aranjamente de reglementare comprehensivă referitoare la trecerea navelor civile. Pentru a umple această lacună, un regulament cuprinzător a fost pregătit și publicat la începutul lunii ianuarie 1994. Noul regulament urmărea să fie în conformitate cu Convenția ONU privind dreptul mării (UNCLOS), deschisă pentru semnături în 1982. Acest regulament a introdus o serie de reguli și a adus reglementări stricte într-o serie de puncte, contrare libertății de trecere, garantată de convențiile internaționale și chiar de convenția de la Montreux. Mai întâi Rusia, țara riverană/litorală, a protestat vehement împotriva noului regulament, proteste și obiecții similare fiind exprimate la scurt timp și de către alte țări. În ciuda criticilor și a obiecțiilor legitime, întemeiate și rezonabile, regulamentul a intrat în vigoare la șase luni după publicarea sa, la începutul lunii iulie 1994. Cu toate acestea, protestele permanente au forțat Turcia și Rusia să adopte o înțelegere comună iar patru ani mai târziu, primul regulament privind trecerea prin strâm-torile turcești a fost înlocuită cu unul nou. În această lucrare sunt analizate noile reguli puse în aplicare de primul regulament cuprinzător al strâm-torilor din 1994, protestele, obiecțiile și modificările puse în concordanță cu prevederile UNCLOS.

INTRODUCTION

The Montreux Convention, which has been regulating maritime traffic through the Turkish Straits since 1936 was reached in response to the military and political developments of the era. It ensured the safety of the Black Sea littoral countries and the free passage of commercial and civilian vessels. When the Montreux was signed, the average number of yearly commercial transits through the Turkish Straits was 4,500-5,000 ships, despite sharp fluctuations during WWII. The route averaged 13 vessels per day.

However, after WWII, the annual number of transits through the Straits increased significantly. Ten years after the Montreux Convention, in 1945, cargo transit through the Straits increased significantly. Unforeseen events at the time the Convention was signed brought along new challenges. During the Cold War (CW), these challenges required rapid solutions to handle the recently arising situations.

The phenomenon of 3rd generation globalization, which accelerated in the last decade of the CW, multiplied the volume of worldwide trade. Similar to other sea corridors in the world, the Turkish Straits were affected by increasing economic activities and intensified transit traffic. The average daily vessel passage through the Bosphorus in the 31 years between 1991 and 2023 was 119. As can be noticed, the new figure is nine times higher than the passage numbers at the time the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of [Turkish] Straits (MCRR[T]S) was signed. In the Dardanelles, daily transit reached 116 vessels during the same period. In addition to higher transit numbers, the carried load increased by an average of 25 times. Because of increased trade volume, a wider range of commodities such as chemicals that threaten human life, crude oil, ammonia, liquefied natural gas, radioactive materials, hazardous wastes, and toxic, dangerous and explosive substances, has become available for transportation through the Turkish Straits.¹

The Montreux Convention is a legal agreement that established internationally recognized universal legal maritime norms. The basic principle of the Convention is the complete freedom of navigation and passage for all civilian vessels in times of peace, while military vessels are limited in number, tonnage, and weaponry, with specific provisions governing their entry and duration of stay. To conform to the rules-based international order, Turkey supervises all transits, whether stopover or non-stopover. In this sense, it is Turkey's duty to carry out the Montreux agreement in line with its spirit. On the other hand, understanding the principle of freedom of passage in the Straits as "free and unregulated" violates Turkey's sovereign rights.² States across the world, whether Montreux parties or not, have no objection regarding Turkey's authority to transit control.

In addition to gradually intensifying vertical traffic, which accelerated in the last 10 years of the CW and reached a high rate in the 1990s, the horizontal sea traffic in Istanbul, which has an average daily population of 20 million including incomers, is around 2,500 including boats, sea buses, and other similar sea vehicles. According to the data of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) for 2022, the resident population of Istanbul was 15,907,951 people.³ This figure, which is greater than the total population of several states across the world, does not account for the unofficially estimated 2.5 million asylum seekers who come to Istanbul as irregular immigrants, and tourists.

¹ <http://www.kiyiemniyeti.gov.tr/default.aspx?pid=23> (Accessed 10.03.2022).

² <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-bogazlari.tr.mfa> (Accessed 08.04.2022).

³ <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=37210> (Accessed 18.03.2022).

This study investigates the newly emerging conditions leading to the first post-CW Straits Regulation in 1994, along with the counterarguments and objections raised by littoral and non-littoral, in the context of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has been enforcing new regulations and enacting current ones since 1982.

THE STRAITS BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 1994 REGULATION

Before examining the Regulation published in 1994, which was the first comprehensive regularization on the passage regime of the Straits after the CW, several basic circulars and bylaws governing the passage regime of the Turkish Straits after the Montreux Convention are worth mentioning.

The first regulation on the regime of the Turkish Straits was published with the signature of President Atatürk after the Montreux Convention came into force in November 1936.⁴ Until that Regulation, there were two distinct passage regimes in effect in the Straits: (1) Passage regime based on full freedom of passage for commercial/civilian vessels. (2) Passage regime with various restrictions for naval warships. Although the Montreux (MCRR[T]S) agreement provided guidelines for both regimes, due to the rapid progress in both the military and civilian shipbuilding industry and the development of new technologies, the Montreux agreement began to fall short in certain areas. Some naval improvements were made for that purpose sixteen years before the signing of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in 1982. To solve the military inadequacies, the first Regulation governing the passage of warships was published 30 years after the Montreux agreement, on 22 June 1966. It had been modified to take into account the maritime customs, practices, and new developments.⁵

Eleven years later, on 27 December 1978, bill No. 7/17114 of the Turkish Council of Ministers established several additional provisions. On 20 February 1979, the “Foreign Warships Passing and Visiting Turkish Waters” revised Regulation went into effect. A few years following that, on 24 November 1983 and 13 December 1987, two new Regulations governing the warship passage

⁴ *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi* (TR-BCA) [Republic of Türkiye Prime Ministry National Archives], 030.10.168.171.05. 26/11/1936.

⁵ *Yabancı Uçak ve Gemilerin Ziyaretleriyle İlgili Tüzük Hazırlandı* [A regulation was prepared Regarding Visits of Foreign Vessels and Aircraft Carriers], in “Cumhuriyet Gazete”, July 23, 1966, p. 7.

regime were implemented. The number of regulations regarding warships was four; nevertheless, there was no complete regulation generating a response to almost half-century collected civilian passage issues until that date. The UNCLOS was opened for signing on December 10, 1982, following long and difficult discussions under the auspices of the UN. On 20 May 1982, seven months before the UNCLOS was opened for signature, the Law on Turkish Territorial Waters No. 2674 went into effect. The new legislation took into consideration all pre-UNCLOS conferences, new international consents, and liberalization norms linked to territorial waters, even if it had little connection with the Straits passing regime directly.⁶

The last regulation on territorial waters implemented by the coupe government (military rule) was largely a duplicate of the rules issued by the civilian government in 1979, both in form and in content. Furthermore, it attempted to restrict the transit regime of foreign warships through Turkish territorial waters. Because the new arrangements and regulations were insufficient to meet the most recent developments, a new regulation was issued and put into effect again by the military rule almost a year after the UNCLOS was opened for signature, in 1983. In light of recent developments, that rule added several technical definitions such as nuclear warships, nuclear fuel, territorial waters, inland waters, ports, etc.

Because the Black Sea and the Straits were among the ports to be visited by warships, the Regulation had to be compliant with the Montreux Convention and capable of meeting Turkey's NATO membership requirements. To eliminate those deficiencies, the first paragraph of Article 15 of the Regulation issued on 24 November 1983 was revised in 1987. Warships entering Turkish territorial waters within the scope of NATO deployment and invited foreign state warships entering Turkish ports were exempted from the provisions of the Regulation. Accordingly, the arrival and departure times of foreign warships to and from Turkish ports for visiting purposes, except for ships visiting Turkish ports for planned NATO or bilateral exercises/training purposes could range between 08.00 and 17.00 on weekdays.⁷

Although Article 2 of the Montreux Convention regulates the passage of merchant ships, it lacks clarity in solving all issues that could arise during the passage of warships and has become unsatisfactory over time. While the

⁶ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmi Gazete (TCRG)" [Republic of Türkiye Official Journal], N. 17706, May 29, 1982, p. 1.

⁷ TCRG, N. 19663, December 13, 1987, p. 2.

Convention guarantees absolute freedom of passage for merchant ships, it also exposes certain loopholes in Turkey's sovereignty. As the traffic in the Straits increased rapidly after the CW, an arrangement had to be made after 1980 that could make up for the deficiencies in the Montreux Convention. As previously stated, laws governing the transit of warships across the Turkish Straits were issued during the CW, but no formal regulation was created addressing merchant/civilian ships.

Apart from the limitations that apply to territorial waters, two regulations were established in 1965 and 1982 regarding Turkish ports. These were implemented since the Turkish Straits have several ports, at the east and west littorals, namely Canakkale, Marmara, and Istanbul. Thus, both port laws controlled navigation in the Straits.⁸

Before addressing the first civilian Straits Regulation, certain explanations regarding the [Turkish] Territorial Waters Law No. 2674, which was regarded as the foundation of the Regulation last issued in 1987, should be made. The law consisted of eight articles. It redefined the terms baseline, territorial waters, and inland waters. As a result, Turkish territorial waters have been set at a minimum of six miles, with the Council of Ministers having the authority to raise it to 12 miles.⁹ Regardless of these measures, the need for a civilian passage regulation remained.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE CIVIL PASSAGE REGULATION OF THE STRAITS

Nearly 53 years after the Montreux Convention, collaborative efforts were launched in 1989 to address the issues of civilian ship transit and a commission was established in 1990 for that purpose. The document would be the first comprehensive instrument governing the transit of the Turkish Straits. Following the publication, the Russian Federation claimed that Turkey's main goal was to divert oil flow to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. It is evident that this was not the entire explanation, and the criticism had some justification. However, the USSR had not yet disintegrated when the commission was established to set the rules for civilian passage through the Straits. Moreover, neither Turkestan nor Caspian

⁸ Hakan Emanet, *Deniz Hâkimiyetinden Dünya Hâkimiyetine Giden Yolda Türk Boğazları* [Turkish Straits on the Road from Sea Hegemony to World Hegemony], Istanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2003, p. 107.

⁹ TCRG, N. 17706, May 29, 1982, p. 1.

oil was on the agenda at the time.¹⁰

While the regulation was underway, the CW officially ended in December 1991. Aside from the increasing trend of civilian vessel traffic across the Straits, oil and other hazardous, dangerous shipments reached excessively high volumes. Aside from the quick surge in traffic, the control and administrative adaptation of the Straits to civilian and commercial ship traffic required urgent implementation of new efficient rules.

There were several reasons for such an urgent need, and some of them had vital importance. (1) The rising numbers of tankers crossing the Straits after the CW, carrying oil from pipelines to the Russian port of Novorossiysk. (2) Plans to transport oil in the Caspian and Turkestan basins in the same way. (3) The RF's declaration that it would accept nuclear waste, some of which would be transported through the Straits. (4) The post-Soviet RF's Baltic ports remaining in the countries leaving the union and the RF's dependability on the Turkish Straits. (5) The resulting higher importance placed by the RF to the Black Sea ports and thus to the Straits. (6) The event of 25 September 1992, barely one year after, when the connection of the North Sea to the Black Sea via the Rhine-Main-Danube was done and from there to the high seas through the Turkish Straits. (7) Because of vessel navigation between the Don-Volga Canal, the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, traffic in the Straits became unmanageable with the rules at the time.¹¹

When the CW was over, one of the most serious concerns of Ankara was that post-Soviet Armenia would join the Montreux Convention. The fear was baseless because there were only three new states bordering the Black Sea after the collapse of the Soviet Union: the RF, Georgia, and Ukraine. Another issue was that the Montreux Convention would be cancelled in the post-CW era and a new contract could be signed instead. It was mostly desired by Western states, especially the USA. In June 1992, a delegation was sent to Moscow to avoid such a scenario. The other aim of the delegation was to prevent any Armenian participation in the Montreux Convention. The RF had similar concerns with Ankara about a potential new application that could replace the Montreux

¹⁰ Gündüz Aybay, *İngilizlerin Kelime Oyunu* [Wording Game of Britons], in "Cumhuriyet", August 24, 2000, p. 8.

¹¹ Fevzi Topsoy, *Ulusal ve Uluslararası Düzenlemeler Işığında Türk Boğazlarının Güvenliği Sorunu* [The Security Problem of the Turkish Straits in the Light of National and International Regulations], Kırıkkale, Kırıkkale Üniversitesi SBE Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2003, p. 4.

Convention. Therefore, it was not difficult to reach a consensus on a continuation of the Montreux agreement.

While contacts and negotiations were taking place, preparatory works for the first comprehensive civilian Regulation on the Turkish Straits were also underway. Almost every country, most importantly the RF, was aware of how the regulation works. Not surprisingly, the first country to develop bold arguments and reject any limitation on the passage before the official announcement of the Regulation was the RF. Meanwhile, in 1993, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) had a general meeting in London, and Turkey was one of the participants.

Before the meeting, the RF informed IMO about its counterarguments and derogations regarding the new Straits Regulation. A few weeks later, in May 1993, a document on "Navigation and Environment Safety in Turkish Straits" was submitted to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee. The aim was to draw attention to the rising environmental and navigation risks in the Straits. However, the RF did not have any intent to consider such risks. The RF, Greece, Southern Cyprus Greek Administration (SCGA), and Panama jointly declared that possible changes and rules that would be enforced by Turkey concerning the passage through the Straits were against the Montreux Convention. The arguments and opposition of the RF and other countries lacked credibility and were unfounded. Turkey, during and after the CW, had followed a policy of broadly interpreting and implementing the Montreux Convention to ease the Soviet successor, the RF's use of the Straits. Otherwise, aircraft carriers built by the Soviets on Black Sea shipyards after the 1970s could not pass from north to south through the Turkish Straits. If the new regulation had not been implemented, the RF would have enabled the same intolerance in civilian navigation.

Aside from persistent counterarguments, strong oppositions, and firm negative attitudes, pressing issues such as environmental security and growing tanker traffic have increased dramatically. In addition, the number of countries signing the UNCLOS reached 60, and it was clear that the Convention would come into force in a few months. Considering all those developments, by the end of 1993, the preliminary work for the first comprehensive civilian vessel passage regulation of the Straits was almost completed. The Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Transport Undersecretaries of Maritime Affairs, and the Navy High Command Department of Navigation Hydrography and Oceanography cooperated closely to create the Regulation.¹² According to those institutions and the Turkish

¹² Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Dışışleri İskelesi, Dışışleri'nde 34 Yıl* [34 Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Istanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2011, p. 219.

Government, the new Regulation was ready to enter into force at the end of 1993. Nevertheless, the RF and several other countries did not agree.

THE NEW REGULATION OF 1994

On 23 December 1993, after the completion of necessary formalities, the Council of Ministers ratified the discussed draft and decided that the Straits Regulation for civilian passage should be put into force according to Article 37 of the Laws 115 and 3046 and Article 2 of the Law of Ports No. 618.¹³ Two weeks after the Council of Ministers' decision, the Turkish Official Journal No. 21815 announced the new Regulation on 11 January 1994. It consisted of seven chapters, 59 articles, six additional parts, and 21 maps. Its full name was "Straits and Marmara Region Maritime Traffic Management Regulation" and was only used for the Turkish Straits. Nevertheless, the Regulation did not include the concepts of "*stopover/call-in vessels*" for non-transit passage and "*non-stopover/non-call-in vessels*" for transit passage, and the name "Turkish Straits" was associated with it.¹⁴

Although it was omitted from the original text, the term "Turkish Straits" has been used in international treaties for many years.¹⁵ The name "Turkish Straits" and the new definition of the passage regime as "*stopover/call-in vessels*" and "*non-stopover/non-call-in vessels*" would be corrected in 1998 through the second Regulation. In the preamble of the Regulation, passage lanes and geographic signs and coordinates were clearly defined and fixed on the attached maps. The first 4 articles of the Regulation defined traffic schemes and lanes, borders of the Straits, related coordinates, routes, including nuclear-powered vessel classes, and the lines vessels had to use through the passage. In 1982, the right traffic system was put into use in the Straits and the Regulation endorsed that change.¹⁶ One of the basic principles of the Montreux Convention was to guarantee the free passage of civilian vessels and to protect Turkey's regulative authority. The Convention also guaranteed the safety of the Black Sea littoral countries and enforced tonnage and duration limitations on non-littoral countries' warships. Yet, Article 5 of the new Regulation forced all countries to

¹³ TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994, p. 2.

¹⁴ TR-BCA, 030.18.01.02.777.573.10. 18/05/1994.

¹⁵ Hilmi Fırat, *Türk Boğazları ve Önemi* [Turkish Straits and Their Importance], T.C. Deniz Basımevi, İstanbul, 1950, p. 3.

¹⁶ TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994, p. 3-5. Articles 1-4.

obey any rule put into force by Turkey. Actually, such a new rule was contrary to the rules established by the Montreux Convention, and clearly, it was obviously an abuse of power.¹⁷

Soon after the Regulation entered into force, the RF and several other countries with high traffic through the Straits argued that the basic aim of the Regulation was to force the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. According to that, the new rules would slow down passages through the Straits. Moreover, strict implementation of the Montreux rules would obstruct the traffic as well. As it is very well known, the Istanbul Strait (Bosporus) is narrower and more curved than the Canakkale (Dardanelles). In addition, because Istanbul is a megacity, there is heavy horizontal traffic in the Istanbul Strait too. That is why the most difficult passage of the Straits is in the Istanbul section, and due to new rules, vessels had to wait for passage permits at either the Marmara entrance or the Black Sea entrance to the north to sail through the Istanbul Strait.¹⁸

One of the basic deficiencies of the Regulation was the “*stopover/call-in vessels*” and “*non-stopover/non-call-in vessels*” classification. It had been updated and codified before the opening of the UNCLOS for signature and it strengthened the authority of the coastal state. As underlined above, it would be included in the second regulation of 1998. Articles 9-14 regulated the passage rules, such as the obligation to display a flag during day passages and a green light during night passages, pilotage, transit passage, and vessels that entered a Turkish port during the passage. The third chapter dealt with the transit across the Straits. During the passage, for safety regulations, the steering mechanism should be controlled manually, the passing vessel should navigate under the control of an authorized captain (Article 15), and night lighting should be provided for vessels longer than 150 m. Article 16 specified conditions for maximum speed. The average top speed was 10 knots (18.5 km/h). Unless they endanger vertical and horizontal traffic within specified limits, vessels could gear down or gear up (Article 17).¹⁹

The length of the Turkish Straits is 164 nautical miles (303 km). The average transit time for a vessel navigating at a constant 10-knot speed through the Straits

¹⁷ TR-BCA, 030.18.01.02.777.573.10. 18/05/1994; TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994, p. 5. Article 5; TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994, p. 6. Article 7.

¹⁸ Deniz Som, *Boğazda Yeni Seyir Düzeni* [New Navigation System in the Straits], in “Cumhuriyet”, April 29, 1982, p. 22; Nur Jale Ece, *Istanbul Boğazı: Deniz Kazaları ve Analizi* [Istanbul Strait Maritime Accidents and Their Analysis], Istanbul, Deniz Kılavuzluk AŞ. Yayını, 2007, p. 22.

¹⁹ TR-BCA, 030.18.01.02.777.573.10. 18/05/1994; TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994, pp. 8-9. Articles 9-17.

is around 16 hours. However, several locations in the Istanbul Strait are unfit for a 10-knot speed. Even if it were possible to gear up in the Marmara Sea, where the passage lane is 110 nm (203 km.), according to the new regulations, the passage through Marmara would also take 8-10 hours.

According to Article 41 of the UNCLOS, which would come into force after the completion of the necessary number of signatures in the same year as the Regulation in 1994, coastal countries, in accordance with international rules and practices, have the right to determine traffic schemes/lanes and passage routes in the Straits.²⁰

The fourth chapter of the Regulation established passage rules for large vessels and nuclear-powered vessels. Nuclear-powered vessels and those carrying nuclear cargo required previous approval from the Undersecretaries of [Turkish] Maritime Affairs while vessels carrying hazardous, dangerous cargo required prior permission from the [Turkish] Ministry of Environment. These vessels have to conform to IMO rules. Those vessels would have a red light on during their night journey. Any vessel infringing the rules will be stopped and commanders will be investigated.²¹

Despite the lack of a precise definition, nuclear waste, chemicals, oil, natural gas, and other comparable items were considered risky cargoes due to the strict regulations governing nuclear-powered vessels. As mentioned before, the maximum average speed restriction for a transit vessel between the Straits of Istanbul and Canakkale was 10 knots and 12 knots in the Straits of Marmara. Even under ideal circumstances, it would take a vessel 12 to 15 hours to cross the Straits. When considering seasonal inconveniences and unfavourable weather conditions during winter, it was clear that the regulation imposed some fixed limits on the number of dangerous cargos that could pass, particularly restricting the passage of oil and natural gas tankers, regardless of whether the entry was made through the north or the south. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the passage of a vessel will be slowed because of its size, draft line, extent, and weight of cargo. A *non-call-in* vessel's (transit vessel) average passage duration through the Istanbul Strait under convenient conditions is 3 hours. Therefore, even if all conditions were optimal, the number of dangerous cargo vessels that might transit the Istanbul Strait in a single day may be limited to seven or eight. Aside from that, the average frequency of misty and unfavourable weather days in the

²⁰ UN, UNCLOS, *Entry into Force Registration Status Text*, C.N.1023.2005.TREATIES-7, October 7, 2005, pp. 32-38.

²¹ TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994, p. 14. Article 35/b.

Istanbul Strait is high.²²

As can be seen, the Regulation's articles, procedures, and norms had various issues, inconsistencies, and disagreements with the Montreux Convention. Following repeated objections, a second regulation seemed unavoidable. Limits would be eliminated in the second regulation of 1998. However, pilotage and towing would be required for hazardous cargo vessels larger than 200 meters and tankers.

The fifth chapter of the Regulation governed the sequence of marine traffic division schemes in the Istanbul Strait and associated rules. Horizontally navigating ships, boats, yachts etc. are not allowed to interfere with vertical traffic. The passage might be put on hold according to the provisions in that chapter, in the event of fast current and counter-current, mist, inadequate visibility, and southerly winds (Articles 38-40). Although it was a Regulation controlling the passage in accordance with natural conditions, limiting the free passage was contradictory to the rules of the Montreux Convention. Nevertheless, restrictions governing nuclear-powered and nuclear cargo-carrying vessels did not violate the Montreux Convention because nuclear energy had not been discovered when the Montreux was signed. Setting regulatory standards for nuclear technology was a *ribus sic stantibus* exception and not an excess of authority.

The definition of fines and penalties in the seventh chapter of the Regulation stipulated that breaking the rules or causing any disruption would result in the payment of fines and penalties. The articles additionally established the amounts of fines.²³ Landmarks, coordinates, and separation lanes were defined on conveniently enclosed maps. To prevent any possible misconduct, the southern and northern approach lanes to the Straits, navigation rules, the transit line in Marmara, and route coordinates were explicitly specified and placed on maps. The passage through Marmara would be on a fixed straight line close to the western bank, with no deviation from the predetermined trajectory. The transit across the Istanbul and Canakkale Straits would be through previously determined lanes running north-south near the western bank and south-north close to the eastern bank.²⁴

²² Erich Obst, *Boğazlar İstanbul Çanakkale Mıntıkası İklimi* [Straits, Istanbul and Canakkale Climate], Istanbul, Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1932, pp. 6-9.

²³ TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994. p. 20. Article 57.

²⁴ TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994. pp. 21-47. Enclosure Map.

JUDICIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE REGULATION AND SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS

Even though the Regulation was already in effect, its official implementation would start on the first day of July, six months after its release. As it is widely known, the highest number of oil and commercial vessels passing through the Straits belonged to the RF, and it was reasonable that the country would continue to criticize the Regulation. Soon after the start of the *ipso facto* execution, littoral countries such as Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, which had a high number of passages through the Straits, and the SCGA, which supported the Russian protests, jointly applied to the IMO and other related international organizations for cancellation or amendment of the Regulation. The RF, Greece, SCGA, and Oman claimed that the new Regulation restricted the universal free passage principle.

While disputes over and debates on the Regulation were going on, an environmentalist group led by Turkish lawyers filed a complaint to the Istanbul Administrative Tribunal three months after the Regulation began to take effect. To attract public attention, they made the collision of the tanker *Independenta* in 1979 an ongoing issue, claiming that the accident had caused an environmental disaster, but neither the related company nor the flag state had taken the necessary measures before and after the collision. The increased tanker traffic has brought new risks and similar incidents could occur. Using such arguments as foundation, the lawyers sought the closing of the Straits to tanker traffic. Almost four days before, on March 13, the petrol tanker *Nassia* had collided with a dry-goods vessel in the Istanbul Strait, putting the megacity at risk for a large-scale disaster.²⁵ Although the lawsuit was a humanitarian effort since the Montreux Convention governed *non-vessel call* (transit) passage through the Straits, local tribunals lacked the authority for litigation in such circumstances. Hence, the tribunal's decision would be invalid.

The RF was the primary opponent of the Regulation. On 14 April 1994, one month before the IMO ratification and three months before its official entry into force, the RF sent a diplomatic note to Turkey underlining its objections. As it is known, when the note was sent, *de jure* formal recognition of the Regulation had not yet begun. The RF applied to the IMO a second time, arguing that the

²⁵ *Boğazlarda Felaketi Lodos Engelledi* [Southeastern Anatolia Prevented a Disaster in Straits], in "Milliyet", March 15, 1994, p. 1.

Regulation breached the International Maritime Law. Russian objections were mainly driven by the likelihood of oil transit issues through the Straits. Russia's plan in those years was to ship oil in the Novorossiysk seaport and to ensure that oil tankers could transit freely across the Turkish Straits to the high seas, and then sell the oil to western markets. Oil pipelines were not operational during those years, hence the most profitable transfer method was maritime transport. Any limit on tankers and civilian vessels would pose a serious threat to that approach.

Despite ongoing Russian protests and objections, Turkey had adopted a firm policy, ignoring Russian demands. Accordingly, the Russian diplomatic note was replied on May 13. Russian claims such as contradiction with the Montreux Convention and demands for major revision before the official entry into force were boldly rejected. The note emphasized that the RF desired an application of the Montreux Convention regardless of the latest developments and that the RF ignored contemporary International Maritime Law.²⁶ Soviet leader Stalin made similar complaints around 1945. The roles have changed since then. It was clear, and Ankara was firm that the Regulation would come into force on the first day of July.

Three days before the formal coming into force on June 29, Greece delivered a diplomatic message in support of Russian demands. Greece also complained that the Regulation was a clear breach of the Montreux Convention, and it should be discussed in the IMO. One day after that note, on June 30, the RF sent a second note referring to the Regulation. The Russian note was both a threat and a warning notifying that Turkey would be responsible for any issues caused by the Regulation. It was clear that the RF and Greece were pursuing a joint policy. The tones of their notes were similar. Despite such objections and rising protests, the IMO implemented the Regulation's traffic structure. The new schemes would take effect on November 24 of that year. The Russian note further said that the RF would obey only rules ratified by the IMO and that unratified rules would be ignored. That was the most serious and real challenge thus far, well beyond diplomatic rules. Turkey sent counter notes both to Greece and the RF, and all demands were firmly rejected.²⁷

Protests and objections were not ineffective. Turkey noted the objections, and although it was not its obligation, it submitted the Regulation to the IMO

²⁶ *Rusya'ya Montreux Notası* [Montreux Note to Russia], in "Cumhuriyet", May 14, 1994, p. 8.

²⁷ *Moskova'dan Ankara'ya Nota* [Note by Moscow to Ankara], in "Cumhuriyet", July 1, 1994, p. 1.

Maritime Safety Committee (IMOMSC).²⁸ Before Turkey's submission, at the 64th meeting of the IMOMSC, the Russian delegation had filed their protests, claiming that several articles of the Regulation contradicted the IMO rules. That objection was the reason for Turkey's submission of the Regulation to the IMOMSC. Overall, submission to the IMOMSC paved the way for an unexpected new discussion regarding navigation through the Turkish Straits: whether to rely on the Regulation or IMO norms. On 24 May 1994, the IMOMSC ratified the Regulation with a few minor revisions. It would come into force on November 24, 1994. The ratification was very important. Thus, right lane navigation through the Straits and traffic separation schemes were endorsed by a high-ranking international organization. Moreover, the ratification had also approved the newly imposed limits on large vessel passages.

Nevertheless, the ratification was far from covering the RF's demands, so it fuelled arguments about the Regulation. One of Moscow's most serious objections was that "due to the infringement of the Montreux Convention" the RF would face considerable economic loss. There was still an impasse; thus, at the 67th meeting of the IMOMSC, the RF suggested creating an international organization to control navigation through the Turkish Straits. The proposal was a clear violation of the Montreux Convention, and totally against the sovereign rights of Turkey. Most likely, the basic aim of that ridiculous proposal was to force Turkey to accept Russian demands. The proposal was rejected by Ankara. The firm line taken by Ankara forced Russia to reconcile; yet, certain critical disagreements were difficult to solve.²⁹ Actually, the Regulation's restrictions were contrary to civilian vessels' free passage principle that had been used since 1829.

It was not only Russian oil and natural gas passing through the Straits. Arms and tanks sold to SCGA were also shipped to Black Sea ports and transported through the Straits. SCGA had purchased high-altitude S-300 missile batteries from the RF, and those systems would very certainly be transported through the Straits. Turkey declared that the deployment of S-300 systems in SCGA was *casus belli*. During those hot days, critical information was intercepted indicating that the RF would transport S-300 batteries through the Straits. The

²⁸ *Türk Boğazlarının Mevcut Durumu ve Güvenliğinin Milli Güvenliğimize Etkileri* [Current Status of Turkish Straits and Effect of Strait Security on Turkey's Security], Ankara, Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı, p. 101-102.

²⁹ Mansur Akgün, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Jeopolitik Etken Olarak Boğazlar* [Straits as a Geopolitical Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy], in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (Ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, İstanbul, Der Yayınları, 1994, p. 29.

Montreux Convention had authorized Turkey to prevent such passage, and Turkey declared that if that happened, the batteries would be captured in the Straits.³⁰ The batteries would not be transported through the Straits, and because of Turkey's firm stance in 1998, they would be deployed in Crete, instead of Southern Cyprus.

Despite its firm stance, Ankara had to handle a compromise and respond to objections two weeks before the entry into force, with the Council of Ministers making minor revisions and changing several strongly disputed parts. The decision was published on 21 June 1994 in the Turkish Official Journal No. 21967. The first revision addressed nuclear cargo vessels and nuclear-powered vessels. It also restricted the application of broad clauses, and nuclear-powered vessels that should be managed by special rules were omitted from the article (Article 1/1). The rules for hazardous cargo and waste cargo were revised in compliance with IMO and MARPOL regulations (Article 1/2).³¹

In addition, Article 4, which specified maritime traffic navigation routes and schemes, was changed, and new schemes were established (Article 2). Article 27, covering traffic flow, schemes, and anchoring locations in the Istanbul Strait, was revised and redetermination and marking on the attached maps were done. An integrated map of the Straits, passage routes, and schemes were also attached. In the Regulation, there was no such integrated comprehensive map. The Council of Ministers' revision decision would come into force on the same date as the Regulation, after the endorsement of the Council of State. Meanwhile, the Council of State endorsed the Regulation.³² The successive Russian and Greek notes sent one week after the revisions proved that the changes made were not enough to meet the demands of the RF and other states. Actually, the revisions did not bring a passage guarantee by any means, and some articles were still contrary to the basic rules of the Montreux Convention.

Despite the arguments, counterarguments, protests, and objections, the new first civilian vessel passage Regulation, which would provide solutions to serious issues that had accumulated since the ratification of the Montreux Convention, entered into force on 1 July 1994 as announced six months before. Its official name was "Maritime Traffic Management Regulation in the Straits and

³⁰ *Füzeleri Mutlaka Vereceğiz*, [We will Definitely Surrender the Missiles], in "Milliyet", February 14, 1997, p. 18.

³¹ TCRG, N. 21815, June 21, 1994, pp. 2. Article 1.

³² TCRG, N. 21815, June 21, 1994, pp. 2-3. Articles 1-6.

Marmara Region”.³³ Discussions and objections persisted after the regulation came into force, which opened the door for a new crisis between the RF and Turkey. Until that date, quarrels had broken out mostly due to martial conflicts. It was the first time the conflict over the Straits was steered by civilian passage issues. Six months after the Regulation went into force, at the beginning of January 1995, the RF sent a third note, complaining about the serious economic losses caused by its implementation. It was believed that the objections and protests would fade with time, but new concerns arose, such as the Regulation being submitted to the UN for a fair solution.³⁴ In such a situation, the Montreux Convention would come under discussion, and undesired developments for both Turkey and the RF would arise. Another option was to take the Regulation to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

If the Regulation was taken to the ICJ, it was likely that the right of free navigation would be broadened, and even warships may benefit from the internationally accepted concept of unlimited free passage. During and after WWII, the RF firmly insisted on a revision of the Montreux Convention, but after the CW, the RF has been striving to keep the Montreux Convention in use. Despite the Convention’s violations of rights, the RF declined to get involved in any discussions on the Montreux Convention. At that point, an open route for compromise between Moscow and Turkey could occur. There was no Vessel Trafficking System (VTS) in the Straits at that time. The system would be operational in 2002.

Turkey’s authority over the Straits was challenged severely because it was evident that the Regulation was done without concern for diplomatic practices, binding conventions, or even UN rules. Moreover, the third 20-year period of the Montreux Convention would end in 1996, and signatory countries, especially the RF could ask for a revision or, worse, termination of the Montreux Convention. Article 29 of the Montreux Convention allowed the RF to demand revision. Such a policy had not been used since Stalin’s 1946 notes, but because of Turkey’s firm attitude, a new crisis could erupt. Worse, as previously said, the Montreux Convention could be replaced by the UNCLOS.

Such a development would represent a serious threat to Russian security in the Black Sea, as established by the Montreux Convention, and Turkey would lose complete control over the Straits. If the UNCLOS fully takes effect, airspace over

³³ TCRG, N. 21815, January 11, 1994.

³⁴ *Moskova’dan Boğazlar Notası* [Straits note by Moscow], in “Cumhuriyet”, March 3, 1995, p. 8.

the Straits would be open to foreign flights. It was the practice under the Lausanne rules, which were in effect until the Montreux Convention. The Montreux agreement favoured both Turkey and the RF. Moscow was well aware of the risks if Montreux became a matter of international discussion. That is why Russian protests and objections to the Regulation and revisions never addressed any discussion on Montreux. Article 29, which allowed signatory countries to amend the agreement, was never mentioned.

Moscow has persistently maintained its objections and ongoing arguments against the Regulation. Worse, in November 1995, Moscow sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Ghali complaining about the Regulation. The basic problem was the RF's consistent determination to continue transporting oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea, Turkestan, and Azerbaijan through the Turkish Straits. Although certain reserves had not been identified, it was known that that area had rich oil and natural gas reserves. While natural gas would be transported after being liquidated, such intense traffic was very risky for the megacity of Istanbul.

Moscow was uninterested in pipelines across Turkey or Ukraine at the time. Numerous oil and natural gas agreements were signed between Moscow and Central Asian countries. Moscow had also intended to transport Kazakhstan's oil across the Straits. Almost 37% of the annual oil transported through the Straits belonged to the RF.³⁵ Furthermore, an agreement was signed between Moscow and Kazakhstan for the transportation of Tengiz oil.

Azerbaijan oil and natural gas wells in Sah Deniz-I (Caspian Sea) would be used in addition to the existing proved and unproved reserves. That oil and natural gas would also be transported through the Straits.³⁶ In 1995, Moscow implemented both the "Greater Mediterranean" and the Black Sea cooperation maritime force policies.³⁷

Despite the ongoing complaints, in addition to the IMO's ratification, in January 1995, the OCIMF also ratified traffic separation schemes and announced that its members would obey the Regulation.³⁸ In the same year, the IMO published a brochure announcing clauses for the passage through the Turkish

³⁵ Serkan Demirtaş, *İsmail Soysal, Montreux Değişebilir* [Ismail Generic, Montreux May Change], in "Cumhuriyet", May 11, 1996, p. 10.

³⁶ Ferruh Demirmen, *Bakû-Ceyhan ve Mavi Akım: Yurtdışından Bakış* [Baku-Ceyhan and Blue Stream: View from Outside], in "Cumhuriyet", November 8, 1999, p. 2.

³⁷ Tatiana Zonova, *Mediterranean Trend in the Russia's Foreign Policy*, in "Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali", Nuova Serie, Vol. 82, 2015, No. 4, p. 523.

³⁸ *Guidelines for Transiting the Turkish Straits*, August 2007, p. 1.

Straits. The following were the IMO passage recommendations: (1) Any vessel entering the Straits has to conform to the traffic separation schemes. (2) Any vessel entering the Straits shall be required to register with the Turkish Straits Reporting System (TUBRAP). (3) For safe passage, pilotage (strait pilot) should be provided. (4) Vessels longer than 200 metres and with draft lines deeper than 15 metres must transit in daylight. (5) If towing is required, it must be arranged in advance. (6) When required, passing vessels should be anchored in predetermined areas.³⁹

In addition to the IMO, the OCMF had also been supporting and encouraging pilotage service because there had been a well-running pilotage service system in the Turkish Straits, and about 140-150 Strait pilots worked in shifts. This recommendation might become a rule, and pilotage could be obligatory for large vessels. Even after the UNCLOS was in use, *non-vessel-in-call* (transit) vessels benefited from free pilotage, and any vessel entering Turkish ports during passage could obtain pilotage. After the entry of the 1994 Regulation in force, the average ratio of the vessels requiring pilotage increased by 55 per cent. The rate of pilotage in the Istanbul Strait was higher than that in the Canakkale Strait.

Protests, complaints, and counterarguments were thoroughly evaluated in Ankara, regardless of difficult opinions. Thus, preparations for a new regulation started before the end of 1995. The new Regulation, addressing nearly all objections, would come into force in 1998. Because the UNCLOS granted broader rights to coastal states, a *non-vessel-in-call* and *vessel-in-call* passage regime would be implemented, and the name of the Straits would be ultimately established as the "Turkish Straits".⁴⁰ Both implementations are compliant with the Montreux Convention, and none of the signatory countries would raise substantial objections this time.

CONCLUSIONS

The Montreux Convention has regulated the passage regime of the Turkish Straits since 1936. Because of geographic challenges throughout history, the status of the Black Sea has been determined by the passage regime of the Straits. The Montreux agreement was signed in response to rising security concerns on the eve of WWII to regulate mostly warship passage rules through the Turkish Straits. The Convention has also regulated the passage of civilian/commercial

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁰ TR-BCA,00955.00246.00010. 08/10/1998.

vessels. Both civilian vessel technology and navy sea powers saw rapid technical advancement, particularly after WWII. Several regulations were issued and implemented until the end of the CW to govern warship passage through the Straits. For instance, there were no nuclear power ships, large aircraft carriers or missile technology when the Montreux Convention was signed. It employed new rules to address issues caused by technological progress.

A similar trend transformed the civilian vessel industry, as there were no tanker ships and no natural gas carriers when the Montreux Convention was signed. Humanity dealt with tremendous tonnage and exceptionally large vessels no fewer than three decades later. The number of civilian vessels passing through the Turkish Straits when the Montreux Convention was signed was 4,500-5,000. Meanwhile, by the time the CW ended in 1991, that number increased nearly tenfold. Block policies dominated international policy throughout the Cold War, as is widely known. Hence, all regulations, bylaws, circulars etc. until the end of the CW aimed to regulate warship passages. That policy caused accumulated civilian passage problems, and when the CW ended, Turkey decided to issue a new and comprehensive regulation to govern civilian vessel passage through the Straits. Another motivation for the new regulation was the rising number of dangerous cargo ships carrying natural gas, oil, or nuclear wastes, as well as the UNCLOS, in 1982. The preparations started soon after the CW and the Regulation was announced in January of 1994.

It was littoral countries, such as the RF, that first objected to the new Regulation and claimed that the new rules breached the freedom of passage established by the Montreux Convention. Even non-littoral countries such as Greece, SCGA, and Oman also objected to the Regulation. Protests mostly targeted new restrictions imposed in contradiction of conventional practices and international conventions. The new Regulation attempted to regulate civilian transit according to safety standards and to establish several radical reforms.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE MOTIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION-UKRAINE WAR WITHIN DUGIN'S UNDERSTANDING OF NEO-EURASIANISM

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Abstract: *It is accepted that the most important ideologue of neo-Eurasianism, which emerged at the end of the 1980s, is Alexandr Dugin. Neo-Eurasianism was not significantly influential in Russia's domestic and foreign policy until the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, it is claimed that it began to become more prominent, especially with Putin's dominance in power. Many international media agencies have reported that, just like the 2014 war between Ukraine and Russia, the war of February 2022 was also provoked by Putin. However, the claim that this war results from an inherited historical legacy, rather than being a war initiated unilaterally by Putin, seems more realistic. At this point, it can be said that neo-Eurasianism was one of the intellectual factors that influenced Putin's attack on Ukraine.*

Key Words: *Ukraine, Ideology, the Russia-Ukraine War, Alexander Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism.*

Rezumat: *O analiză a motivelor războiului dintre Federația Rusă și Ucraina derivată din înțelegerea neo-eurasianismului de către Dughin. Se admite în general că cel mai important ideolog al neo-eurasianismului, recte versiunea eurasianismului apărută la sfârșitul anilor '80, este Aleksandr Dughin. Este atestat îndeobște faptul că, până la sfârșitul anilor '90, neo-eurasianismul nu a avut o influență semnificativă în politica internă și externă a Rusiei. Cu toate acestea, se susține îndeobște ideea că acesta a început să devină mai proeminent mai ales odată cu accederea lui Putin la putere. Multe agenții media internaționale au raportat că, la fel ca războiul din 2014 dintre Ucraina și Rusia, războiul din februarie 2022 a fost provocat de către Putin. Cu toate acestea, afirmația că acest război*

rezultă mai degrabă dintr-o moștenire istorică, decât că este un război inițiat unilateral de Putin, pare mai realistă. În prezent, putem afirma că neo-eurasianismul a fost unul dintre factorii intelectualii care a influențat atacul lui Putin asupra Ucrainei.

Peter the Great did not take anything away from Sweden;
he just returned land that rightfully belonged to Russia.

It is now time for us to take back what is ours.

Vladimir Putin - 10/06/2022

INTRODUCTION

The struggle between Russia and Ukraine turned into war in 2014, which resulted in Russia's annexation of Crimea, and, subsequently, it occupied Eastern Ukraine through its proxies. Later in 2022, Russia launched a large-scale invasion, called 'Special Military Operation', to protect the separatist regions located in the east of Ukraine and stop so-called Ukraine's 'aggression' targeting these regions. Although the breakout of this war is primarily attributed to Putin's personality, it would be more accurate to state that Putin inherited this policy to a large extent. It is possible to say that one of the most important ideologies affecting this heritage is neo-Eurasianism.

The classical period of Eurasianism, which ended in failure in the 1930s following the establishment of the USSR, re-emerged during the late 1980s when the USSR gave signs of disintegration, this time under the name of neo-Eurasianism. Having risen as a response to the new Russian state's quest for political leadership, neo-Eurasianism has numerous representatives. However, there is no doubt that the most influential one is Alexandr Dugin. Dugin's geopolitical perspective is based on the endless struggle between the 'land' and 'sea' civilizations, which he drew primarily from Mackinder. In this context, Dugin emphasized the necessity of building a landlocked Eurasian block against the maritime Atlantic block, which he sees as the major enemy. At this point, he draws attention to the significance of Russia's unification with its immediate surroundings in its struggle with the United States, the leader of the Atlantic bloc. He claims that the Empire located in the centre of the Eurasian bloc consists of states, besides the Russian Federation, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and he, therefore, implies that he does not consider these states as independent ones. At this point, Ukraine, the centre of the former Kyiv

Principality, the first Russian state in history (but according to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who was the most distinguished Ukrainian historian, the Kyiv Principality is just the first state of the Eastern Slavs and argued that the history of the Ukrainian nation is distinct from that of the Russian both in its origin and in its political, economic, and cultural development),¹ occupies an important place in the definitions of the Russian homeland and identity, both geographically and sociological. However, at the end of 1991, Ukraine, like other former Soviet republics, gained independence, and their aspiration to protect these territories baffled Russia. Particularly, Ukraine's improving relations with the Atlantic bloc have caused Russia to take an increasingly tough stance on Ukraine since it does not aspire to lose Ukraine to the West. This paved the way for adopting a policy based on the neo-Eurasianist ideas headed by Dugin.

The aim of this study is to seek an answer to the question "Does neo-Eurasianism provide an intellectual basis for Russia's attack on Ukraine?". To this aim, a content analysis was conducted by benefiting from the books and articles written by Alexandr Dugin as well as his writings on the "Geopolitika" website, of which he was the editor. This study consists of two parts. The first part discusses the transformation of Eurasianist theory from classical to neo-Eurasianism.² The second part, primarily based on Dugin, reveals how much impact neo-Eurasianist thought has on Russia's waging war on Ukraine.

EURASIANISM FROM CLASSICAL TO NEO

The word 'Eurasia' was first used by the famous Russian geographer V. Lamansky, who declared in 1892 that 'Great Russia' represents a continent in its own right.³ While Eurasianism was first merely a geographical term, it later

¹ For more information, please see University of Alberta, *Who was Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, <https://www.ualberta.ca/canadian-institute-of-ukrainian-studies/centres-and-programs/jacyk-centre/hrushevsky-translation-project/who-was-mykhailo-hrushevsky.html> (Accessed on 24.10.2023).

² For detailed information please see Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, Arktos Media Ltd., 2014; Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008; Madhavan K. Palat, *Eurasianism as an Ideology for Russia's Future*, in "Economic and Political Weekly", Vol. 28, 1993, no. 51; Ilya Vinkovetsky, *Classical Eurasianism and its Legacy*, in "Canadian-American Slavic Studies", Vol. 34, 2000, no. 2 and Boris Ishboldin, *The Eurasian Movement*, in "The Russian Review", Vol. 5, 1946no. 2, pp. 64-73.

³ Alberto Masoero, *Russia between Europe and Asia*, in Pietro Rossi (Ed.), *The Boundaries*

acquired a philosophical and ideological meaning in 19th-century Russia. This ideology that emerged during the crisis periods of Russian political life became again prominent in the 20th century, when the USSR gave some signs of disintegration and tried to evolve a national ideology for Russians.⁴

Eurasianism agrees with the idea of German and Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians that the land-sea duality refers to two distinct political concepts. In this regard, Eurasianists primarily associate the maritime sphere with parliamentary democracies, and the continental sphere with more autocratic regimes. This duality of the world seems to reappear in Savitskii's idea of two imperial models. One of these is continental and overlaps with the ideas and patterns of the civilization model of the Roman/Byzantine Empire. The other is maritime and coincides with the British model, considering the predominance of economic or trade relations, along with the cultural level it dominates. In Eurasianist thought, the continental model, which is claimed to be applicable only to Russia, appears to be accepted as a healthy imperialism capable of creating a supranational culture and serving the progress of humanity.⁵

Eurasianists believe that the prevailing Western idea that considers individuals as 'atomic parts' in the state, public, social groups, and even in the family is inaccurate. They think that the public is a transpersonal organism, the individual 'I' literally does not exist, and the individual personality is nothing more than the enrolment of a social personality. Furthermore, the Eurasianist movement undoubtedly rejects the Eurocentric emphasis on world history. Here, Eurasianists do not accept the understanding of civilization commonly believed for all based on the universal values established by the 'West'. This rejection of Eurocentrism also opposes the western form of liberal democracy, its rule of law, parliamentarism, and human rights. In turn, Eurasianists, as an anti-thesis, have developed the idea of a strong authoritarian state based on the organic unity of the person and the state, in other words, the 'symphonic personality', as well as the principle of the communion of Russian Orthodoxy *sobornost*.⁶ In particular, the

of Europe: From the Fall of the Ancient World to the Age of Decolonisation, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2015, p. 203.

⁴ Boris Ishboldin, *The Eurasian Movement*, in "The Russian Review", Vol. 5, 1946, no. 2, p. 67.

⁵ Marlene Laruelle, *Conceiving the Territory: Eurasianism as a Geographical Ideology*, in Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, and Marlene Laruelle (Eds.), *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 2015, p. 80.

⁶ Christian F. Wehrschutz, *Rus Fikriyatının Parçası Olarak Avrasyacılık* [Eurasianism as

increasingly bureaucratic nature of Soviet life and the enduring totalitarianism of Soviet society have altered the Eurasianists perspective that totalitarian/authoritarian regimes are more suitable for Russia.⁷

Based on these foundations, Eurasianism is an ideological and social-political thought, born in the environment created by the first wave of Russian emigration. In this sense, the foundations of Eurasianism were built in Sofia in July 1921. At that time, four emigrant Russian scholars published a book entitled *Exodus to the East: Forebodings and Events: An Affirmation of the Eurasians*. These scholars were Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoi (1890–1938), a famous linguist and a philosopher; Petr Nikolaevich Savitskii (1895–1968), an economic geographer and skilled geopolitician; Georgii Vasilevich Florovskii (1893–1979), a theologian and historian; and Petr Petrovich Suvchinskii (1892–1985), a gifted musicologist and art critic. They were all immigrants from Bolshevik Russia who had just arrived in Bulgaria. Their book, as the name implies, was also the harbinger of the birth of a new intellectual group called ‘Eurasians’.⁸

Despite its diverse nature, it can be stated that Eurasianism in this period was based mainly on two ideas. The first is the idea of uniting the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples of the USSR. From this perspective, Eurasian differs considerably from Slavic nationalism. Second, like many supporters of the revolution, Eurasians see the Bolshevik Revolution not as a deviation but as a transformation that strictly adheres to the political tradition of the state, and they consider Soviet Russia as the principal Eurasian state.⁹ In the 1930s, some Eurasians who experienced divisions within themselves returned to Russia and began to argue

Part of Russian Idea], in Erol Göka, Murat Yılmaz (Eds.), *Uygarlığın Yeni Yolu Avrasya* [The New Path of Civilization Eurasia], İstanbul, Kızıllema Yayıncılık, 1998, p. 26-27.

⁷ Dmitry Shlapentokh, *Introduction: Eurasianism and Soviet/Post-Soviet Studies*, in Dmitry Shlapentokh (Ed.), *Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism*, Leiden, Brill Publishing House, 1997, p. 131.

⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, Arktos Media Ltd., 2014, p. 24; Shlapentokh, *Introduction: Eurasianism and Soviet/Post-Soviet Studies*, p. 6., Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, Marlene Laruelle, *What Was Eurasianism and Who Made It?*, in Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, Marlene Laruelle (Eds.), *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015, p. 2; Marlene Laruelle, *Conceiving the Territory: Eurasianism as a Geographical Ideology*, p. 69.

⁹ Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Eurasianism: Past and Present*, in “Communist and Post-Communist Studies”, Vol. 30, 1997, no. 2, p. 130-131; Fatih Akgül, *Rusya ve Türkiye’de Avrasyacılık* [Eurasianism in Russia and Turkey], İstanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2009, p. 18-19.

that the USSR was the real Eurasian State. Some of them left this movement, and a significant part of those who remained outside the country was destroyed by the Soviet Secret Service. After the 1930s, Eurasianism was stripped of its so-called politics and became a perspective that could be used by the political will and even a part of the propaganda of the communist regime. In the following years, the Soviet government banned the literature created by Classical Eurasianists, albeit for a while. In this perspective, immigrant Eurasianists in the Soviet Union were accused of being bourgeois nationalists, and their teachings were also suppressed.¹⁰

Lev Gumilev is known to have been one of the USSR's leading representatives of the Eurasianist movement at the end of the Second World War. Gumilev has developed classical Eurasianism in two aspects. He first adopted the general vision that Russian-Eurasia was a multinational civilization, and then he argued that this civilization had become a great continental power not by conquest and domination but by the cooperation of all the Russians and non-Russian people that made it up. Another contribution to Eurasianist ideas Gumilev made is his emphasis mainly on 'lower-level' issues related to ethnicity and ethnonational identity. At this point, Gumilev argued that the biology of ethnicity was based on external geographical factors rather than internal physiological structure and genetics. In this sense, it seems that Gumilev does not believe that nations or ethnicities represent genetically conditioned races. On the contrary, he claims they are always composed of a mixture of different racial elements.¹¹

We can find traces of Eurasian ideas in Soviet political discourse with the proposal of Mikhail Gorbachev for a common 'European home', which granted the Warsaw Pact countries the right to determine their destiny but deprived the union republics of the same right because they were decisively different civilizations. Nevertheless, such rhetoric has remained extremely limited. Eurasianism, which lost its significance over time, revived, and became prominent again with the intellectual pursuits that arose with the collapse of the USSR. Classical Eurasianism, which emerged in the 1920s, was manifested in the 1980s, this time as neo-Eurasianism. After the collapse of the USSR, it has become one of the main

¹⁰ Paul Pryce, *Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?*, in "Romanian Journal of European Affairs", Vol. 13, 2013, no. 1, p. 30; Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008, p. 24-25.

¹¹ Mark Bassin, Gonzalo Pozo, *Introduction*, in Mark Bassin, Gonzalo Pozo (Eds.), *The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia's Foreign Policy*, London, Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd., 2017, p. 6.

ideological principles of the opposition (from red to brown) against the Yeltsin regime.¹²

In the 1980s, the Soviet system began to experience significant depression, which boosted expectations for change. In such an environment, the word 'reform' in Russia is identified with liberal democracy. The reformists, namely liberal democrats, who accepted the superiority of the West and wanted to imitate it, began to dominate the Soviet system. In this atmosphere, a national-patriotic opposition began to appear, including former Soviet supporters and those disappointed with the reforms. In other words, Russia embarked on a new quest with the feeling of defeat against the West. Eurasianism is an ideology that emerged largely against the West and against the views of Western supporters within the country. It began to become widespread again in the 1990s as the ideology of the recovery of the Russian Empire, which was trying to overcome the difficult period after the collapse of the USSR and did not want to lose its sphere of influence in the Soviet period to the United States. By 2002, it became more prominent in Russian political life with the establishment of two Eurasian parties during Vladimir Putin's rule. Eurasianism has not only changed but also diversified in the process of its political/ideological development.¹³

This new understanding, known as neo-Eurasianism, is essentially the most detailed of the various conservative ideologies that emerged in Russia during the 1990s. The ideology claims that Europe is not in a state of advanced development but represents a certain form of development that cannot be reproduced. For this reason, it is claimed that "Russia must learn the West but reject the imperialism of European identity". The Eurasian doctrine has always been attractive to many intellectuals and politicians, because the doctrine helped the elites to formulate an explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union and reshape the sense of

¹² Paul Pryce, *Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?*, p. 30. Fatih Akgül, *Rusya ve Türkiye'de Avrasyacılık*, p. 19 and Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Eurasianism: Past and Present*, p. 6.

¹³ Demirhan F. Erdem, *Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Avrasya ve Avrasyacılık: Algılamalar Yaklaşımlar ve Stratejiler* [Eurasia and Eurasianism in the World and in Turkey: Perceptions, Approaches and Strategies], Ankara, Barış Kitap, 2016, p. 20-22; Mehmet S. Erol, *Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Avrasya Jeopolitiği ve Avrasyacılık Tartışmaları* [Eurasian Geopolitics and Eurasianism Debates in the Global Power Struggle], in İhsan Çomak (Ed.), *Rusya Stratejik Araştırmaları* [Russian Strategic Studies], İstanbul, Tasam Yayınları, 2006, p. 130; Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Introduction: Eurasianism and Soviet/Post-Soviet Studies*, in Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism*, Leiden, Brill Publishing House, 2007, p. 6.

Russia's continuation by focusing on spatial concepts rather than temporal ones.¹⁴ This new and non-uniform way of thinking has manifested itself in the form of neo-Eurasianism, which is considered the continuation of Classical Eurasianism, as well as a wide range of Eurasianist approaches, from integration with the new world order to opposing the dominance of Russia. In this study, we will consider the neo-Eurasianist perspective framed by Alexandr Dugin, which has considerably influenced Russian political discourse and foreign policy since the early 2000s.

Marlene Laruelle states that Dugin occupies an important and controversial role in the Russian public sphere.¹⁵ She argues that Dugin seems to have power in influencing some military and political circles and some people in the presidential administration. Dugin was an adviser to Gennady Seleznev, the chairman of the State Duma from 1996 to 2003. Subsequently, he became the head of the Geopolitical Expertise Department of the Duma's advisory National Security Council. In addition to his position at the Geopolitical Expertise Department, his courses at the General Staff Military Academy have provided him with financial support from military circles. He has easy access to the Duma and supporters in all parties represented in Parliament and his book on geopolitics is taught as a textbook in many higher educational institutions. Aleksei Podberezkin and his organization 'Spiritual Heritage', which has long functioned as the leading think tank of the Communist Party, regularly quotes Dugin and he is also recognized as having inspired several books by Gennady Zyuganov.¹⁶

Dugin's philosophy is based on his emphasis on the irreconcilable conflict between the Eurasian civilization, at the heart of which is Russia, and the Atlantic civilization, led by the United States. Accordingly, there was a long-standing conflict between the land power of the continental states (most notably Russia and Germany) representing the 'heartland' of the Eurasian continent and the naval power of the 'ocean' states (Britain and America) located at the edges of Eurasia. At this point, Mackinder's final thesis is that the power that dominates the Eurasian territory will dominate the whole world. This structure consists of two main elements. The first is Eurasianism, the doctrine that emerged among

¹⁴ Marlen Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, p. 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ At the same time, Laruelle claims that it would not be accurate to state that Dugin is the ideological "guru" of the Putin regime. She notes that Dugin's influence is mainly limited to certain academics and students in the fields such as philosophy, culture, political science, and international relations. For more information, see Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, p. 11.

Russian immigrants in the 1920s. The main principle of this thought is the assumption that Russia is a unique mixture of Slavs and Muslims, mostly Turks, as well as other ethnicities of Russia and the Soviet Union, which is considered an organic part. The second-largest building block is the traditional geopolitical understanding at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.¹⁷

Dugin points out that, from a geopolitical perspective, the existence of the Eastern Bloc is a positive factor for both the possible Eurasian Union and the continental integration and sovereignty of the larger area. In this sense, Dugin considers it necessary for the geopolitical and strategic sovereignty of Russia to incorporate the Western continental states (initially, the Franco-German bloc, which tends to get rid of the Atlanticist patronage of the American-led NATO) and Eastern continental states (Iran, India, and Japan) into the Eurasian strategic bloc, along with the lost ‘immediate environment’.¹⁸

MAKING SENSE OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DUGIN’S UNDERSTANDING OF NEO-EURASIANISM

Dmitry V. Shlapentokh argues that although Dugin’s geopolitical perspective found little direct application in actual Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, it had an impact on Putin’s stance on Crimea and Ukraine, even if indirectly. In this regard, it can be stated that Dugin’s views, especially on Ukraine, are essential in terms of making sense of the war between Russia and Ukraine.¹⁹ Pointing out the importance of Ukraine for the Russian Empire, Dugin draws attention to this matter by stating, “in order to succeed in forming the Eurasian Union, it is enough to get the support of Kazakhstan and Ukraine.” Dugin defines the Moscow-Astana-Kyiv geopolitical triangle as a framework that can assure the stability of the Eurasian Union and points out that Russia and Ukraine have much in common, such as cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic resemblances.²⁰

¹⁷ Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Implementation of an Ideological Paradigm: Early Duginian Eurasianism and Russia’s Post-Crimean Discourse*, in “Contemporary Security Policy”, Vol. 35, no. 3, 2014, p. 381; Meşdi İsmayilov, *Avrasyacılık: Mukayeseli Bir Okuma Türkiye ve Rusya Örneği* [Eurasianism: A Comparative Reading the Case of Türkiye and Russia], Ankara, Doğu-Batı Yayınları. 2011, p. 227-228.

¹⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, p. 10.

¹⁹ Please see Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Implementation of an Ideological Paradigm: Early Duginian Eurasianism and Russia’s Post-Crimean Discourse*, p. 381.

²⁰ Alexander Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım* [Russian Geopolitics: Eurasianist Approach], 9th edition, translated by Vügar İmanov, İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2014, p. 79.

In this context, Dugin draws attention to the fact that the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine is a highly adverse condition for Russian geopolitics and points out that this case can also easily provoke a military conflict. He stated that, in the current situation in Ukraine, a Russia devoid of the Black Sea from Ozi Castle to the Kerch Strait would be doomed to an extremely small coastline. In this way, Russia would be doomed to an extremely limited coastline, and its existence as a independent state would be regarded with suspicion. He also emphasizes that an independent Ukrainian state, with some territorial claims, poses a great danger to the integrity of Eurasia. It would make no sense to talk about continental geopolitics before the Ukrainian issue is resolved. Therefore, Dugin asserts that Ukraine should be considered a strategic extension of Moscow in the south and west.²¹

Dugin also supports his ideas with historical and sociocultural examples. In this context, he states that the Eastern Slavs, who came out after the Kyiv principality faded away, were divided into various parts in the historical process. However, he claims that this partition did not happen in the form of tribes, but instead occurred in the form of Russians who were divided into different geographies and experienced different destinies. Thus, he notes that in the eastern and northern parts of Russia, one of the branches of the Eastern Slavs, the Kievan Rus people, gradually appeared. Although the term 'Russians' is generally used for these people, he suggests that it would be more appropriate to use the term 'Great Russians' for them as those who live in the western part of the Eastern Slavs are also Russians.²²

He notes that this western part of the Eastern Slavs, the only Orthodox Russian people of the Grand Duchy of Kyiv, was divided into two branches: northwestern and southwestern. The Northwestern Russians are Belarusians because this part of Russia is called Belaya (white), while the Southwestern Russians would later be called 'Little Russians.' However, this term would be used both in a broad sense (including the territory of Galicia-Volyn) and in a narrow sense (concerning Central Ukraine). At this point, it is possible to state that the Little Russians here coincide with the modern-day Ukrainian nation. Nevertheless, despite this distinction, Dugin draws attention to the fact that these are divided not based on nation or tribe, but according to political and historical

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 175-176.

²² Alexander Dugin, *Ethnosociology of Ukraine in The Context of Military Operation*, in "Geopolitika", <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/ethnosociology-ukraine-context-military-operation> (Accessed on 25.06.2023).

criteria, and they are parts of a single nation (Russian). Dugin mentions that, over time, all three branches of the Eastern Slavs (the future Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarusians) lost their sovereignty and found themselves in other, more powerful political formations. He states that the Belarusians and the Little Russians initially found themselves part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and, after the union, part of the Poland–Lithuania Kingdom. Dugin states that in this way, the three branches of a single nation, which he calls the Eastern Slavs as a whole, remain within different political systems. In other words, Dugin has always characterized the historical Ukrainian identity as an integral part of the Russian identity.²³

Dugin points out that, given the political contradictions between the Russian Empire and Western Europe, the process of creating unnatural nations evolved into a political tool, leading to the construction of a separate Ukrainian identity. Dugin argues that the Ukrainian nationalism that emerged at the end of the 19th century was even more unnatural and baseless. Moreover, he points out that the Ukrainian identity is supported primarily by Poles in the hope of countering the Great Russians, gaining an ally in the war against Russia, and regaining their dominance over Western Russia in the long run. At this point, he points out that the Poles have also played an essential role in creating a manufactured Ukrainian language. At the same time, he asserts that Austria–Hungary not only contributed to the Poles in Galicia, but also to the creation of Ukrainian nationalism to use against Russia. Ukrainian nationalism began to take shape rapidly in the process of the collapse of the Russian Empire, and these first steps primarily played only an intermediary role in the struggle of Polish nationalism against Russia. Dugin also argues that in the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West, the founder of geopolitics Halford Mackinder has also been involved in Ukrainian nationalism and the project of creating a Ukraine nation while he was the High Commissioner of the Entente for Ukraine during the Civil War era.²⁴ At this point Dugin states that the Ukrainian identity has been created fully unnaturally with the help of Western states within the framework of the Russia–West conflict. Dugin points out that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was united by Lenin during the Soviet rule but claims that this state was made up of artificially united parts. He also states that it was impossible to build a full-fledged nation in Ukraine due to the socialist

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

understanding and suggests that Ukraine remained a manufactured state during this period.²⁵

Dugin claimed that this historical background led to the emergence of a new, heterogeneous ethnic-sociological structure in Ukraine. He draws attention to the fact that one of the most critical parts of this structure was a crowded population belonging to the Grand Russian family, which in no way stood out in Soviet society. He points out that this population primarily lived in Slobozhanshchyna, Donbas, Novorossiia (as far as Odesa), and Crimea in the territory of Eastern Ukraine, and notes that ethnically, culturally, historically, and linguistically, they are not different from the South Russian population and are often called 'Russians.' He states that the latter are descendants of Cossacks and peasants of Little Russia who passed from the rule of the Poles to the Russian Empire in Central Ukraine, mainly in the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions. He also points out that in these regions, dialects of Little Russian were widespread, and peasants retained many features of the archaic way of life. He claims that the third one is the population living in the Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr regions, located west of the Dnieper, and the population here is even more agricultural and archaic. He notes that the manufactured language here and the Small Ukrainian dialects coexist with the Russian language. He states that the classical Russian ethnicities are relatively few in this region, which he calls Great Russians, and notes that the difference from the Russian identity was more apparent when the Polish influence increased since the region is close to the West. The fourth region, he states, is Galicia, an exceptional region whose population is in no way connected with the Russian Empire. He also draws attention to the fact that although Galicia and Volhynia do not actually belong to Ukraine, the most independent Ukrainian identity developed in this region. And the last part is Subcarpathia, which had been the land of the Hungarian crown for almost a thousand years. The region remained under the sovereignty of the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary, then became part of Czechoslovakia, then Hungary again.²⁶

Ukraine has always been of particular importance for Russians because it is an area that Russians consider to be within the "actual Russian territory" on both identity and historical grounds.²⁷ As stated by Dugin, there is also a significant

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Aleksandr Soljenitsin, *Rusya Nasıl Kurtulur?* [How to Save Russia?], in Erol Göka, Murat Yılmaz (Eds.), *Uygarlığın Yeni Yolu Avrasya* [The New Path of Civilization Eurasia], İstanbul, Kızılelma Yayıncılık, 1998, p. 209.

amount of ethnic Russian population living in the east and south of Ukraine, which in the historical process has remained under the control of Russians. Therefore, although fifteen independent states appeared after the collapse of the USSR, the loss of Ukraine was the most difficult for the Russians to adopt. Dugin expresses this situation by saying: "unitary Ukraine cannot be allowed to live any longer. This country should be divided into several areas in accordance with the diversity of the geopolitical and ethnic-cultural realities." In addition, the necessity of annexing Crimea to the Russian territory, which is located in a highly strategic position for Russia due to its hosting of the Black Sea navy, was also upheld by Dugin in 1997 as follows: "It is impossible to let Crimea be «sovereign Ukraine». Because this situation will pose a direct threat to Russia's geopolitical security and cause ethnic tensions within Crimea."²⁸ For these reasons, Dugin states that Western geopolitics and the central 'Ukrainian issue' require Moscow to take urgent preventive measures since a strategic blow to Russia is underway. It is unreasonable that Russia, the "geographical axis of history," should not respond to this issue.²⁹

Anton Shekhovtsov states that neo-Eurasianism's view of Ukraine can be summarized in several topics within the framework of the points above. The first is that neo-Eurasianism considers Ukraine an 'unnatural state' consisting of different regions with different geopolitical allegiances. Second, a sovereign and united Ukraine poses a significant threat to the geopolitical security of Russia and the probable Eurasian Empire. Third, to eliminate this threat, Russia, guided by the neo-Eurasian principles, needs to divide Ukraine and bring most of the territory, especially Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, under the direct control of Moscow by non-military measures (or that could be described as a hybrid war, military and non-military instruments combined).³⁰

It is seen that the implications of neo-Eurasianism framed by Dugin are also reflected in the Russian administration and foreign policy. In addition to the Georgia War in August 2008 and the conflict that broke out in Ukraine in 2014, Russia gained the upper hand owing to its support of the regime in Syria. With its increasing self-confidence, Russia stated in its Russian National Security Strategy

²⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, p. 207.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 209-210.

³⁰ Anton Shekhovtsov, *Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian-Ukrainian War*, in Mark Bassin, Gonzalo Pozo (Eds.), *The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia's Foreign Policy*, London, Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd., 2017, p. 185.

(dated December 2015) that the most critical threats to Russia's national security are NATO's even more prominent activities in the region and the implicit activities of the United States close to the Russian borders. This statement brings to mind Dugin's 'common enemy'³¹ principle.³²

As mentioned above, Georgia and Ukraine are crucial for Russia due to their geopolitical importance and historical ties (especially Ukraine). Thus, Russia needs to control these countries in its immediate vicinity. In this regard, Dugin stresses that complete and unlimited control of Moscow along the entire coastline from Ukraine to Abkhazia is an absolute necessity of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast, and this whole area could be fragmented as much as possible according to ethnocultural differences by granting ethnic and religious autonomy to the people of the region, on the condition of military and political control from Moscow. And this area should be kept away from the Atlanticist influence of both the west and Turkey, serving as the extension of the West in the region, and should be under the control of Moscow from a Eurasian perspective.³³

It can be asserted that this point of view clearly reflects the intellectual background of the first stage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The spark of the

³¹ For detailed information about the principle of "Common Enemy", see Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, p. 52-53.

³² In Russia's National Security Strategy Document (dated December 2015), under the title of "Russia in the modern world", it is stated that "NATO's military buildup activities that violate the norms of international law, as well as the support of the military activities of the bloc states, the growing expansion of the NATO alliance and the deployment of military facilities near the Russian borders, are factors that pose a threat to Russia's national security. In addition to the components of the American missile defence systems, which are practically the embodiment of the «global strike» concept, the deployment of non-nuclear strategic weapons systems in Europe, the Asia-Pacific Region and the Near East, as well as weapons placed in space significantly limits the opportunities for maintaining global and regional stability". The statement in Article 106 of the document, i.e. "Due to NATO's increasing military activities, its military facilities closer to the Russian borders, the construction of a missile-defence system, and its attempts to encourage the alliance to perform global functions in a way that violates the international law, Russia's interests are being undermined, and these developments underline Russia-NATO relations", clearly demonstrates Russia's perspective on NATO. For more information see Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, p. 11. See also especially *Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 - Full-text Translation*, "Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos", <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf> (Accessed on 08.09.2021).

³³ Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, p. 176.

war was lit in November 2013, when Ukraine's Russian-backed President Yanukovich refused a major economic deal, he was negotiating with the EU and decided to accept a \$15 billion Russian counteroffer; this decision triggered protests of the masses of EU supporters in Ukraine against the government.³⁴ Demonstrations intensified in the country's west, especially in the capital Kyiv, and continued to escalate. The harsh measures taken by the government further increased the demonstrations, and on February 17, 2014, Yanukovich was compelled to leave the country. An interim administration was established in Kyiv until the elections (May 25, 2014) and, although the West recognized this administration, it was not recognized by Russia. Then, anti-Western and anti-government demonstrations started in the pro-Russian regions of Ukraine and these demonstrations soon spread to the east and south of the country.³⁵ In Crimea, one of the predominantly inhabited places of Russian ethnicity, the Parliament first declared the independence of the region; then, as a result of the referendum held on March 16, 95% of the participants voted "yes" to the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and its integration into Russia.³⁶ Soon after, Vladimir Putin signed the decree officially approving the unification of Crimea with Russia and officially confiscated Crimea.³⁷ Meanwhile, anti-Western demonstrations spread to the Donbas region in the east of the country. On May 11, 2014, referendums were held in Donetsk and Luhansk, the eastern provinces of Ukraine, where a considerable number of ethnic Russians live. As a result of these referendums, the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics were declared. However, Russia did not recognize the independence of the so-called republics at

³⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, *Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin*, in "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 93, no. 5, 2014, p. 4.

³⁵ Hasret Çomak, Ufuk Cerrah, *Karadeniz Jeopolitiğinde Ukrayna ve Kırım'ın Güvenliği ve Bu Güvenliğin Avrasya Enerji Güvenliğine Etkileri* [The security of Ukraine and Crimea in the Black Sea Geopolitics and the Effects of this Security on Eurasian Energy Security], in "BİLGESAM", http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-381-201412291guvenlik_kongresi_bildirileri-43.pdf (Accessed on 05.09.2021).

³⁶ Conversely, this so-called referendum is not recognized by Ukraine, nor is it recognized by the international community. Regarding the fact that such a referendum was not accepted, a decision called "General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region (GA/11493)" was adopted by the UN General Assembly on March 27, 2014. Please see United Nations, *General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region*, <https://press.un.org/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm> (Accessed on 24.05.2023).

³⁷ Anton Shekhovtsov, *Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian-Ukrainian War*, p. 181.

that time. Separatists even declared that referendums could also be held in eastern provinces other than Donetsk and Luhansk and, with the participation of these provinces, a new republic could be declared in the east of Ukraine with the name of 'Novorossiia' (New Russia).³⁸ However, these referendums, like the others, did not comply with international law and were not recognized by the other states.³⁹

From the end of February 2014, Dugin actively publicized neo-Eurasianism and anti-Ukrainian messages using mainstream media, as well as neo-Eurasianism-supporting media, and shared his comments on the developments in Ukraine on Facebook and the Russian platform. Anton Shekhovtsov claims that Dugin's messages on the Ukrainian war generally focus on four issues. First, pro-Atlanticists declared war on Russia, bringing the Nazis to power in Ukraine. Second, the Provisional Government is a Nazi junta with no legitimacy. Third, Ukraine does not now exist. Finally, Russia needs to act decisively to prevent the pro-Atlanticists from establishing control over the entire territory of former Ukraine.⁴⁰ The Russian side used these issues also in the 2022 war as justifications for legitimizing the war.

All these developments essentially paved the way for the conflict to flare up again in February 2022. Dugin lit the flare of the war that would break out on February 24, 2022, by stating, "Since the rhetoric that Kyiv will remain alone or abandon its pro-American and anti-Russian policy is unrealistic, Russia will have to solve the Novorossiia problem radically sooner or later".⁴¹ In order to effectively protect Crimea and solve the Donbas problem, the entire Novorossiia region should be liberated, Dugin says, noting that if the war is inevitable, Moscow's only task is to win the war as soon as possible. At this point, the goal that can be considered a victory is to create a friendly Russian region or

³⁸ Hasret Çomak, Ufuk Cerrah, *Karadeniz Jeopolitiğinde Ukrayna ve Kırım'ın Güvenliği ve Bu Güvenliğin Avrasya Enerji Güvenliğine Etkileri*.

³⁹ Please see John B. Bellinger, *Why the Crimean Referendum is Illegitimate*, in "Council on Foreign Relations", <https://www.cfr.org/interview/why-crimean-referendum-illegitimate> (Accessed on 24.05.2023).

⁴⁰ Information is also contained in the work of Shekhovtsov that Dugin gave direct instructions to certain members of the pro-Russian separatist movement in Donetsk. For more information, see Shekhovtsov, *Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian-Ukrainian War*, p. 192.

⁴¹ Alexander Dugin, *Principles and Strategy of The Coming War*. Part II, in "Geopolitika", <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/principles-and-strategy-coming-war-part-ii> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

independent states from Odesa to Kharkov, or to incorporate them into Russian territory, and he also pointed out that the fate of the Central and Western Ukraine is not of great value.⁴²

In addition, Dugin states, "I am completely sure that if we lose the Donbas, we will lose Crimea, and then all of Russia", making the war almost a matter of existence.⁴³ On the other hand, Dugin declares that he is not against the existence of a sovereign Ukraine if it is to be an ally or partner of Russia or at least a neutral intermediate region. Dugin notes that Russians want to be together in a single state with Ukrainians. Still, Ukrainian citizens should decide it, and what should never be allowed is the occupation of Ukraine by the Atlantic Bloc. Noting that the enemies of Russia are very well aware that Russia can only become great again together with Ukraine or by forming some type of balanced alliance, he also points out that it is impossible to create a united and robust Russian world in Ukraine without a Eurasian axis, whether peaceful or not. Stating that Russia cannot evade its historical responsibilities, Dugin points out that if they challenge Russia and tear up the Minsk Agreements in Donbas, it will become inevitable for Russia to achieve a victory in Ukraine.⁴⁴

Davor S. Vuyachich, who wrote an article about the war on Dugin's website "Geopolitika", claimed Russia does not want any armed conflict to occur in Ukraine and has been trying for eight years to solve the issue through diplomacy. However, he claimed that Ukraine refused to resolve the dispute on the table through diplomacy and fulfil the Minsk agreements due to Washington's support and promises. He also noted that Ukraine has been arming for more than eight years to recapture the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk People's Republics using weapons. At this point, he pointed out that Russian intelligence services obtained strong evidence that Ukraine was preparing for an armed attack ultimately led to the necessity for Russia to intervene militarily in Ukraine, even though Putin was reluctant to intervene until the last minute. Vuyachich noted that the Kyiv regime's extraordinarily hostile and aggressive policy towards Russia makes Ukraine's military confrontation with Russia inevitable, and all responsibility for this belongs to the United States.⁴⁵

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Alexander Dugin, *War in Donbass will be Imposed on us by Washington and Kiev*, in "Geopolitika", <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/1276-war-in-donbass-will-be-imposed-on-us-by-washington-and-kiev.html> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Davor S. Vuyachich, *Ukraine – From Euromaidan to Afghanistan*, in "Geopolitika", <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/ukraine-euromaidan-afghanistan> (Accessed

Pepe Escobar, another author who published in “Geopolitika”, in parallel with Dugin, claiming that Ukraine has never actually been a state and has always been a part of states or empires such as Poland, Austria–Hungary, Turkey, and most notably, Russia. Noting that Ukraine means ‘border region’ in Russian, Escobar stated that in the past, it constituted the westernmost regions of the Russian Empire. In this regard, when the Empire began to expand to the south, he noted that the new regions, mostly seized from Turkish rule, were called ‘Novorossiya’ (New Russia), and the northeastern regions were called ‘Malorossiya’ (Little Russia). At the beginning of the 1920s, he pointed out that it was up to the USSR to deconstruct all these parts and call it ‘Ukraine’ and to annex western Galicia, which was not historically Russian territory. Commenting that the most critical turning point in the future of Ukraine occurred with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Escobar notes that Novorossiya and Malorossiya regions were not allowed to rejoin Russia, but Russia is now reclaiming these historical Russian lands based on its own power. Escobar states that the ultimate goal of the ‘Special Military Operation’ targeting Ukraine is to liberate all of Novorossiya and ensure complete control of the Black Sea coastline, which is currently part of Ukraine.⁴⁶

Dugin notes that even if Russia loses Ukraine, its system will not tumble down completely, and its influence will not decrease much either. Nevertheless, he claims that the loss of Ukraine would symbolically deal a major blow to Russia’s power and open a breach in the walls of its empire. He also notes that though Ukraine is just a pawn for the West, it means a lot more than that for Russia. According to Dugin, on the path to world hegemony between Russia and the United States, Ukraine is a must-win actor. Similar situations occurred in the 1990s, but the Ukraine issue is becoming even more vital today, and the only way out of this problem is now a victory. In this sense, the victory does not mean maintaining Ukraine’s current form in exchange for some small demands of Russia. Dugin points out that the ultimate success is a complete change of both Ukraine and Russia, implying that a completely dominated Ukraine will mean the ultimate victory.⁴⁷

on 25.05.2023).

⁴⁶ Pepe Escobar, *The Total War to Cancel Russia*, “Geopolitika”, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/total-war-cancel-russia> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

⁴⁷ Alexander Dugin, *Victory or Nothing*, in “Geopolitika”, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/victory-or-nothing> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

Regarding the limits of the operation, Dugin notes that many people accuse the proponents of the Russian world and Eurasian geopolitics of calling for a disproportionate expansion of the great Eurasian state. However, he finds this unrealistic and states that everything starts with an idea in politics. In the Ukrainian crisis, the idea is the reconstruction of the borders of Russia-Eurasia and the Russian world. At this point, noting that he has certain reservations about the future of Western Ukraine, Dugin stresses that ethno-sociologically, historically, and psychologically, it is impossible to integrate this region into Eurasia, except for the Orthodox peoples of Transcarpathian Ruthenia and Volhynia. Against this background, he criticizes Stalin, noting that when he reintegrated West Ukraine into the Empire, the only achievement was increasing Russian hostility and rejecting any unity. To this end, Dugin largely excludes the west of Ukraine from this definition, arguing that Russia should seize places that it can realistically absorb and defend.⁴⁸

As for the ultimate goal of the 'Special Military Operation', Dugin points out that there are two primary goals. One is 'de-Nazification', and the other is 'demilitarization'. This means that Russia will not stop until it has eliminated the model of nation and nation-state that the Ukrainian nationalists have built with the support of the West. This means that Russia will not stop until it destroys the nation and nation-state model that Ukrainian nationalists have built with the support of the West. He also notes that this will mean starting off a new phase in which the Great Russians and the Little Russians will be reunited into a single nation. It is worth noting that according to Dugin, this does not necessarily mean a victory of the Russians over the Ukrainians, but the reunification of the Eastern Slavs, namely Great Russians and Little Russians (and Belarusians). He points out that if one wants to move toward a resurgent society, one should also learn from the mistakes of Ukrainians and never incline toward nationalism. To express this situation, Dugin states, "we are not a nation; we are the people". In this sense, he expresses his goals: "we must build a great state that will accommodate all, whose fate is connected with us, primarily, our East Slavic brothers".⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Alexander Dugin, *The Future of the Ukrainian State*, in "Geopolitika", <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/future-ukrainian-state> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

⁴⁹ Alexander Dugin, *Ethnosociology of Ukraine in The Context of Military Operation*, passim.

CONCLUSIONS

Eurasianism is defined as an ideology of a crisis period since it has played an essential role in Russian political life during and after the disintegration of the Russian Tsardom and the USSR. Classical Eurasianism has changed and become more thriving over time and it came to the agenda in the 1990s as neo-Eurasianism. It is widely accepted that one of the most influential figures of neo-Eurasianism (even the most influential) is Aleksandr Dugin. His role in Russian politics and his prolific academic career as a writer played a significant role in recognizing and accepting his views.

Although neo-Eurasianism was not dominant enough in Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, it is generally accepted that it became prominent, especially during the Putin period. Of course, it is also unrealistic to claim that Putin has always considered the idea of neo-Eurasianism in all his steps. However, the affinity between Dugin's neo-Eurasianism and Putin's practices is clearly not a coincidence. Since Putin, who desires to make Russia an empire again, is fed from many different sources in Russian political life, his practices also parallel neo-Eurasianism. It can be argued that Ukraine is one of the most critical areas where this parallelism can be best explained. Dugin primarily characterizes Ukraine as an essential part of the historical Russian homeland since the first Russian state, the Principality of Kyiv, is based in Ukraine. He notes that from a geographical point of view, Ukraine is located in the center of the Russian imperial territory, and even calls the area where Ukraine is located 'Little Russia.' Dugin notes that the south of Ukraine and the east of the Dnieper River are related to the Russian ethnicity, and the population living in these regions also belongs to the sect of Orthodoxy, as do the Russians. In other words, he claims that Ukraine is part of the Russian Empire on historical, geographical, ethnic, and religious grounds. By claiming that the Russian Empire, located at the center of the Eurasian Empire, consists of Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, he clearly states that he does not consider these states to be independent. Thus, he implies that these states will be integrated into the Russian Empire when the time is up.

Based on these considerations, Dugin argues that there is no Ukrainian ethnicity; it was created completely unnaturally with the help of western states within the framework of the Russia–West conflict. However, maintaining that this state cannot go beyond being a manufactured state, he draws attention to the significance of destroying this unnatural nation and the state based on it, thus disrupting the game of the Atlantic bloc. He proposes that the heavily Russian-

populated South of Ukraine, and the east of the Dnieper River, called Donbas, be connected to Russia.

As Dugin points out, the south of the country was largely connected to Russia with the annexation of Crimea in the 2014 war and a Russian-backed uprising began in the Donbas region. From the concentration of Russian troops in the south (to establish a land connection between the east of the country and Crimea), it is understood that the remaining task work is done with the war in February 2022. On February 10, 2022, on a television program, Putin, implying the war in Ukraine, stated, “Peter the Great waged the Great Northern War for 21 years. When he was at war with Sweden, he did not take anything away from Sweden; he just returned land that rightfully belonged to Russia. Now it seems our turn to take back what is ours”;⁵⁰ thus, he points out that this policy has historical grounds. Although there may be many historical reasons for this war, it is possible to state that neo-Eurasianism also plays an essential role in forming an ideological basis for it.

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A NEW FACE OF CHINA: SHARP POWER STRATEGY AND ITS GLOBAL EFFECTS

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Abstract: *China's rapid emergence as a great power in the world has not only influenced the actions of other countries, but also introduced new concepts to academic discourses. One of these concepts is sharp power, which has entered academia to theoretically explain China and Russia's rise. More particularly, China's actions to consolidate its position as a great power and to restore its image, have given rise to this concept. Its influence in other countries is intangible in nature and tools, but it has great tangible effects. At first, this article seeks to examine sharp power as a new concept and explain China's influential behaviours. Second, it will study the rationale of China's sharp power and then scrutinize its indicators in the world. The paper assumes that China has infiltrated the world by using intangible but powerful tools and is consolidating its foothold in different countries.*

Keywords: *China, Sharp Power, Hard Power, Soft Power, Influence, Strategy*

Rezumat: *O nouă față a Chinei: strategia „sharp power” și efectele sale globale. Ascensiunea rapidă a Chinei ca mare putere nu numai că a influențat acțiunile altor țări, dar a introdus și noi concepte în discursurile academice. Unul dintre acestea este „sharp power”, care a intrat în circuitul științific și a explicat din punct de vedere teoretic ascensiunea Rusiei și a Chinei. Noul concept, apărut după 2014, se aplică inclusiv la acțiunile Imperiului Celest de consolidare a imaginii și a poziției sale de mare putere. Influența acestui stat asupra altor țări este greu sesizabilă atât ca natură, cât și ca instrumente, dar are efecte tangibile mari. În introducere, este prezentat noul concept și aplicabilitatea sa la politicile de influență ale Chinei. Ulterior, articolul va studia rațiunea folosirii acestei politici de către China și va analiza influența acestui tip de politică în lume. În final, autorii încearcă să demonstreze că acest tip de politică*

a Chinei s-a manifestat deja în mod evident în lume, folosind instrumente intangibile, dar puternice, ajutând astfel la consolidarea poziției Imperiului Celest în diferite țări.

INTRODUCTION

Power has long played a central role in the dynamics of both domestic and international systems. Dahl defines power as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”¹ Traditionally, the physical aspects of power dominated discussions, but its interpretation has evolved over time due to the practices of international actors and scholarly efforts. In today's world, Chinese foreign policy is redefining power through the concept of ‘sharp power,’ which Beijing views as a potent tool for extending its global influence. Sharp power is a relatively recent addition to the discourse of International Relations, largely emerging from the experiences of non-democratic and authoritarian regimes. Though this concept is often associated with China, it has also found relevance in describing Russia's foreign policy conduct since the mid-2010s. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 marked a significant turning point, sparking heightened interest in the study of ‘hybrid warfare’ and laying the early foundations for the concept of sharp power in contemporary international politics.²

Various terms and frameworks have been used to describe Russia's approach to global influence, including ‘coercive diplomacy,’ ‘active measures,’ and the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.’³ Collectively, these describe the complex and dynamic nature of Russia's global behaviour and contributed to the conceptualization of ‘sharp power’ as a distinctive mode of influence in international relations. Common elements across these frameworks encompass propaganda, disinformation, cyber operations, and influence campaigns on social media, energy and economic leverage, support for extremist political movements, espionage, and covert operations.

Nevertheless, it is China that academia designates as an exemplar of sharp power in its international behaviour. China's aspirations for global economic

¹ Robert A. Dahl, *The Concept of Power*, in “Behavioral Science”, 1957, Vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 202-203.

² Andis Kudors, *Russia and Latvia A Case of Sharp Power*, New York, Routledge, 2014.

³ Ryan C. Maness, Brandon Valeriano, *Russia's Coercive Diplomacy: Energy, Cyber and Maritime Policy as New Source of Power*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Olga Bertelsen, Jan Goldman, *Russian Active Measures*, New York City, Columbia University Press, 2021, *passim*; Oscar Jonsson, *The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace*, Washington D.C. George Town University Press, 2019, *passim*.

dominance and political influence necessitated a re-evaluation of the concept of power. As the prevailing international order constrained the use of military might by states in pursuance of their objectives, China developed sharp power as a strategy to enhance its global reach.⁴ Thus, the concept of 'sharp power' was coined in the West to describe China's disruptive influence on traditional power dynamics in the international arena. It lies in between hard power and soft power, using tactics that manipulate information. China's behaviour in the context of sharp power is neither so bullying as to require the use of military force nor so peaceful as to be placed in the realm of soft power. Hence, China's approach has shifted from attraction-based soft power to penetration-based sharp power. It wants to expand global influence by distracting and manipulating information, rectifying its image and undermining adversaries.

This study seeks to examine China's actions and strategies on the international stage, particularly within the framework of sharp power. It seeks to thoroughly examine various facets of China's foreign policy conduct, shedding light on its multifaceted dimensions. The study addresses some key questions: how is the nature of sharp power defined within the context of China's foreign policy, what motivates China's emphasis on sharp power, and what tools and indicators are employed in wielding this form of power? Through a descriptive-analytical approach, the research posits that China employs sharp power to manipulate information, engage in self-censorship, sway public opinion, and take retaliatory measures. The primary motivation behind this approach is to weaken US hegemony and bolster the international standing of the ruling regime. China's sharp power indicators manifest in the realms of media, politics, academia, and the economic sector.

SHARP POWER

Sharp power is a concept that has emerged in the West to describe foreign policies and behaviours of China and Russia in recent years. Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig coined the term for the first time in 2017 to describe how authoritarian regimes opt for the manipulation of culture, education systems, and media in other countries.⁵ However, being a new concept and due to its novel

⁴ Andrea Benvenuti et al., *China's Foreign Policy: The Emergency of a Great Power*, New York, Routledge, 2022, p. 175.

⁵ Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig, *From 'Soft Power' to 'Sharp Power': Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World*, in *Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence*, 2017, p. 12.

application, sharp power is typically confused with soft, hard, and smart power. It is defined as the ability to influence others to achieve the desired results not through attraction or persuasion but through distraction and manipulation of information. The practices of countries such as China and Russia that have no aspect of persuasion to influence democratic societies as well as creating narrative are the essence of sharp power.⁶ The effort to divide or replace ideas, values, and norms or to spread the debates is a kind of narrative.⁷

Joseph Nye, however, sees sharp power as an old concept in International Relations that has been used in the past by two vying blocs during the Cold War. According to him, sharp power is a kind of information warfare and the use of fake information for malicious purposes. The goal is to conquer the minds and hearts of the target countries. Soft power pursues the same goal, but sharp power skillfully manipulates the target country or society and tries to impress the audience by destroying facts and reshaping them through fake information. Nye also believes that the real goal of sharp power is to shape public consciousness and the minds and views of leaders worldwide, as well as to undermine western democratic processes.⁸ Indeed, one of the topics discussed in the definition and explanation of sharp power is the controversy over its distinction and similarities with the concepts of hard power and soft power. Although Nye considers sharp power as an offshoot of hard power that seeks to manipulate information, many researchers distinguish between the two concepts. Hard power is a realistic tool for states' interaction. This type of power is exercised primarily through military and sometimes through economic means. Nye argues that sharp power is a kind of hard power because it uses coercive means to force states to do something favourable. States use this kind of power by either disseminating false information or manipulating it for hostile purposes.⁹

On the other hand, in the context of hard power, the actors use military tools to achieve their goals, but a state that uses sharp power acts in a way that is not

⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr, *China's Soft and Sharp Power*, in <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-soft-and-sharp-power-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-01> (Accessed on 15.10.2022).

⁷ Olga Leonova, *Sharp Power: The New Technology of Influence in a Global World*, in "World Economy and International Relations", Vol. 63, 2019, no. 2, p. 25.

⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr, *How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power*, in <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power>, (Accessed on 17.11.2022).

⁹ Jingkai Shao, *Exploring China's 'Sharp Power': Conceptual Deficiencies and Alternatives*, in "Waseda University", Vol. 6, 2019, no. 2, p. 133.

clear and can be easily denied. For example, during elections, spreading fake news on social media without being identified can impact the political process in a rival country. Manipulation of electoral results may undermine confidence in democracy. When states can easily deny allegations of such interference, it becomes challenging for the target state to respond by military force. Thus, sharp power is distinguished from hard power because it is intangible.¹⁰

Walker and Ludwig, as proponents of the concept, define sharp power as a form of information warfare being waged by authoritarian states, principally China and the Russian Federation, to shape public perceptions and behaviour around the world, using tools that exploit the asymmetry of openness between their restrictive systems and democratic societies.¹¹ Authoritarian regimes aim to rebuild their image in the democratic world and undermine democratic attractions. They use sharp power, a subset of hard power that employs intangible tools. Unlike soft power, sharp power incurs a penal consequence in addition to soft penetration. While soft power is a Western and a liberal approach to expanding influence, sharp power is used by authoritarian regimes to extend their influence.¹² In the method of action, too, sharp power is different from soft power. Sharp power is more of a reactionary aspect that aims to manipulate and revise existing information about the country. Soft power, on the other hand, has an action aspect and is used to promote values in target countries. When a country utilizes soft power, it uses reward instead of persuasion or coercion. This characteristic marks the major difference between soft power and hard power. Furthermore, because the implementation of sharp power and soft power is similar and both share common tools, the boundary between the two is subtle. However, the main indicator that distinguishes sharp power from soft power is compulsion. Soft power relies on attraction, not coercion, but sharp power relies on censure, creating distractions, and manipulating information.¹³

Sharp power is also different from smart power. Smart power combines components of hard and soft power and uses them simultaneously.¹⁴

¹⁰ Ethan Greene, *Sharp Power: How Foreign Election Interference is Changing the Global Balance of Power*, in "WWU Honors College Senior Projects", 2020, p. 5-6.

¹¹ Andrea Benvenuti et al, *passim*.

¹² Joseph S. Nye Jr, *How Sharp Power*, *passim*.

¹³ June Teufel Dreyer, *Roundtable on Sharp Power, Soft Power, and the Challenge of Democracy: A Report from the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies*, in "American Journal of Chinese Studies", Vol. 25, 2018, no. 2, p. 152-153.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr, *Security and Smart Power*, in "American Behavioral Scientist", Vol. 51, 2008, no. 9, p. 1352.

Nevertheless, in sharp power, while the tangible tools of hard power are ignored, coercion and subversive destruction are used.

CHINA'S SHARP POWER: RATIONALE AND PURPOSES

To gain an understanding of Chinese sharp power, it's essential to explore significant historical instances, as some elements of this power can be traced back to historical practices in China. From the ancient tributary system to the enduring teachings of Confucianism and the spread of the Chinese script, China's influence has transcended its borders for centuries. The tributary system of China was a diplomatic arrangement where neighbouring states recognized China's supremacy by offering tribute to the Chinese emperor. In exchange, they gained access to trade and protection. This system maintained peaceful relations, spread Chinese culture, and reinforced China's dominance in East Asia, lasting for centuries under various dynasties, reaching its zenith during the Ming Dynasty, particularly under the rule of the third emperor, Yongle (1360–1424).¹⁵ On the other hand, the ancient Silk Road served as a vehicle not only for trade but also for cultural exchange, allowing China to disseminate its culture, philosophy, and technology to neighbouring regions. Additionally, the voyages of Admiral Zheng He and the enduring relevance of ancient strategies like *The Art of War* demonstrate how China's strategies of influence have persisted over time.¹⁶

China's sharp power strategies diverge from conventional soft power tactics by aiming to persuade and manipulate global audiences, encouraging them to try out such political and value systems in their local communities. This approach extends to infiltrating Western democracies, Latin America, the US, Central and Eastern Europe, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, targeting influential figures and elite students. The list includes wide range of influential politicians, academicians, journalists and retired diplomats. Incumbent and ex-government officials and elite students are also spotlighted by Chinese sharp power.¹⁷ Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China has accelerated its efforts to shape public opinion through

¹⁵ Asım Doğan, *Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics. From the Tributary System to the Belt and Road Initiative*, New York, Routledge, 2021, p. 56.

¹⁶ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Thomas Cleary, Colorado, Shambhala Publications, 2019.

¹⁷ Roman Štěpař, *China's Sharp Power: How China Seeks to Influence and Coerce its Neighbors*, (Master Thesis, Charles University Faculty of Social Sciences, 2020), p. 6. <https://dspace.cuni.cz/bitstream/handle/20.500.11956/118653/120360972.pdf?is-Allowed=y&sequence=1>.

manipulation and censorship, with evidence of penetration in various sectors. Notable examples include espionage recruitment within American intelligence agencies, leveraging economic power to stifle free speech in the National Basketball Association controversy, and compromising data security in the Marriott breach. Cyber-attacks on the US Navy further reveal China's persistent use of cyber means to undermine American national security.¹⁸

Given the significance of China's sharp power, the question arises as why a country like China resorts to this power. One reason is that the country has little to say about soft power and has failed to act. China has everything a country needs to bolster soft power, but it has not made significant progress. In this respect, it is lagging behind not only the US but also its neighbours, including Japan and South Korea.¹⁹ On the other hand, exercising hard power comes at a high political expense. The world is sensitive about resorting to hard power for achieving goals and securing interests. At the same time, using hard power is also economically very costly, whereas, new information and communication technologies have made the use of sharp power both cheaper and reduced the possibility of retaliation.²⁰

Another reason that has drawn China's attention to sharp power is the political culture of the CCP. Andreas Fulda believes that China's sharp power is not a novel issue. This approach has been the focus of Communist leaders since 1935, before the communist revolution. After the establishment of PRC, the CCP used double policies of 'rule by bribery' and 'rule by fear' under the united front method to reinforce the regime. The former was implemented by giving privileges in the form of patronage, but the later by the use of coercion. The second method, which was done with the tactic of filing citizens' information or *dang'an zhidu* (dossier), caused widespread self-censorship.²¹

Sharp power is much more suitable for maintaining regime stability and national security than soft and hard power. Given China's huge population of over 1.3 billion, its vulnerability is also infinite. The rivals can create trouble for China's growth and stability and try to undermine its national security and territorial integrity. The CCP may have strong control over the flow of ideas within its political system, but outside, it is not possible. Although it controls the media, religious groups,

¹⁸ William J. Holstein, *The New Art of War – China's Deep Strategy inside the United States*, New York, Brick Tower Press, 2019.

¹⁹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Is the American Century Over?*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 2015, p. 47.

²⁰ Roman Štěpař, *China's Sharp Power*, p. 6.

²¹ Andreas Fulda, *The Struggle for Democracy in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong: Sharp Power and its Discontents*, London, Routledge, 2020, pp. 84-87.

online chats, and civil society associations, it cannot cut off or control its citizens' treatment of the outside world. These citizens can develop negative views of the CCP after leaving the country. Thus, they can threaten the legitimacy of the CCP and influence Beijing officials' interactions with the outside world.²² Accordingly, the CCP has resorted to covert and organized investment in the form of media and other tools of sharp power to become more powerful in the international arena.

China utilizes sharp power to change the international community's view of this country and to present itself as a prosperous and responsible nation. In addition, China wants to use sharp power to neutralize or soften potentially harmful views of the West. Both China and Russia are dissatisfied with the current world order and try to change the norms that guide the existing order. To protect their interests, they try to develop a more favourable international attitude towards the sovereignty and actions of authoritarian countries. Motivated by revisionist approach, both countries struggle to increase their capacity in terms of sharp power to revise global narratives. Some argue that because the two countries are relatively less attractive to the West, through a campaign of spreading false information and distorting facts, they seek to make their political systems better embraced.²³ Given that the level of trust in democracy and respect for liberal values in the world has substantially declined²⁴ China and Russia try to exploit the situation. China uses its sharp power capacities to diminish the importance of democracy in the eyes of grass roots. It also goes further and establishes itself as a more enduring leader in the international system.²⁵

China's adoption of sharp power also aligns with its goal of challenging the US and disrupting its dominance on the global stage. The CCP considers the US as the self-assumed hegemon of the current international order and its main adversary. By its centenary, China envisions a long-term strategy to first become a great modern socialist country and then disrupt the US-led world political and economic order.²⁶ In this pursuit, they employ a multifaceted strategy that includes intelligence

²² Peter Gries, *Nationalism, Social Influences, and Chinese Foreign Policy*, in David Shambaugh (Ed.), *China and the World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 73.

²³ Their goal is to improve the perception and acceptance of their political systems, even if these systems differ significantly from Western ideals. This strategy aims to garner support or understanding for their policies and governance, potentially on both domestic and international fronts; Natasha Lindstaedt, *Democratic Decay and Authoritarian Resurgence*, Bristol, Bristol University Press, 2021, pp. 107-108.

²⁴ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2022*, p. 14.

²⁵ Ethan Greene, *Sharp Power: How Foreign Election*, p. 13.

²⁶ Angang Hu, *2050 China: Becoming a Great Modern Socialist Country*, Gateway East,

operations, cyber warfare, information campaigns, united front initiatives, unconventional military actions, and economic leverage. Recent research, such as that conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, explores China's engagement strategy with the US, utilizing the framework of political warfare to illuminate their methods. Notably, China has been implicated in cyber-attacks compromising data for roughly 80 per cent of American citizens since 2014. Additionally, China's use of the Wolf Warrior approach underscores the CCP's strategy by rejecting US-led global governance and promoting anti-American sentiments.²⁷

Beijing, on the one hand, expands its influence in different countries to restrain Washington, and on the other, it builds clandestine footholds on American soil to undermine it from within. Moreover, China has created a vast band of agents to penetrate both American political and security administration and its business community, thereby both strengthening its power and influence and weakening its rival.²⁸ Likewise, China employs sharp power to actualize its strategic narratives, notably during Xi Jinping's leadership, which comprises the 'Chinese Dream' and 'Chinese Wisdom.' The 'Chinese Dream' seeks to reinstate China's historical greatness and global significance, while 'Chinese Wisdom' emphasizes the concept of a harmonious, equitable world based on shared destiny, aiming to overcome historical biases and centuries of imperialist humiliation and play a pivotal role on the international stage.²⁹ Aspiring to annex Taiwan to its territory, Beijing tries to achieve a fully integrated status by 2049 (the 100th anniversary of PRC).³⁰

In this respect, China's sharp power utilizes crucial tools. For instance, Confucius Institutes and Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE have raised serious controversies and challenges in the West. In pursuing global infiltration operations, Beijing often pursues its goals through the Chinese diaspora, cultural associations, chambers of commerce, Chinese students, and the international media.

Springer Nature, 2020, p. 78.

²⁷ Jones, Seth G., Emily Harding, Catrina Doxsee, Jake Harrington, Riley McCabe, *Competing without Fighting: China's Strategy of Political Warfare*, Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 2023.

²⁸ Roger Faligot, *Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping*, trans. Natasha Lehrer, 2nd ed., London, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 2019, p. 393; Hannah Rabinowitz, Evan Perez, Lauren del Valle, *FBI Arrests Two Alleged Chinese Agents and Charges Dozens with Working Inside US to Silence Dissidents*, in <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/17/politics/fbi-chinese-agents/index.html> (Accessed on 04.10.2023).

²⁹ Yi Edward Yang, *China's Strategic Narratives in Global Governance Reform under Xi Jinping*, in "Journal of Contemporary China", Vol. 30, 2021, no. 128, pp. 300-306.

³⁰ Peter Gries, *Nationalism, Social Influences*, p. 190.

THE MEDIA

The Chinese are very sensitive to the way foreigners perceive them and their country's foreign policy. The officials in Beijing frequently accuse the Western media of disseminating a negative image of China. Thus, constructing a positive image of the country abroad has been one of the key issues for the CCP.³¹ According to the Bloomberg study, between 2008 and 2018, China invested \$2.8 billion in media.³² In October 2021, in a repressive move, it banned foreign investment on the Chinese media.³³ This project has been accelerated under Xi Jinping, who emphasizes the need to bolster international communication and promote China's narrative globally.³⁴

China has 33 radio stations in 14 countries, with Xinhua as the mainstay of its news coverage in its multiple offices around the world. China aids global foreign media and grows its international Chinese media presence. Beijing's main target is the Third World countries i.e., Africa and its neighbouring countries such as Pakistan, Cambodia and East Timor. Chinese international media conveys the CCP's official narratives to counter Western biases and present a more favourable image of China.³⁵ As part of the Chinese government-sponsored network and broadcast programs in support of Beijing, it has established radio stations in Italy, Hungary, Finland, Romania, Spain and the Western Balkans. Being established as a global band, their mission is to broadcast positive news about China in Chinese, English as well as Turkish and Italian. The CCP's relations with these companies are hidden.³⁶

³¹ Ingrid d'Hooghe, *Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China* in Jan Melissen (Ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 91.

³² Andre Tartar, Mira Rojanasakul, Jeremy Scott Diamond, *How China is Buying its Way into Europe*, in <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-china-business-in-europe/> (Accessed on 27.11.2022).

³³ Bo Gu, *China Proposes Plan to Block Private Investment in Media*, in <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-proposes-plan-to-block-private-investment-in-media/6281977.html> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

³⁴ David Bandurski, *Mirror, Mirror on the Wall*, in <https://chinamediaproject.org/2016/02/22/mirror-mirror-on-the-wall/> (Accessed on 18.12.2022).

³⁵ Sarah Cook, *China's Global Media Footprint: Democratic Responses to Expanding Authoritarian Influence*, in "National Endowment for Democracy", 2021, p. 6.

³⁶ Koh Gui Qing, John Shiffman, *Beijing's Covert Radio Network Airs China-Friendly News Across Washington, and the World*, <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/> (Accessed 02.06.2023); Rufin Zamfir, Andrei Tiut, *Chinese Influence*

Also, in recent years, China has bribed magazines and media outlets to censor news and information that are not to the liking of the CCP. In 2017, Chinese officials asked the University of Cambridge to remove a total of 315 articles related to the Tiananmen Massacre, the Cultural Revolution and the Taiwan issue. Meanwhile, the US-based National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) said the same request had been made by Chinese officials to remove nearly 100 articles from the journal.³⁷ In 2017, Clive Hamilton's book *Silent Invasion: Chinese Influence in Australia* was declined three times by Australian domestic publishers for fear of Chinese backlash. Hamilton's research showed how Australian institutions and industries were affected by a multifarious influence and control system directed by the CCP. This included multiple sectors such as educational institutions, media, mining, agriculture, tourism, ports and the national grid.³⁸

Some believe that the CCP's influence in Australia has found strategic value in the sense that Australia is an ally of the US, and Beijing seeks to weaken this alliance.³⁹ Chinese officials have stepped up pressure on Chinese-language and foreign-language media outlets, calling for the dismissal of journalists and newspaper editors who criticize the CCP.⁴⁰ For example, China's pressure on foreign media led to the removal of Lei Jin, editor-in-chief of Global Chinese Press, following his work to spread the word about the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The editor-in-chief of the Chinese Canadian Post was fired after writing an article criticizing Chinese Canadian and pro-Beijing Michael Chan. He later filed a complaint with the B.C Human Rights Tribunal for proceeding against China.⁴¹ In September 2018, Azad Essa, an Independent Online journalist (a news-analytical website in South Africa), found out that his page was closed after writing an article about the oppression of Uighurs in China.⁴² The list of such cases is so long that it does not fit in this space.

in Romania, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), <https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/chinese-influence-in-romania/> (Accessed 02.06.2023).

³⁷ J. Michael Cole, *The Hard Edge of Sharp Power: Understanding China's Influence Operations Abroad*, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2018, p. 16.

³⁸ Clive Hamilton, *Silent Invasion: China's Influence in Australia*, Melbourne, Hardie Grant Publishing, 2018, p. 15.

³⁹ Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig, *From 'Soft Power'*, p. 20.

⁴⁰ J. Michael Cole, *The Hard Edge of Sharp Power*, p. 18.

⁴¹ Xiao Xu, *Dismissed Chinese Newspaper Editor Files Human-Rights Complaint in B.C.*, in <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/dismissed-chinese-newspaper-editor-files-human-rights-complaint-in-bc/article36224584/> (Accessed on 09.01.2023).

⁴² Natasha Joseph, *A New World Order*, in "Index on Censorship", Vol. 50, 2021, no. 1, p. 70-71.

Moreover, the China International Television Corporation and the China-Africa Private Development Fund (CADFUND) were established to control seven per cent of the broadcasters. Bloomberg reports that in the past decade, China has invested nearly £3 billion in various media to make a profit.⁴³ Since 2014, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chinese universities have held programs aimed at educating journalists. By this investment, these journalists were expected to reflect on China's positive traits once they are back.⁴⁴ Other study shows that Beijing employs approximately 1,000 African journalists each year to provide them with a positive view of China and its power. This initiative is referred to as constructive journalism.⁴⁵ By strategy of "borrowing the boat to reach the sea", China intends to dominate the media contents worldwide. Even this country funds American radio programs in 15 US cities through China Radio International.⁴⁶ Positive news about China and its economic development can influence US public and official opinion and shape its official (trade and fiscal) policy towards China.

POLITICIANS AND CHINESE BANDS

When discussing public diplomacy and the exercise of sharp power, it's important to highlight the Chinese diaspora as well. There are approximately five million Chinese diaspora, half of which is living in the US who potentially play a role in promoting Chinese culture and lobbying for Chinese political interests. Over the years, Beijing has established over 80 pro-Chinese unions among the Chinese communities around the world and held regional conferences to guide them to establish a united global network. Through these organizations, Beijing has funded and developed many cultural, economic, and educational activities to support these groups and encourage them to invest in China.⁴⁷

These large groups of the Chinese overseas community also serve as another important asset to China's sharp power, led by the UFWD.⁴⁸ The UFWD sees the Chinese diaspora as key aides not only in promoting and implementing China's

⁴³ J. Michael Cole, *The Hard Edge of Sharp Power*, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Renée DiResta et al, *Telling China's Story: The Chinese Communist Party's Campaign to Shape Global Narratives*, in "Hoover Institution", 2020, p. 10.

⁴⁵ Fei Jianga et al., *The Voice of China in Africa: Media, Communication Technologies and Image-building*, in "Chinese Journal of Communication", Vol. 9, 2016, no. 1, p. 2.

⁴⁶ Sarah Cook, *Chinese Government*, p. 4.

⁴⁷ Ingrid d'Hooghe, *Public Diplomacy in the People's*, p. 191.

⁴⁸ Suisheng Zhao, *China's Foreign Policy Making Process: Players and Institutions*, in David Shambaugh (Ed.), *China and the World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 99-100.

policies, including the BRI, but also as a tool to counter anti-Chinese activities abroad. In China's view, this power can be used against human rights activists, Tibetan secessionists and supporters of Taiwan's independence. Chinese diaspora associations frequently stage large protests against Falun Gong and pro-Tibetan groups. Supporting patriotic education, the Chinese Ministry of Education has issued guidelines for the establishment of multidimensional networks between Beijing, Chinese foreign students, and foreign missions. Around 350,000 Chinese students in the US are showing a growing interest in lectures and extracurricular activities with significant relevance to China.⁴⁹ The Chinese Professionals Associations of Canada (CPAC) is considered as an organization with close links to Beijing. The delegation is part of the National Congress of Chinese-Canadians (NCCC), a group that pursues the interests of the CCP in Canada. According to Chen Yonglin, the former secretary of the Chinese consulate in Sydney, the Congress and its affiliates in other countries are at the forefront of Chinese-backed groups. It has been launched by the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa to infiltrate the Chinese community and the Canadian government.⁵⁰

China also enjoys a powerful influence on politicians. In recent years, there have been revelations about the relationship between ministers and representatives of other countries with China especially in New Zealand, Canada and Australia. There have been manifestations that these people have abused their position to influence relations between the two countries. For instance, Sam Dastyari, an Iranian-Australian member of Australia's Labor Party, was fired. He was accused of preventing Wan Mann, his party's spokesman at the State Department, from meeting with democrat activists in Hong Kong. Moreover, a document had been issued by him urging the Australian government to respect China's geopolitical claims in the South China Sea. Further disclosures revealed that two Chinese companies, one owned by Huang (a person close to the Chinese government), had donated some 7.6 million Australian dollar to the two main political parties in the past decade. Consequently, Australian lawmakers passed laws to prevent foreign aid.⁵¹

⁴⁹ William J. Holstein, *The New Art of War*, p. 86-92.

⁵⁰ Matthew Little, *Michael Chan and the Troubling Thumbprint of the Chinese Communist Party in Canada*, in https://www.theepochtimes.com/michael-chan-and-the-troubling-thumbprint-of-the-chinese-communist-party-in-canada_1395433.html (Accessed on 13.01.2023).

⁵¹ Senéad Short, *Sharp Power: China's Solution to Maintaining the Legitimacy of its Non-Interference Policy*, (BS Thesis University of Iowa, 2018), p. 22-23. <https://iro.uiowa.edu/esploro/outputs/undergraduate/Sharp-Power/9984111232602771/filesAndLinks?index=0>,

In June 2017, ABC News Australia released a report that highlighted the strong impact of assistance from China-affiliated institutions on trade policy between Australia and China. The report revealed that between 2013 and 2015 over \$5.5 million worth of aid was provided to the Liberal Party and the Labour Party by companies and individuals affiliated with China.⁵² In New Zealand, Anne-Marie Brady, a Chinese political expert at the University of Canterbury, revealed more secrets in a 2017 report. The report found that several New Zealand-born members of parliament with close ties to China, as well as many other politicians in the country, had received bribe. These bribes were channelled through the help of Chinese businessmen and CCP-sponsored organizations such as the Chinese Business Association in New Zealand. After the report was released, Brady's office was demolished.⁵³ In Canada, Richard Fadden, the former director of the country's intelligence agency, warned in 2010 that China's influence in Canada was manifesting itself in the most aggressive way possible. He exposed how the Chinese government paid hush money to Australian and Canadian officials in exchange for their silence on criticizing China.⁵⁴

China uses its vast resources, investment, and large markets to influence other states by engaging retirees, civil and military officials in the target countries. While not all of these are illegal in their essence, the promise of preserving interests after retirement raises the question of whether in some cases these officials may be in China's favour in their decisions. In November 2017, a wealth of evidence emerged from the corruption of Chinese Energy Fund Committee Secretary-General Patrick Hu Chi Ping, who was charged by a US court with money laundering and violating foreign corruption measures. The investigation revealed that he had worked extensively with the UFDW. Moreover, recently he has played a significant role in advancing China's international influence through foreign cooperation and conferences. The subject of many of them has been Chinese claims on Taiwan and the South China Sea.⁵⁵

⁵² Chris Uhlmann, Andrew Greene, *Chinese Donors to Australian Political Parties: Who Gave How Much?*, in <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-21/china-australia-political-donations/7766654?nw=0&r=HtmlFragment> (Accessed on 17.01.2023).

⁵³ Anne-Marie Brady, *Magic Weapons: China's Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping*, in https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf, 2017, p. 25.

⁵⁴ Huhua Cao, Jeremy Paltiel (Eds.), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower: Domestic and International Dynamics from a Multidisciplinary Angle*, Singapore, Heidelberg et al., Springer, 2015, p. 101.

⁵⁵ J. Michael Cole, *The Hard Edge of Sharp Power*, p. 19.

According to Diamond and Schelle of the Hoover Institution, China has always sought to identify and nurture politicians in the US federal and state governments.⁵⁶ The Chinese also use lobbies and public relations to work with civil society activists. These activities, carried out with the support of the Chinese central government, facilitate congressional officials and staff to visit China. Chinese institutions are always looking for ways to communicate with Congressmen through lobbying and public relations. In 2017, the Sino-US Exchange Foundation spent about \$668,000 for lobbying, especially with the use of the Podesta Group and other groups in the US Congress on Sino-US relations.⁵⁷

The Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies and the Global Public Policy Institute in a research argue that China is using a flexible and comprehensive approach to its influence in Europe. These methods include overt and covert tools in three areas: political and economic elites; media and public opinion; and civil society and academicians. China has infiltrated these countries through the very open gates of Europe and tried to bring them in line with its policies. The impacts of this asymmetric political relationship are manifested in the fact that European countries are increasingly seeking to formulate their policies in the form of blind obedience to China. It is said that if they train enough people in the right situations and places, they will start to change the subject without wishing to directly inject their views.⁵⁸ In other words, Beijing is indirectly trying to change the attitude of European leaders towards China through economic and diplomatic means.

CULTURE AND EDUCATION

Cultural assets as traditional sources of soft power are also used in the framework of sharp power. China has established 525 Confucius Institutes in 146 countries including 105 in the US alone. These institutes which cover 9 million students are funded by Office of Chinese Language Council International.

⁵⁶ Larry Diamond, Orville Schell, *China's Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance: Report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States*, Stanford California, Hoover Institution Press, 2019, p. 7.

⁵⁷ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, *This Beijing-Linked Billionaire is Funding Policy Research at Washington's Most Influential Institutions*, in <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/28/this-beijing-linked-billionaire-is-funding-policy-research-at-washingtons-most-influential-institutions-china-dc/> (Accessed on 19.01.2023).

⁵⁸ Maaïke Okano-Heijmans, Takashi Terada, *EU-Japan Relations in the Age of Competitive Economic Governance in Asia*, in Axel Berkofsky et al. (Eds.), *The EU-Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China: The Crisis of Liberalism*, London, Routledge, 2018, p. 104.

Confucius Institutes promote Chinese language and culture including the official Chinese narratives of Tibet and Taiwan, which often contradicts academic research.⁵⁹ Some critics believe that Confucius Institutes covertly promote a favourable view of the 'Chinese Model' in development sector and undercover debates on censored issues in China. This includes the Tiananmen Massacre and the rectification of perceptions about China as a fanatical and hard-line country that violates human rights. In the backdrop of these critics, the Confucius Institute at Stockholm University (founded in 2005 as the first Confucius Institute in Europe) was closed in 2015 due to criticism from staff and the public.⁶⁰ Western democracies like the US, Canada, and Australia are intensifying scrutiny of China's influence, with calls to limit or sever ties with Confucius Institutes at universities. A 2018 report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service highlights the shared concerns among Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the US about this matter, which appears to be more pronounced than in Europe.⁶¹

Of the Confucian Institutes around the world, 12 instances and 35 classrooms function in Canada alone.⁶² Moreover, by the beginning of 2018, China established about 39 institutes and 11 Confucian classes in Latin America and the Caribbean, which receive over 50,000 students.⁶³ Critics present that the institutions offer an attractive view of China and prevent discussion of sensitive issues such as Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang. In fact, Confucius Institutes often act as a cover for clandestine activities by the Chinese government. There are signs of coercion, deviation and manipulation in these institutions that cannot be assessed in the form of soft power; rather, they are aspects of sharp power.⁶⁴

On the other hand, China maintains several Scientific-Research programs and provides numerous scholarships. Given the need of Western universities to

⁵⁹ Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, *China's Relations with Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East*, in David Shambaugh (Ed.), *China and the World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 302; Zhidong Hao, *Academic Freedom Under Siege: What, Why, and What is to be Done*, in Zhidong Hao, Peter Zabielskis (Eds.), *Academic Freedom Under Siege: Higher Education in East Asia, the U.S. and Australia*, Berlin, Springer Nature, 2020, p. 26.

⁶⁰ Naja Bentzen, *Foreign Influence Operations in the EU*, in European Parliamentary Research Service", 2018, p. 21.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Wai-Chung Ho, *Culture, Music Education, and the Chinese Dream in Mainland China*, Springer Nature Singapore, 2018, p. 63.

⁶³ *Confucius Institute Latin America Regional Center Holds China-Latin America Forum on 'Bond across the Ocean,'* in http://english.hanban.org/article/2018-01/29/content_716734.htm. (Accessed on 01.07.2023).

⁶⁴ Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig, *From 'Soft Power' to 'Sharp Power'*, p. 22.

attract foreign students and charge tuition, China has taken advantage of this dependence. According to the latest statistics from the Chinese Ministry of Education, in 2019, 703,500 Chinese students were studying abroad. Chinese student associations work closely with Chinese embassies and consulates, using the opposition or critics of Chinese politics as leverage to force the cancellation of lectures or seminars. In 2017, when the University of San Diego in California extended an invitation to Dalai Lama, the leader of the Tibetan opposition for a speech, it sparked protests from the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, representing over 3,500 people. In other incident, a Canadian-based Chinese student mobilization was active in preventing Anastasia Lin, a former Chinese-Canadian model and fierce critic of the CCP, from attending Durham University.⁶⁵

Chinese students also observe professors in their classrooms who make anti-Chinese statements. For example, when a professor at an Australian university described Taiwan as an independent state and used a map to show the Chinese-Indian border, Chinese students described the allegations against China as unfair. Such cases have forced university professors to self-censor and to refrain from discussing some sensitive issues, especially issues related to China's territorial integrity and its reputation. Because Chinese students serve as financial assets for Western universities, their officials are also reluctant to defend professors who have been expelled by Chinese students.⁶⁶

In 2020, about 410,000 Chinese were studying in the US. The US officials and analysts believe that these are parts of China's ongoing and aggressive efforts to undermine the US industry, steal secrets and reduce its global influence, so that Beijing can expand and advance its agenda. Joseph W. Augustyn, a former CIA officer, believes that instead of trying to train experienced spies to infiltrate American universities and businesses, Beijing intelligence services strategically exploited Chinese students as available agents or secret infiltrators.⁶⁷

FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

Using financial capital and foreign investment is also the most important Chinese instrument for global influence. During the 2008 Financial Crisis, weaker

⁶⁵ J. Michael Cole, *The Hard Edge of Sharp Power*, p. 14.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Carol Huang, Connie Chuyun Hu, *Study Hard but Do Tour to See the World: Tourism of Chinese Students who Studied in the United States*, in Belal Shneikat, Cihan Cobanoglu, Cem Tanova (Eds.), *Global Perspectives on Recruiting International Students: Challenges and Opportunities*, Bingley, Emerald Group Publishing, 2021, pp. 43-44.

European economies were in urgent and dire need of foreign investment. The CCP exploited the situation by hunting them into its debt trap. Pursuing tributary strategy, the party injected large sums of money into other countries in exchange for reducing their support for issues such as the rule of law and human rights in China. Beijing is said to have used the method to widen the gap among European countries. During the Greek Debt Crisis, China invested heavily in this country with a particular focus on the Port of Piraeus in 2008. China's state-owned shipping giant, China Overseas Shipping Group Co. (COSCO), acquired a 30-year concession to manage two terminals of the Port of Piraeus for a substantial €490 million, an amount significantly higher than the market price at the time. COSCO's investments did not stop there; they continued to expand and renovate the port infrastructure, making Piraeus their gateway to southern Europe, effectively quadrupling container traffic, and transforming the port into a vital hub for China's maritime trade with Europe. Years after this investment, Greece witnessed further cooperation with China, including a visit by Premier Li Keqiang that led to multi-billion-euro cooperation agreements. Despite political shifts in Greece's government and some labour concerns, China remained committed to its investments, ultimately gaining full management control of Piraeus in 2016 and investing a total estimated value of €1.5 billion in the project. COSCO's success in Piraeus has motivated China to pursue additional infrastructure projects in Greece, aligning with its broader ambitions to expand economic influence in Europe and the Mediterranean through strategic investments.⁶⁸

These investments have brought political implications for China. As a member of the EU, Greece has used to oppose the EU's plans aimed at criticizing China's stance on the South China Sea. It is also the first European country to officially join China's Belt and Road Initiative. In June 2017, Greece blocked the passage of an EU statement to the Security Council, which criticized Chinese human rights record. In 2012, when the CCP introduced the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC), Hungary was the first country to join. Like Greece, Hungary has always been reluctant to the EU's criticism of human rights abuses by China. In a report on Russia and China's activities in Europe, the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) said that China wants to ensure that in the face of US global influence in China, Europe does not side with the US in a common front

⁶⁸ Philippe Le Corre, *Chinese Investments in European Countries: Experiences and Lessons for the 'Belt and Road' Initiative*, in Maximilian Mayer (Ed.), *Rethinking the Silk Road: China's Belt and Road Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations*, Springer Nature Singapore, 2017, pp. 165-167.

against China. Beijing, on the other hand, is trying to dispel any European criticism of its poor record of human rights abuses. Serbia is another country that is more anchored in China. Annoyed by the EU's economic assistance to the country, it strongly welcomed China's cooperative stance.⁶⁹ Portugal, too, started to prefer China over the EU's collective agenda. Though it is not official part of BRI, it has entered a memorandum of understanding with China on this initiative.⁷⁰

John Hopkins School of Advanced International Relations' study puts China's investment in Africa at \$153 billion between 2000 and 2019.⁷¹ In Latin America, China's loans exceed the total loans of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. These loans have strained diplomatic relations of several countries with Taiwan. For example, in June 2017, Panama announced that it had ceased its relations with Taiwan and instead recognized PRC. Likewise, in May 2018, El Salvador followed suit while in December 2021 Nicaragua cut ties with Taiwan and recognized China. Guatemala's incoming president intends to align with China, mirroring South American countries. Overall, in South America, all but Paraguay have made this shift, while Haiti and three smaller Caribbean nations maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. This change reflected China's strategic approach of utilizing economic opportunities to secure diplomatic recognition in various parts of the world, including Africa. China often does not impose conditions for its loans, as opposed to the WB and the IMF, which make lending conditional on compliance with their terms. However, these loans require recipient countries to go for Chinese materials or services for their development projects. It also obliges them to diplomatically support China's objectives, including the One China policy. Lithuania's naming of Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius as 'Taiwan' in November 2021 challenged Beijing's One China policy, resulting in China's economic coercion tactics. This included an export embargo and informal secondary sanctions to caution companies buying Lithuanian products about potential issues in their China relations. This means that China is using its sharp power to force the target countries to come to terms with its trade conditions. In other words, escaping trade partnership with China implies losing the opportunity to

⁶⁹ Karin von Hippel, *Axis of Disruption: Chinese and Russian Influence and Interference in Europe: Introduction to a New RUSI Series on Russia and China in Europe*, in "Royal United Service Institute for Defense and Security Studies", 2020, p. 14.

⁷⁰ António Raimundo, Stelios Stavridis, Charalambos Tsardanidis, *The Eurozone Crisis' Impact: a De-Europeanization of Greek and Portuguese Foreign Policies?*, in "Journal of European Integration", Vol. 43, 2021, no. 5, pp. 540-544.

⁷¹ Kevin Aker, Deborah Brautigam, *Twenty Years of Data on China's Africa Lending*, in "China Africa Research Initiative", 2021, no. 4, p. 1.

receive tribute from that country in exchange for diplomatic engagement on the Taiwan issue. On the other hand, not doing business with China undermines the benefits of unconditional political trade.⁷² Surprisingly, the Chinese government warned about 44 foreign airlines to include Taiwan in the list of regions under Chinese rule; otherwise, they would face punitive action. As a result of this warning, most of these companies reconciled.⁷³

In addition to investing, China uses debt trap to achieve strategic interests that include ports mainly in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and even Europe. When Sri Lanka failed to pay its debts to Chinese companies in 2017, it ceded the right to use the port of Hambantota to a Chinese company for 99 years. Some also see anti-critics decision of Greece and Hungary in the EU declaration on the South China Sea in 2016, as a move imposed by Beijing in return for investment in these three countries.⁷⁴ The Chinese are seeking to increase their power by investing in important and critical infrastructures. This approach is intended to use it as a foreign policy tool to punish, coerce or incite other countries to favour China's stance and goals.⁷⁵

CONCLUSIONS

Sharp power has become a subject of focus as one of the areas of China's strength and tool of global influence. China's sharp power includes unique features such as the manipulation of information about the country. This nascent concept is in fact a reaction to the American and Western approaches to power, such as soft power and smart power. Realizing that non-Chinese versions of power in the current international system cannot be fit to Chinese political outlook, the country has sought to redefine the concept of power. In the form of sharp power, China has made covert and subtle efforts in the world of information with full skill to consolidate its influence in the international level. The intelligence services of many countries have concluded that China has infiltrated the policies of democracies and endangered their national sovereignty. In the form of sharp power, China has carried out secret tactics of infiltration with punitive consequences across the world.

⁷² George Ofosu, David Sarpong, *China in Africa: On the Competing Perspectives of the Value of Sino-Africa Business Relationships*, in "Journal of Economic Issues", Vol. 56, 2022, no. 1, p. 139.

⁷³ Zhidong Hao, *Academic Freedom under Siege*, p. 26.

⁷⁴ Stroikos Dimitrios. 'Head of the Dragon' or 'Trojan Horse?': Reassessing China – Greece Relations, in "Journal of Contemporary China", 32, 2023, no. 142, p. 609.

⁷⁵ Jeff M. Smith, *China's Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Implications and International Opposition*, in "The Heritage Foundation", 2018, No. 3331, p. 16.

China's sharp power approach is rooted in the domestic and foreign imperatives of this country. China has invested in sharp power to domestically strengthen the communist regime and internationally restore its centrality in the international arena. It has also aimed at dislocating the US as the dominant global power. Other goal of China from sharp power is to undermine democracy in the world. In this context, by rectifying its own image, China has tried to project authoritarian regimes more stable than democracies. On the other hand, China's focus on sharp power is not devoid of stimuli. The costly political aftermath of using hard power and the country's inability to strengthen the attraction element of soft power for global influence have led sharp power to be chosen as the middle ground. The political culture of the Chinese Communist Party is another reason that has put sharp power at the forefront of foreign policy tools.

In the context of sharp power, China has used official and unofficial actors. In the declarative policies of China, the official organs of the government, especially the UFWD, have the mission of advancing the goals of this country in this format. Unofficially, China uses the Chinese diaspora and its students for execution of its sharp power. In this regard, China has used tools such as the media, political elites, academia, diaspora, and investment for global influence. In the meantime, students are considered the cost-effective tool to exercise sharp power, and investment is the most expensive. On the one hand, by investing in sharp power, China is persuading Western countries to give up their political considerations for China. On the other, because of China's sharp power, there are concerns about Western countries' emulation of the Chinese model. This implies that China's sphere of influence will extend beyond expectations in the international arena. One conclusion to draw is that China has made significant strides in expanding its global influence through sharp power tactics. In addition to China's deep-rooted history, economic clout has enabled it to establish relationships with numerous countries through BRI projects, which can lead to increased political influence. The proliferation of Confucius Institutes and the global reach of Chinese state-run media have also allowed China to shape narratives in its favour. However, whether China's sharp power efforts can be deemed successful is a matter of ongoing debate. Success in this context can be measured in different ways. China has gained more global influence but has also faced criticism from countries concerned about its tactics, such as debt-trap diplomacy and alleged human rights abuses. Especially The Covid-19 pandemic has also brought attention to China's global image and handling of international crises. China's sharp power continues to make not only a topic for further research in academia but also influences the balance of power approach in the international arena.

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RETURNING TO QUAD: INDIA'S SEARCH FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Consisting of the US, India, Japan, and Australia, the Quad consultative forum emerged as a new multi-foreign policy formation in the Indo-Pacific. Described as a strategic partnership in the face of China's increasing expansionist policies, the Quad also explains India's foreign policy's strategic autonomy and pluralistic approaches. In recent years, India's actions to improve its strategic alliances against the expansionist states in the region within the framework of the liberal order brought the Quad back to the fore of activities aimed at limiting China's actions in the region. In this context, the primary purpose of the Quad to establish a strategic partnership stems from the desire to protect maritime interests. Ensuring the security of energy resources, free trade and navigation, disputes over the border and continental shelf, and economic-based disputes are the main reasons for bringing the Quad back to the agenda. While India's pluralistic foreign policy understanding and China's recent policy perception overlap, the conflicting environment in the global world order pushes China to an expansionist policy in the Indo-Pacific; India, on the other hand, is trying to balance China by establishing various alliances. Although the scale of the economic engagement of the US with countries party to the Quad is no more significant than China's, Quad 2.0 is now a structure where the state parties can take joint steps for security and strategic partnerships due to military interests and cultural ties from the past.*

Keywords: Quad, India, China, South Asia, Indo-Pacific, Regional, Security.

Rezumat: *Întoarcerea la Quad: India în căutarea securității regionale. Format din SUA, India, Japonia și Australia, forumul consultativ Quad a apărut ca o nouă formațiune de politică externă multilaterală în bazinul Indo-Pacific. Descriș ca un parteneriat strategic în fața politicilor expansioniste în creștere ale Chinei, Quad explică, de asemenea, autonomia strategică și abordările pluraliste ale politicii externe a Indiei. În ultimii ani, acțiunile Indiei*

de îmbunătățire a alianțelor strategice împotriva statelor expansioniste, în cadrul ordinii liberale, au adus din nou Quad-ul în prim-planul activităților de limitare a acțiunilor din regiune ale Chinei. În acest context, scopul principal al Quad-ului, de stabilire a unui parteneriat strategic, provine din dorința de a proteja interesele maritime. Asigurarea securității resurselor energetice, comerțul liber și libertatea de navigație, disputele asupra granițe și platformei continentale, ca și disputele economice, sunt principalele motive pentru readucerea Quad-ului pe ordinea de zi. În timp ce înțelegerea pluralistă a politicii externe a Indiei și percepția recentă a politicii Chinei se suprapun, mediul conflictual din ordinea mondială globală împinge China către o politică expansionistă în Indo-Pacific; India, pe de altă parte, încearcă să echilibreze China prin stabilirea de diverse alianțe. Deși profunzimea angajării economice a SUA cu țările ce fac parte din Quad se desfășoară la o scară mai mică decât cu China, Quad 2.0 este acum o structură în care statele părți pot lua măsuri comune privind securitatea și parteneriatele strategice, datorită intereselor militare și a legăturilor lor culturale din trecut.

INTRODUCTION

The geopolitical and economic problems of the East have started to become the focus of attention as a set of strategic studies in the analysis and evaluation of global problems in the last two decades in globalizing world politics. Issues related to maritime dominance and regional power are now considered a side argument within the idea of globalization. The problems in the Indo-Pacific region have begun to evolve within this literary conjuncture in the period up to the present. Moreover, past regional conflicts have become a global problem in today's system. But, of course, the effects of the rapidly increasing international world debates and the 'Post-Network' Society, which has been rapidly developing since the 1990s, cannot be denied¹.

Moreover, the state's problems in the rapidly growing and developing Indo-Pacific can spread to different areas regarding conflicts or frictions. When regional problems and difficulties become a situation that states cannot cope with alone, the alliance concept increases the importance of solving interstate issues. This situation drags regional conflicts into global chaos.

The Quad formation, which initially emerged as a consultation center between India, the US, Japan, and Australia, aimed at the regular exchange of views on regional challenges and dealing with threats such as ocean emergencies and

¹ Yasin Caglar Kaya, Goktug Kiprizli, *Does Democratic peace Theory Genuinely Envision Global Peace? A Critical Approach*, in "Journal of International Studies", Vol. 15, 2019, p. 74.

piracy, is now a power group in the region to rein in China – turned into a workshop. In this case, China reiterated the “Asian NATO” rhetoric concerning the Quad². At that time, these perceptions of China were widespread even when the Quad group first started negotiations. Nowadays, the Quad is an entity that has regular official meetings, holds foreign ministerial-level talks, and is aimed at forming a bloc in the Indo-Pacific region. Although China’s reactions were not considered condescending and notable in this conjuncture, the primary purpose of the formation of this group was clearly to prevent China’s economic and military expansionism³. If issues such as Quad+ and Quad 3.0 are being discussed in official meetings today beyond Quad 2.0, it is undoubtedly because of the fear of imminent Chinese expansion in the countries party to this group⁴.

Considering today’s conjuncture, although China does not openly express its concerns about grouping, China’s adverse reaction against such groupings continues. China’s attitude towards protecting its national interests in the Indo-Pacific and the US’s efforts to establish superiority over China in this region seem to push the Quad and AUKUS⁵ from diplomacy to military integration in the current status quo. China’s recent rise in the maritime field and its desire to protect its regional interests also reveal the paradox of uncertainty in the final purpose of the Quad formation.

This article is structured into four parts. The first part outlines a typology of the return of the Quad within the framework of the new political and economic understanding in the Indo-Pacific. The second part elaborates on the rise and expansion of China that comes with China’s growing disproportionate power in the Indo-Pacific. The third part examines the background of India’s involvement in the Quad and India’s pursuit of security in the Indo-Pacific. The concluding section analyses the regional alliance’s economic, political, and military

² Mahima Duggal, *Quad as Asian NATO: A Practical Proposition?*, in “Multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific”, London, Routledge, 2022, p. 15.

³ Jagannath Panda, *Beijing’s ‘Asian NATO’ Maxim on Quad Is Structural*, in “Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)”, 2019, <https://idsa.in/system/files/news/PacNet-Commentary-Beijing.pdf> (Accessed on 15.05.2023).

⁴ Kei Koga, *Japan and the Development of Quadrilateral Cooperation*, in “Pensamiento Propio”, 2021, p. 160.

⁵ AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, primarily focused on security and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. It aims to enhance the capabilities of these countries and promote regional stability.

implications in the Quad context for all Indo-Pacific countries. The authors find that during the transition from Quad 1.0 to Quad 2.0, China's geopolitical and geoeconomic approach against the background of its rise and increasing expansion in the region pushed the countries that are party to the Quad to cooperate again in different dimensions. Analyzing these interactions between the Quad and China gives us a complete picture in explaining the balance between the political decision-making mechanisms of countries in the Indo-Pacific region revolving around the multidimensional international system, infrastructure investment, and regional balancing. In this context, the last section ends with some predictions about how this series of interactions will affect the Indo-Pacific security and economic order.

RETURNING TO QUAD

Quad Dialogue is a consultation mechanism specific to the Indo-Pacific region that was first launched in 2007 between Japan, the US, Australia, and India at the initiative of then-Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. The main goal of this dialogue was to create a meeting format for senior officials to talk about regional security issues and to evaluate the naval exercises and the strategic infrastructure deficiencies of these countries on a single table. The cooperation within the core group, formed during the joint intervention in the tsunami in 2004, came together again in 2007 and tried to unite the interests on a common denominator⁶. Japan's and India's approaches to this unification were especially relatively moderate then. Abe's speech before the Indian Parliament emphasized the connection between the Indian and the Pacific. Although the focus of Abe's speech was the importance of Japan-India relations, implementing seas of freedom and prosperity for the well-being of this region was mentioned⁷. At that time, this rhetoric could be understood as usual rhetoric for the two states in China's grip. But at that time, these visits also included the search for a strategy for the two regional powers that had problems with China in the region.

After the US implemented the "Pivot to Asia" strategy in 2011, targeting China in different areas and efforts to contain China made it essential to make the

⁶ Shinzo Abe, *MOFA: Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India 'Confluence of the Two Seas'*, 2007, in <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html> (Accessed on 07.05.2023).

⁷ *Ibid.*

Quad functional later. Washington's attempts to form new alliances to balance Beijing reveals the importance of the concept of the "New Cold War" in this respect⁸. Washington, which pursues a policy of rapprochement with India as the country with the highest potential in balancing China, supported India's post-cold war nuclear armament policies⁹. Beijing closely followed its support. Afterwards, the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan increased the importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in China. As a result of the US's search for an alliance in the Indo-Pacific, it also opened the door to China's attempts to form a new partnership with Russia and Pakistan. Until 2017, China's development of Pakistan's Gwadar Port and initiation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Project, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the typical Central Asian policies with Russia, and the port and transportation infrastructure ultimatums of China in South Asian states¹⁰. It is all about breaking the power of the existing alliance and taking control of the trade routes.

The Quad, which was almost re-established in 2017 and gained a more institutional identity because of then-President Donald Trump's harsh policies towards China, stated that the Quad's Indo-Pacific region should be "free and open" with a statement published at the end of the talks held in November 2017. It was stated that it was based on a consensus. This containment policy against China naturally expected a military alliance from the Quad formation from that time on. However, it is still too early to talk about the transformation of this alliance into a military structure. There are severe and problematic issues regarding the current Quad formation.

Firstly, in the traditional foreign policy of India, the largest country in the Quad in terms of population, procedures have been followed based on the non-aligned movement since its establishment. Notably, New Delhi, following a balanced policy and trying to develop the Make in India Innovation program¹¹,

⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, *A New Cold War Has Begun*, in "Foreign Policy", 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun> (Accessed on 05.05.2023).

⁹ Tanvi Madan, *Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War*, Washington, D.C, Brookings Institution Press, 2020, p. 34.

¹⁰ Arzan Tarapore, *Zone Balancing: India and the Quad's New Strategic Logic*, in "International Affairs", Vol. 99, No. 1, p. 241, DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiaac281.

¹¹ Make in India is an initiative launched by India in 2014 with the aim of promoting India as an important investment destination and a global hub for manufacturing, design, and innovation. The program seeks to encourage both multinational and domestic companies to manufacture their products in India. It emphasizes the creation of job

entering such a formation will result in the risk of investment resources from China, where it receives the most FDI support¹². In addition, the dependence on Russia in the defense industry may not be welcomed by Russia in such a rapprochement, and it may also lead to pressure from the US for CAATSA¹³ sanctions in such an alliance relationship.

Secondly, a change must be made in Article 9 of its Constitution to enter such a formation in Japan. At the time, work on a change to this clause was initiated by Abe. But no conclusion was reached. On top of that, there is no national consensus on whether to change this article of the Constitution or whether such a study could be carried out in an environment of increasing tension when Abe was assassinated.

Thirdly, Australia has very close economic relations with China. Close ties with China may economically drag Australia into chaos due to its involvement in such a formation. Another relevant aspect is that China has been the country that has invested the most in Australia since its first formation¹⁴. In Australia, there are severe reactions regarding the negative steps taken against China and the moves towards rapprochement with the US. As a result, there will be no consensus for the Quad in Australia and Japan, which have strong democratic structures despite a possible alliance. Finally, the Quad has not yet established an institutional basis, content, and scope other than joint declarations and political statements. This makes it impossible to treat the Quad as a construct yet. Considering the argument that China has become a superpower by using its strengthening economy, military modernization moves, and free trade in place, in the future, after the formation of the Quad group, a part of the power balance in the region will be managed by an

opportunities, skill enhancement, and overall economic growth, thus contributing to the country's development and reducing its dependency on imports.

¹² Wooyeal Paik, Jae Jeok Park, *The Quad's Search for Non-Military Roles and China's Strategic Response: Minilateralism, Infrastructure Investment, and Regional Balancing*, in "Journal of Contemporary China", Vol. 30, 2021, No. 127, p. 41, DOI:10.1080/10670564.2020.1766908.

¹³ CAATSA stands for the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which was signed into law in the United States in August 2017. It aims to deter these countries from engaging in activities that pose a threat to the national security of the United States and its allies.

¹⁴ Elena Collinson, *Australian Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative*, 2019, in <https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/australian-perspectives-belt-and-road-initiative> (Accessed on 09.05.2023).

absolute authoritarian power¹⁵. In the joint statement published in September 2021, the principle for the Indo-Pacific region to be free and open was repeated; international law, freedom of navigation, the issue of solving problems by peaceful methods, and the rule of law are emphasized¹⁶. In today's world conjuncture, the Western bloc of the past forms the basis of the strategy for today's US. The adventures of the US-India Malabar Naval Exercise, which started in 1992, seem to take place with the Quad as of 2011 when the US has assumed a relationship of interest in this region and its new regional strategies¹⁷. But if there is no such dilemma as Australia's stepping back in 2008, Quad's security dialogue seems to be operational again today.

THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF CHINA

The cold war was a period when the parties involved did not hesitate to use all kinds of tools on the global scale to wear each other out. The USSR and the US, which took on a plan- and policy-determining role in all competitive environments, including the ideological ground, clashed with the surrounding countries rather than the global power struggle between them¹⁸. In addition, these two states were in serious cooperation in protecting their common interests with secret works. Of course, the biggest reason for this was that global actors had nuclear weapons.

While the policies of mutual balancing and deterrence between the US and the USSR continued, the field of struggle between them started to shift from Europe to Asia over time. The establishment of the People's Republic of China and

¹⁵ Raymond Kwun-Sun Lau, *The Rise and Fall of China's 'Peaceful Rise': Implications for US-China Geopolitical Competition in the Indo-Pacific*, in "Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations", Vol. 2, 2022, No. 8, p. 8.

¹⁶ The White House, *Joint Statement from Quad Leaders*, 2021, in <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/> (Accessed on 05.05.2023).

¹⁷ Kate Sullivan De Estrada, *India and Order Transition in the Indo-Pacific: Resisting the Quad as a 'Security Community'*, in "The Pacific Review", Vol. 36, 2023, No. 2, p. 386, DOI:10.1080/09512748.2022.2160792.

¹⁸ Cengiz Topel Mermer, *QUAD'ın Güney Pasifik'teki Tamamlayıcı Halkası; AUKUS [QUAD's Companion Ring in the South Pacific; AUKUS]*, in "Türk Asya Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi", 2022, in https://tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/70115/quadin_guney_pasifikteki_tamamlayici_halkasi_aucus (Accessed on 08.05.2023).

the policy of importing regimes to neighboring countries triggered counter moves by the US and its allies. The rivalry between the two poles extended to the South Pacific geography. During this period, the main parameter that the western side could not understand was the pressure on China created by the USSR's punishment of allied states. According to the analyses of that period, this situation was not understood until the 1970s. Realizing there was no unity between the USSR and China, the West started to develop a policy of dividing the USSR and China after this period¹⁹. After Kissinger's contact with China through Pakistan and diplomatic activities, they began cooperating with China against the USSR covertly. This rapprochement can be accepted as the end of the USSR and the first step of China as a new superpower on the world stage. As a result of this development, which was the first significant step that brought forth the end of the cold war, both bloc leaders made a strategic mistake²⁰. The effort of the USSR to confine China within itself and the unofficial support of the US for China marked the beginning of the end of the cold war. This situation made the USSR question the existence of its hegemony in the world and itself. On top of that, it resulted in China's expansionist policies, threatened the US in many areas, and opened the doors to a new threat for the next 20–30 years of the US.

Another leap forward in China's development is the effort to reform the Chinese economy and functionalize its bureaucratic administration. Deng Xiaoping's border problems, territorial claims, and organizational structure in the administrative system were a policy aimed at breaking the pressures of the international system to strengthen China's economy²¹. China's rise as the global manufacturing hub can be attributed to its strategic utilization of soft power policies, which have enabled it to foster strong economic ties and partnerships with various countries. By employing a combination of economic incentives, cultural diplomacy, and international aid programs, China has effectively expanded its influence and strengthened its position in the global market²². The

¹⁹ Aaron L. Freidberg, *The Growing Rivalry Between America and China and the Future of Globalization*, in "Texas National Security Review", Vol. 5, 2022, No. 1, p. 101, DOI:10.15781/BOSB-PY52.

²⁰ Zaki Laidi, *Rethinking Post-Cold War*, in "Economic and Political Weekly", Vol. 29, No. 32, 1994, p. 2068.

²¹ Kalpit A. Mankikar, *Preserving National Security, the Xi Jinping Way*, in "Observer Research Foundation (ORF)", New Delhi, 2021, p. 11, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/preserving-national-security-the-xi-jinping-way/> (Accessed on 07.05.2023).

²² Mammadli, Rasim, and Kalfaoglu, Rabia, *BRICS in the Arctic: The Member-States' Interests and the Group's Disregard*, in "Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, stands as a prominent example of China's soft power initiatives, as it aims to promote economic cooperation and connectivity across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Additionally, China's emphasis on building robust trade relationships through initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and various bilateral trade agreements have further enhanced its status as a pivotal player in the global economy.

Moreover, China's role as the primary production base for the world's leading corporations can be attributed not only to its soft power strategies but also to the active involvement and investment of Western nations. Western companies, attracted by China's low-cost labor and vast consumer market, have heavily invested in China, effectively contributing to its transformation into the world's manufacturing powerhouse²³. This symbiotic relationship between China and the West has not only fueled China's economic growth but it has also shaped the dynamics of global trade and investment, leading to a complex interdependence that continues to influence the global economic landscape. The most considerable success of this production center was undoubtedly China's refraining from declaring its global targets openly, which it had applied to international politics since the 1970s²⁴. When it became clear that China was combining its economic gains with military gains, India and the United States began to get closer. So they sought an alliance in a possible crisis. The US's "Pivot to Asia" strategy starts with these convergences. China considers this strategy a move to revive the concept of the "New Cold War"²⁵.

Over the last decade, China has emerged as a global hegemonic power. The "Pivot to Asia" strategy's main objective was to maintain the US's influence in the Indo-Pacific geography. This was a development that China had already expected. China has been preparing to compete with the US for a long time. Chinese President Xi's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and bilateral alliances and programs with other states to revive the silk road can be evaluated. China's innovation

Relations", Vol. 7, 2021, No.1, p. 192.

²³ Aydin Gulsen, Yüce Müge, *China's Hard Power versus Soft Power in Central Asia: An Analysis of the One Belt One Road Initiative as a Soft Power Instrument*, in "Caucasus International", Vol. 8, 2018, p. 67.

²⁴ Goktug Kiprizli, Seçkin Köstem, *The Onset of BRICS Cooperation on Climate Change: Material Change, Ideational Convergence and the Road to Copenhagen 2009*, in "Third World Quarterly", Vol. 44, 2023, No. 6, p. 1201, DOI:10.1080/01436597.2023.2177632.

²⁵ Mrityika Guha Sarkar, *China and QUAD 2.0: Between Response and Regional Construct*, in "Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India", Vol. 16, 2020, No. 1, p. 115, DOI: 10.1080/09733159.2020.1794526.

program beyond this region includes many global plans, from railways to economic corridors, from oil and gas pipelines to new port constructions²⁶. In this context, the China–Pakistan economic corridor and the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor, jointly run with Pakistan, constitute this program’s two most vital structures. From the military base in Djibouti to its discourses on the South China Sea, Taiwan, and India, China, which has become more aggressive in the military field, does not neglect use of military force in everything it plans²⁷. This aggressive attitude of China’s also worries the US and all the countries in Indo-Pacific. The creation of the Quad, or rather its revival, is a product of this aggression. As a matter of fact, because of this uneasiness, Quad discussions started today. South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines are also mentioned in the Indo-Pacific²⁸.

The US seem to be aware that it is a little late against China, which is planning to become a dominant military power in the Indian Ocean to protect its commercial interests and hegemony. The US, which think that China’s rapid rise will threaten its interests in the medium and long term, want to balance the problem with China over the South China Sea by means of the Quad again. As a result of China’s attitude and rhetoric that does not comply with international law, the relations between the two countries gradually resumed, increasing the number of anti-Chinese views in Australia. Alternatively, China’s starting to be active in economic projects in countries neighboring India within the scope of its policy of containment of India and even starting to benefit from some of Pakistan’s military ports threatening India the most. Considering that China has ensured energy security and strengthened its military institutions by the economic projects it has achieved in other countries in the area, the impression that all these generalizations lie within the scope of the policy of containing India further strengthens its argument. This situation is reflected in the Quad, which can be an alliance that supports this expansionism. When the member states of the Quad saw China’s military and economic gains as an existential threat to them, they felt obliged to establish security mechanisms against China²⁹. Still, today, every state

²⁶ Kalim Siddiqui, *One Belt and One Road, China’s Massive Infrastructure Project to Boost Trade and Economy: An Overview*, in “International Critical Thought”, Vol. 9, 2019, No. 2, p. 216, DOI: 10.1080/21598282.2019.1613921.

²⁷ Mankikar, *Preserving National Security, the Xi Jinping Way...*, p. 11.

²⁸ Bhubhindar Singh, *Japan’s Responses to China’s Rise: Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia*, in “Asian Security”, Vol. 18, 2022, No. 1, p. 12, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1942849.

²⁹ Jennifer Lind, *Asia’s Other Revisionist Power*, in “Foreign Affairs”, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-02-13/asias-other-revisionist->

that has problems with China in the Indo-Pacific is a party in this formation against China. Therefore, attempts to develop strategies take place. In this context, the US's global economic and military system, which withdraws from the Middle East, will be concentrated on the Indo-Pacific³⁰.

INDIA'S SEARCH FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

Despite attempts to give the impression that the Quad is not an open move against China, India's view of the Quad is a calculated strategic move to protect its interests in the Indo-Pacific against China's maritime ambitions. Essentially, India's involvement in the Quad strengthens China's foreign policy reach in response to China's volatile stance that challenges India's strategic ambitions³¹. From this perspective, it can be expressed as a plural foreign policy strategy for the Quad to engage more carefully with a dominant power structure led by the United States to eventually gain superiority over an alternative arrangement, also known as India's liberal power structure. The so-called Quad 1.0 formation did not have a military meaning at that time but there was a suggestion that it would be a regional consultation forum³². However, China regarded this situation as "Asia's NATO" at that time. This situation resulted in China having an independent foreign policy and seeing India as a pro-American country. J. Panda explains this situation because China is following an erroneous foreign policy that serves the interests of the West³³.

This Quad group gathered again in Manila in November 2017; instead of making a joint statement due to the changing conjuncture of the period, they made statements showing how different their strategic goals and regional preferences were from each other³⁴. This case indicated that Quad 2.0 was also just a consultation forum. The common point of these press releases is related to the security

power?gad=1&gclid=CjwKCAjw3ueiBhBmEiwA4BhspF1K5DaiqwPcpUZR6vvuQcQFvNm-2ilz3j_-y47MqSCZZPpKZvzmRoC25YQAvD_BwE, (Accessed on 15.05.2023).

³⁰ Rory Medcalf, *Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific*, 2015, in <https://theasanforum.org/reimagining-asia-from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific/> (Accessed on 13.05.2023).

³¹ Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Kate Sullivan de Estrada, *India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad*, in "Survival", Vol. 60, 2018, No. 3, p. 189, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2018.1470773.

³² Lau, *The Rise and Fall of China's 'Peaceful Rise' ...*, p. 13.

³³ Jagannath Panda, *India's Call on China in the Quad: A Strategic Arch between Liberal and Alternative Structures*, in "Rising Powers Quarterly", Vol. 3, 2018, No. 2, p. 90.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

problems created by terrorism and nuclear programs; there is hardly any common consensus. The only issue agreed upon was the preservation of the rule-based order. While the statements of the US, Japan, and Australia were related to the development of maritime security and freedom of navigation following international law, India made more cautious statements³⁵. Making a statement with a focus on terrorism and the expansionism of North Korea, India emphasized the importance of the freedom of the Indo-Pacific. Although India's statements matched those made by other states about inclusion, there were constructive statements that the ideas about the Quad were not contrary to China's direct interests³⁶. India's inclusiveness issue also points to its advocacy of a "free and open" Indo-Pacific. Although India is worried about a strong Chinese navy in Indo-Pacific, it does not exclude the presence of China in the area. Modi's speech in the Shangri-La dialogue in 2018 was in this vein again. All of these statements clearly articulate India's vision of the Indo-Pacific. In addition, considering that Russia and China follow standard policies, it may be concluded that China and Russia will collaborate against other states in the Indo-Pacific³⁷. In this case, India will create a theoretical opposition to China's infrastructure projects. Although India will not participate in the Indo-Pacific Business Forum-2023, it implicitly supports this argument.

What kind of expectations India has of Quad is still not fully explained. Indeed, India's endorsement of Quad 2.0 brings forth a debate as to whether India is abandoning its traditional non-alignment foreign policy to adopt a strategy that openly supports a US-led liberal structure³⁸. In this context, it is evident that India sees Quad 2.0 as a strategic structure against China; however, India's main impasse in the Indo-Pacific is the dilemma between its economic relations with China and the fact that its neighbor China is a threat to its territory. India's primary purpose in increasing its relations with the countries that have been parties to the Quad for a long time is to grow regional cooperation and develop a counter strategy as a deterrent to diplomatic collaboration on all issues it sees as a threat to itself. Other parties to the Quad see India as a strategic pillar of the Indo-Pacific³⁹. Diplomatic attitudes such as Japan's inclusion of India in its strategic

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³⁶ Jennifer Lind, *Asia's Other Revisionist Power...*

³⁷ Igor Denisov et al., *Russia, China, and the Concept of Indo-Pacific*, in "Journal of Eurasian Studies", Vol. 12, 2021, No. 1, p. 80, DOI: 10.1177/1879366521999899.

³⁸ Panda, *India's Call on China in the Quad...*, p. 84.

³⁹ Darshana M. Baruah, *India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi's Theater of Opportunity*, in "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace", 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/30/india-in-indo-pacific-new-delhi-s->

partnerships with this region and the US's opening of a separate parenthesis for India in the Indo-Pacific phenomenon reveal the importance of these attitudes and evaluations. In this context, other parties to the Quad have high expectations for India to play a constructive and vital role in the Quad.

Although there are various analyses and comments regarding the fact that China does not have any general strategy regarding the Indian Ocean^{40,41}, China has long been working to strengthen its contacts with the strategic and geographically essential states in the region to ensure energy security. Moreover, China's commercial relations with the countries that are party to the Quad are even higher than the trade volume of the countries that are party to the Quad. Even this situation is a great trump card in China's hands against the states that have established a strategic partnership with itself. Although India adopted the Quad to create a balance element in Indo-Pacific, China's policies to expand its overseas trade network and these policies' efforts to strengthen its military power with ports it bought from other states, China's diplomatic and economic activities in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its naval force, are superior to any general interest in the Quad's states, including divers cooperation⁴².

India has made many breakthroughs in its maritime strategies in recent years. While strengthening the connection of its ports with commercial regions with the SAGAR project within the scope of the Make in India program, it went on the path of developing its economic basin by entering various bilateral dialogues, especially with the states in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, through varied intercontinental bilateral cooperation. Another expectation of India regarding the Quad is to increase investment in the country by including the countries party to the Quad in these development programs and to take a precaution against Chinese expansionism on its shores by strengthening bilateral security dialogues with

theater-of-opportunity-pub-82205 (Accessed on 20.10.2023).

⁴⁰ Kondapalli, Srikanth, *China's Evolving Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean Region: An Indian Perspective*, in David Brewster (ed.), *India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean*, New Delhi, Oxford Academic, 2018, DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199479337.003.0007.

⁴¹ Megal Jahanzaib, Mirza Muhammad Nadeem, *String of Pearls and Necklace of Diamonds: Sino-India Geo-Strategic Competition in the Indian Ocean*, in "Asia-Pacific", Vol. 40, 2022, pp.21–41, DOI: 10.47781/asia-pacific.vol40.Iss0.5862.

⁴² Ashok Rai, *Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2 (Quad 2.0) – a Credible Strategic Construct or Mere 'Foam in the Ocean'?*, in "Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India", Vol. 14, 2018, No. 2, p. 140, DOI:10.1080/09733159.2019.1572260.

these countries⁴³. However, how India will position itself in this formation and whether it will take a side against China is directly related to how aggressive a policy China will follow in Indo-Pacific.

THE YIELDS OF REGIONAL ALLIANCES

When the member states of the Quad met again in November 2017, it was a widely mentioned issue among the analyses that, although the current status gave the impression of a return to the Quad, not much was done to improve cooperation among themselves. The parties to the Quad were already continuing to develop bilateral and tripartite relations to coordinate their policies toward the Indo-Pacific⁴⁴. There were also regional differences of opinion on specific issues, such as India's opposition to Australian participation in the Malabar exercises⁴⁵.

The Quad formation was needed mainly cyclically in connection with the evolution of the great power rivalry between China and the United States over the past two decades. Particularly in the last 15 years, with China's emergence as a global superpower and severe competitor to dethrone the US, the Quad countries were also concerned about their security paradigms⁴⁶. In the last two decades, China's tripling of purchasing parity, leaving the US behind, and the concern that US officials will lag behind China in defense modernization have pushed the US to take some measures to rein in China in the global arena. Moreover, China's investments and innovations in the defense industry are not limited to modernization. With the skills China has acquired in various levels and tools, such as integrated air defense strategies in the defense industry, conventional ballistic missiles, and unique software systems in cyber technology⁴⁷, its studies on

⁴³ Degang Sun and Yahia H. Zoubir, *Securing China's 'Latent Power': The Dragon's Anchorage in Djibouti*, in "Journal of Contemporary China", Vol. 30, 2021, No. 130, p. 681, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2020.1852734.

⁴⁴ Jagannath Panda, *India, the Blue Dot Network, and the 'Quad Plus' Calculus*, in "Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs", Vol. 3, 2020, No. 3, p. 7.

⁴⁵ Harsh V. Pant and Anant Singh Mann, *India's Malabar Dilemma*, in "Issue Brief of Observer Research Foundation (ORF)", 2020, p. 4, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ORF_IssueBrief_393_Malabar.pdf (Accessed on 05.05.2023).

⁴⁶ Lau, *The Rise and Fall of China's 'Peaceful Rise...*, p. 11.

⁴⁷ Christian Ploberger, *One Belt, One Road – China's New Grand Strategy*, in "Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies", Vol. 15, No. 3, 2017, p. 301, DOI:10.1080/14765284.2017.1346922.

regional security have reached levels that seriously threaten the safety of the states. In this case, the United States naturally pushed their allies in the Indo-Pacific to work to make it a deterrent against China in the field of defense. That is what the Quad means to the US.

The United States are now aware of the dangers. Through its Indo-Pacific strategy, it has attempted to create a comprehensive entity covering the economic, military, and diplomatic fields. In this context, the goals of the US strategy are to ensure that the Indo-Pacific region, which imagines the Indian and Pacific oceans as a single system, remain "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" to flight and trade for all countries⁴⁸. The main argument for achieving this goal is to respect the law and not be under the revisionist domination of a single power. In this US-led effort to defend the global order, the Trump administration has sought to strengthen the Quad coalition with Japan, India, and Australia. After the Covid period, this was further extended, and a new policy was developed called Quad Plus⁴⁹. From the 2018 national defense strategy of the Trump administration, the US call China a strategic competitor to become a hegemonic power in the Indo-Pacific in the near term and threaten US interests. With the US taking an increasingly aggressive stance against China, the concept of the "New Cold War" began to be mentioned a lot in the specialized literature⁵⁰. During the pandemic, Trump's "Chinese Virus" slogan was not a coincidence but timing. Twenty years ago, the Bush administration referred to China as a virus⁵¹. Therefore, although the discourses have changed, the goal of the regional plan is to ally a precaution against Chinese expansionism.

⁴⁸ David Vergun, *Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea Critical to Prosperity, Says Indo-Pacific Commander*, in "U.S. Department of Defense", 2019, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2025105/freedom-of-navigation-in-south-china-sea-critical-to-prosperity-says-indo-pacif/> (Accessed on 05.05.2023).

⁴⁹ Indrani Bagchi, *Focus on Covid in Quad Plus Meet*, in "The Times of India", 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jaishankar-discusses-covid-19-with-counterparts-in-us-5-other-countries/articleshow/75702875.cms> (Accessed on 05.05.2023).

⁵⁰ Rob Huebert, *A New Cold War in the Arctic?! The Old One Never Ended!*, in "Arctic year book", 2019, <https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2019/2019-commentaries/325-a-new-cold-war-in-the-arctic-the-old-one-never-ended> (Accessed on 05.05.2023).

⁵¹ George W. Bush Warned of Not Preparing for Pandemic in 2005, ABC News, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=spcj6KUr4aA> (Accessed on 21.10.2023).

As one of the few major powers that did not openly support the US's framework for an alliance bringing together Australia and Japan, India has been an active partner in the Quad process. More importantly, India was the country that diplomatically supported the Quad the most, with the perception of its being the putative alliance of like-minded countries mainly in the Indo-Pacific. Along with the meetings held at the level of foreign ministers during the pandemic, there have been many discussions on mutual diplomatic cooperation, creating a consultative understanding channel and, more importantly, increasing collaboration⁵². In this case, this explains that despite the reluctance to take sides with the Quad, India risks incurring economic losses. However, this risk has not occurred. On the contrary, India has concluded many technology transfer settlements even during the negotiation stages of this formation⁵³.

For Japan, the Quad has been evaluated along different dimensions over the past decade. After the failure of Quad 1.0, the idea of such a grouping was in the background of Japan's foreign policy agenda until 2012⁵⁴. There is a consensus that this is due mainly to government changes in the country. Abe's article titled "Asia's Diamond of Democratic Security" was published after he regained the prime ministership in 2012⁵⁵. The claims about resources, navigation, and freedom of flight against China's assertive stance in the maritime field required the member countries of the Quad to come together again and define a strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Although Abe discovered Chinese expansionism earlier than other states, his search for an alliance was met after about five years. Of course, before this process, it had been rooted in the unsuccessful struggles of Southeast Asian states for resources against China's expansionist policies. After the tension with China following Japan's nationalization of Senakaus in 2012, Abe once again started working on developing cooperation with the countries that are party to the Quad⁵⁶. He tried to prepare the infrastructure by establishing bilateral and

⁵² Zongyou Wei, *The Evolution of the 'QUAD': Driving Forces, Impacts, and Prospects*, in "China International Strategy Review", Vol. 4, 2022, No. 2, p. 295, DOI: 10.1007/s42533-022-00119-w.

⁵³ Indrani Bagchi, *Focus on Covid in Quad Plus Meet...*

⁵⁴ Daniel Flitton, *Who Really Killed the Quad 1.0?*, in "The Interpreter", 02.06.2020, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/who-really-killed-quad-10>, (Accessed on 05.05.2023).

⁵⁵ Shinzō Abe, *Asia's Democratic Security Diamond*, in "Project Syndicate", 2012, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe> (Accessed on 05.05.2023).

⁵⁶ Kei Koga, *The Rise of China and Japan's Balancing Strategy: Critical Junctures and Policy*

trilateral dialogues with the US, India, and Australia so that Japan could make these strategic networks multilateral. Four years after the Abe government took office, the strategic landscape in East Asia changed dramatically. The growing concerns of the Japanese government, the increasing pressure from the BRI, and the subsequent economic destruction have also necessitated Japan's regional cooperation⁵⁷.

Australia, on the other hand, can be described as the most reluctant ring of the Quad. Australia has long had very close commercial, cultural, and economic relations with the US. Even though they had very close ties with China during the Quad negotiations, they decided to freeze the process in the first phase of the Quad upon China's criticism of the Quad as "Asian NATO" and the criticism of the increasing attitudes towards China in Australia⁵⁸. Even if the Quad is considered a commercial and economic structure today, it is evident that Australia's biggest allies will still be Japan and India⁵⁹. For example, within the scope of the Japan–Australia Economic Corridor, Japan's FDI seems to increase exponentially in the future. Japan has critical investments in India's technology, infrastructure, and industrial sectors. With the integration of Australia into the Sagar Mala project in 2020, the dependency on China for the supply chain was also reduced. In addition, given India's action-oriented security and growth initiatives, the trade volume between Australia and India has exceeded \$22 billion recently. Australia is also present in all tripartite table meetings formed by India⁶⁰. In short, India's foreign policy is focused on choosing Australia as a partner in these regional policies. But Australia doesn't put all its eggs in one basket for various reasons⁶¹. The first of these reasons is its very close trade relations with China. Secondly, China is active in almost all of Australia's domestic markets. All 5G investments come from China.

Shifts in the 2010s, in "Journal of Contemporary China", Vol. 25, 2016, No. 101, p. 780, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1160520.

⁵⁷ Brendon J. Cannon, Ash Rossiter, *Locating the Quad: Informality, Institutional Flexibility, and Future Alignment in the Indo-Pacific*, in "International Politics", 2022, p. 5, DOI: 10.1057/s41311-022-00383-y.

⁵⁸ Sarkar, *China and QUAD 2.0...*, p. 121.

⁵⁹ Sullivan De Estrada, *India and Order Transition in the Indo-Pacific...*, p. 379.

⁶⁰ David Walton, *Australia and the Quad*, in "East Asian Policy", Vol. 14, 2022, No. 1, p. 40, DOI: 10.1142/S1793930522000034.

⁶¹ Henry Storey, *Why Australia Shouldn't Put All Its Eggs in the Quad Basket*, in "The Interpreter", 2022, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-australia-shouldn-t-put-all-its-eggs-quad-basket> (Accessed on 01.06.2023).

The Huawei company is building the foundation of the entire national infrastructure technology⁶². Moreover, this situation severely pressures the Australian government, which is a vulnerability for Australia. The main objective of Australia's becoming a party to the Quad was to try to suppress China commercially⁶³.

Thirdly, considering Australia is the country that is farthest from the war in the current system, it is about being in a military formation for no reason in a possible alliance, in its integrity, when there is no danger. In this case, a threat element will inevitably be pulled over them. Against Quad, however, Australia has a different perspective. While other states are directly involved in the problems in Indo-Pacific, Australia is reluctant to prioritize these issues as it is under the umbrella of influence due to themselves.

Finally, a key question mark for Australia is the possible impact of the tripartite security arrangement known in the region as AUKUS on Australia's role in the Quad. AUKUS is broadly a military and technological advancement plan that encompasses Australia's mechanisms for procuring nuclear-powered submarines and explicitly intensifies Australia's deterrence capability in the face of the growing dangers of Chinese naval power⁶⁴. The problem here is not the structure of AUKUS but the danger of the Quad evolving into such a structure. Indeed, AUKUS is founded on the same ideals as Quad⁶⁵. So increasing the number of mini-sided engagements designed to complement each other with a comparable sense of purpose means bringing more countries under one concerned roof to stabilize and deter China.

The initial reactions from the state parties to the formation process of Quad 2.0 revolved around the need for greater policy coordination by understanding the strategic position of the power of the member states. Also, while Australia, Japan, and the USA expressed their willingness to continue the Quad in the first place, India remained silent about its format and continuity⁶⁶. In addition, even when the free and open Indo-Pacific term is used again by Australia and India in the first place, it does not make sense in terms of their policy, understanding that they would be involved in such a formation in the military and technical field, even though they did not encounter any terminological technical problems⁶⁷. Moreover,

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Walton, *Australia and the Quad...*, p. 41.

⁶⁴ Shakthi De Silva, *Quad 2.0: Australia's Reaction to the 'China Threat,'* in "Journal of Strategic and Global Studies", Vol. 6, 2023, No. 1, p. 17, DOI: 10.7454/jsrgs.v6i1.1103.

⁶⁵ Walton, *Australia and the Quad...*, p. 45.

⁶⁶ Kei Koga, *Japan and the Development of Quadrilateral Cooperation...*, p. 171.

⁶⁷ Tanvi Madan, *The Quad as a Security Actor*, in "Asia Policy", Vol. 29, No. 4, 2022, p. 52, DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0065.

the past Quad has already begun to be referred to by terms such as Quad Plus, Quad 3.0. With the resulting synergy, it is of vital importance to the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. The idea of such a multi-faceted expansion of the Quad will be realized largely when like-minded countries adopt this vision.

CONCLUSIONS

The Quad's effort to strengthen alliances in the Indo-Pacific region has increased over the past few years. It pushes China, which is rising and increasing the expansionism of the four countries, to create multiple mini-sided platforms to constrain it in both security and economic dimensions. China's decision-makers and analysts are also aware of this situation. China is aware that in the case of Quad 2.0 and Quad 3.0 in the future, there will be severe blocking in Indo-Pacific. This blocking will hinder China's plans within the framework of BRI programs economically and militarily. Conversely, the state parties in the Quad intend to make the Quad more functional in various agendas to collectively counter China's military and economic power in a new formation with the experience China gained in the past coalition with Quad 2.0. In this respect, this Quad may turn into a configuration like Quad 3.0 in the future.

The authors examined the efforts of the Quad countries to balance China with mini-lateral coordination in the Indo-Pacific region in the context of the dangers posed by the evolution of Chinese expansionism from the past to the present. But, of course, such a formation is not strategically isolated and independent; however, in the context of the US–Chinese rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, the intensifying economic war due to this situation pushes China to take more cautious and sharper steps against the Quad. In this regard, while China uses the divide-and-rule tactic, it also tries to hinder the Quad's development by improving its bilateral trade relations with these countries, either by coercion or menace. While examining China's relations with other states, it is necessary to consider China's debt trap diplomacy by assuming that while establishing various relations against the Quad, at the same time, it tries to create mini and multilateral platforms with other states in Indo-Pacific. Various cooperation and strategic alliances with other states in the Indo-Pacific are also a result of these policies. China's ultimate suppression policy on Sri Lanka and its economic corridors up to the countries party to the Arabian Sea in the context of China–Pakistan are steps taken in line with China's aim to counter the Quad with alternative sources and means to BRI.

So, how does the re-emergence of Quad 2.0 under the leadership of the US and the increasing oppressive influence of China in the region affect the order in the Indo-Pacific? Three scenarios can be suggested for the following periods. First, the Quad's non-military cooperation could result in China being labeled as a military challenge to the US regional rule-based order in the coming years. This situation justifies the perception that China has created Quad 2.0, even Quad 3.0, to limit itself. From a realist paradigm, the vision of hegemonic competition and even non-military issues will accelerate the cooperation developed in Quad 2.0. Secondly, it will result in China's suppression of other states in the region to increase its influence; on the other hand, developing its economic relations with Japan, Australia, and India will deter this formation economically so that it should not pose a danger to itself through mini and multilateral economic cooperation. The reaction of the public in Australia to Quad 2.0, the changes in the expectations of the Japanese public about the Quad after Abe's assassination, the efforts to increase its effectiveness in the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization in India, China's efforts in the countries that are party to the Quad suggest that China might use its economic power to destabilize in the future. China's broader economic relations with these states than those of the the USA also support this argument. The last scenario is related to China's suppression of possible parties to Quad 3.0, dragging the current order into an environment of conflict and, in this way, its effort to suppress the Quad. The Taiwanese attitudes toward China and the US almost brought about a hot war. In the context of the BRI, China's economic corridors stretching from Kuala Lumpur to Jakarta also endanger the trade routes of the state parties to Quad 2.0. A tense environment is also developing in the context of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. In the event of a possible conflict in the future, the parties in Quad 2.0 being involved in such a conflict may push China and other states in the region to have disagreements with the countries that are parties to Quad 2.0. A more collaborative order emerges in the first two scenarios, but the last scenario may further strain the current political environment.

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BUKOVINIAN SPIRITUALITY: THE CHURCH OF 'SAINT GEORGE THE GREAT MARTYR' OF THE 'SAINT JOHN THE NEW OF SUCEAVA' MONASTERY

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Abstract: *Literature that focuses on the monasteries and places of worship in Bukovina contributes to a higher understanding of this region's spiritual/religious magnetism. The work under review - "The Church of 'Saint George the Great Martyr' of 'Saint John the New of Suceava' Monastery. History, Faith, Culture and Civilization" by Vasile M. Demciuc, PhD, is an excellent example of such writing. Thanks to the author's efforts readers gain knowledge about the architectural ensemble's historical setting, the founders, inscriptions, iconostasis (Moldavian Baroque style), architecture, altar, or nave, the external painting which was severely damaged during the Habsburg period and largely covered by a thick layer of plaster.*

Keywords: *Bukovina; monasteries; churches; Saint Ioan; Saint George; medieval architectural landmarks; Moldavia.*

Rezumat: *Spiritualitate bucovineană: Biserica „Sfântul Mare Mucenic Gheorghe” a Mănăstirii „Sfântul Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava”. Istorie, credință. cultură și civilizație. O literatură a mănăstirilor și locașurilor de cult din Bucovina (Romania) ne facilitează mai buna înțelegere a magnetismului spiritual/religios al acestei regiuni. În respectiva categorie de literatură se încadrează și lucrarea asupra căreia ne concentrăm atenția: Biserica "Sfântul Mare Mucenic Gheorghe" a Mănăstirii "Sfântul Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava". Istorie, credință, cultură și civilizație, semnată de Arhid. dr. Vasile M. Demciuc. Prin efortul autorului, cititorii vor afla date și informații privind încadrarea ansamblului arhitectural în contextul istoric, despre ctitori, pisanie, iconostas (care aparține stilului*

baroc moldovenesc), arhitectură, altar ori naos. Se adaugă la acestea și un aspect nefericit: pictura exterioară a fost sever deteriorată în perioada habsburgică, în plus fiind și în mare parte acoperită cu strat gros de tencuială.

Romania, in almost its entirety, is an Orthodox territory; however, it must be said that the region of Bukovina is unique in this regard. Bukovina, also known as *Moldova de Sus* (Upper Moldavia), genuinely emerged onto the stage of history in the second half of the 14th century. It is the heart of Moldavia's feudal state, created in 1359, and includes the regions of Chernivtsi and Suceava. From the mid-14th century to the end of the 18th century, the northern part of this region was marked by an intense Romanian life, manifested through institutions and places of worship/culture. An active spiritual life evolved in this area, with a particular emphasis on renowned monasteries, such as Putna, Moldovița, Sucevița, Voroneț, Arbore, Solca, Dragomirna, etc. The Byzantine influences and those brought from Western Europe are prevalent in the impressive medieval architectural monuments, many built in the 15th and 16th centuries with the financial contributions of Moldavian rulers and boyars and especially with the efforts of the population. Millions of people visit Bukovina each year, both from within the country and from abroad, to admire the beauty and natural riches and take in the various Austro-Hungarian influences that can be sensed from the first moments of a visit. The cultural and historical settlements and the hospitality of the inhabitants, among countless other reasons, are the factors when labelling the region as "Sweet and Holy Bukovina". However, what truly sets this territory apart is the remarkable number of monasteries and places of worship. In connection with this, new literary works are constantly generated to help readers better grasp the region's spiritual and religious magnetism.

Such an example is "The Church of 'Saint George the Great Martyr' of 'Saint John the New of Suceava' Monastery. History, Faith, Culture and Civilization", by Vasile M. Demciuc, Assistant Professor at Stefan cel Mare University of Suceava's Faculty of History and Geography.¹ We must mention that the author has older scientific concerns related to the monastery of St. John in Suceava and its spiritual

¹ Vasile M. Demciuc, *Biserica „Sfântul Mare Mucenic Gheorghe” a Mănăstirii „Sfântul Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava”. Istorie, credință. cultură și civilizație* [The Church of 'Saint George the Great Martyr' of 'Saint John the New of Suceava' Monastery. History, Faith, Culture and Civilization], Bucharest, Crimca Publishing House, 2022, 197 p.

patron². Archdeacon Vasile M. Demciuc holds a Ph. D. in History (1994) and a double bachelor's degree in history-Geography (1983) and Theology (1995). He has had a remarkable career as a museum curator, university lecturer, and director of the Department of Human and Social-Political Sciences at Stefan cel Mare University of Suceava's Faculty of History and Geography. He was also the Chief Counsellor of the County Inspectorate for Culture in Suceava before becoming the Director of the County Directorate for Culture, Religions, and National Heritage (Suceava). He has won several awards and honours for his achievements. Archdeacon Demciuc has authored numerous articles, studies, monographs, and books about local and national personalities, as well as monuments in the former Byzantine region³. He has been a counsellor in the Archdiocese of Suceava and Rădăuți's Heritage department since August 1, 2020.

The work indicates that the 16th century is the historical reference segment for the construction of the Church 'Saint George the Great Martyr' located at the centre of the architectural ensemble of the Monastery 'Saint John the New of Suceava', founded by prominent Musatine Dynasty representatives, Bogdan III (1504-1517) and Stefan Vodă (1517-1527), direct descendants of the Voivode (Prince) of Moldavia, Stephen the Great.

The author positioned the architectural ensemble in the context of Moldavia's geopolitical situation at the beginning of the 16th century, which was influenced by the great empires of southeastern Europe. Professor Demciuc emphasized the political and military involvement of the two rulers who led the country of Moldavia during that period, as they were worthy successors of the great Voivode Stephen the Great, who played a significant role in the history of his time. "What Stephen the Great achieved in terms of diplomacy and military affairs remained unchanged during the reigns of his son and grandson", noted Vasile M. Demciuc.

² Idem, *Sfântul Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava* [Saint John the New of Suceava], 2nd edition, Jassy, Doxologia Publishing House, 2012, 140 p.

³ In this respect, we mention only his recent representative books: Vasile M. Demciuc, *Cappadocia. Istorie, credință, artă și civilizație bizantină* [Cappadocia. Byzantine History, Faith, Art, and Civilization], Bucharest, Basilica Publishing House, 2020, 744 p.; Idem, *Dicționar de artă și civilizație medievală* [Dictionary of Medieval Art and Civilization], 2nd edition, Jassy, Vasiliana '98 Publishing House, 2019, 256 p.; Idem, *Yusuf Koç church - Göreme*, Opera Magna Publishing House, Jassy, 2018, 75 p.; Idem, *Trapezunt – fascinație și reper spiritual bizantin* [Trebizond – fascination and Byzantine spiritual landmark], Bucharest, Basilica Publishing House, 2014, 309 p.

The work's organized material includes significant events as well as a variety of data and information about:

- *Foundations and Inscriptions*: The inscription placed above the entrance door of the church narthex, written in Old Slavonic, reveals that the construction of the Church 'Saint George the Great Martyr' was begun by Bogdan III and finished by Ștefăniță Vodă.

- *The iconostasis*, belonging to the Moldavian Baroque style.

- *The former metropolitan cathedral's architecture*. It included besides the Church, the Bell Tower and the Metropolitan's Ecclesiary of Anastasie Crimca.

- *The frescoes that decorate the church* offer undeniable testimony to Moldavian craftsmen's impressive display of creative force during Petru Rareș's reign.

- *The altar*, which in its upper part houses the customary fresco with medallions of saints.

- *The nave*. Stylistically, the painting in the nave is the most representative; according to the author, "the tendency to amplify the forms in the mural painting of previous churches reaches its zenith."

The author noted the unfortunate aspect concerning "The exterior painting executed in continuation of the interior one, which lent splendour to the Suceava Metropolitan Cathedral, suffered significant damage during the Habsburg period when it was largely covered with layers of plaster. Furthermore, to enhance the adherence of the new plaster layer, the previously painted plaster was struck with a hammer, as revealed during the recent restoration and conservation efforts of the exterior painting."

It is worth noting that Archdeacon Vasile M. Demciuc, as a servant of the Holy Altar, has skilfully described, based on the foundation of the Holy Scriptures and the pictorial tradition, iconographic scenes that have survived to the present day. These descriptions are rich in symbols and theological connotations, making them accessible and useful for the reader.

In this perspective, we note that the architectural context behind the Cross symbolizes the wall of Jerusalem. This particularity emphasizes that Christ was crucified outside the city but simultaneously conveys a profound spiritual idea: just as Christ suffered outside the gates of Jerusalem, so must Christians follow Him and go beyond the walls to discover Him.

It is also worth noting that, by examining the church life in Moldavia at the beginning of the 16th century, Professor Demciuc managed to highlight the contribution of those who succeeded Stephen the Great and completed

construction works that he had left unfinished. This also includes the aspect of equipping these structures. According to Professor Demciuc, Bogdan III was successful in completing what remained unfinished by his father in terms of church construction.

Notwithstanding all the author's strengths emphasized here, the value of the work may have been enhanced concerning the discussed theme if the author had additionally focused on meanings and implications pertinent to our modern times, and the immediate relevance. They could have started with the opportunity that the Church now provides to society, its many contributions to life and continued existence, and so on.

A subsequent investigation on this topic would be appropriate to address the pilgrimages to holy places and the broader phenomenon of religious tourism that defines the Bukovina region. Along with refining the structuring of the text, it would be equally beneficial for the English and French summaries to be accompanied by a Romanian version, which is now missing from this book.

Such suggestions are intended to facilitate the reader's attempt to engage with the thematic content, thereby achieving a greater understanding of the Muşatin spirit and the spirituality of Bukovina as a whole.

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- ¹ Paul Jensen, *History of the World*, New-York, University Publishing House, 2003, p. 243.
- ² Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale în istoria lumii* [International Systems in World History], Iași, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 62-63.
- ³ Stelian Tanase (coord.), *Cioran si Securitatea* [Cioran and Securitatea], Iasi, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 14.
- ⁴ Christine Sylvester, *Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR*, in "Millennium: Journal of International Studies", 1994, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 315-334.
- ⁵ Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale...*, p. 79.
- ⁶ *Australia-NATO Joint Political Declaration*, in http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_94097.htm (Accessed on 12.11.2012).
- ⁷ A. I. Denikin, *Put' russkogo ofitsera* [The Way of a Russian Officer], Moskva, Sovremennik, 1991, p. 58.

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